


The Princeton Theological Review



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The Princeton Theological Review

JANUARY 1927

THE NAMES OF GOD IN THE PSALMS

The importance of fixing the approximate date and probable authorship of the Psalms arises largely from the bearing of these matters upon the history and religion of Israel. The prophetic authorization of the Canon and the trustworthiness of the historic records depend, also, in large measure upon the time at which the Psalms were written. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the most virulent and persistent attacks upon the traditional view of the time of the composition of the Old Testament books has been made upon these great lyrical productions. If the headings of the Psalms be reliable, then there can be no doubt that many of the Psalms (seventy-three to be exact) were composed by David, the sweet psalmist of Israel. The main attack of the radical critics on the Psalms, therefore, has been upon the veracity of the headings. In two recent articles on "The Headings of the Psalms,"¹ I have endeavored to show on the ground of the testimony of the Hebrew manuscripts, of the ancient versions, of the language of the headings, and of the contents of the Psalms themselves, that there is no good reason for concluding that they are not what the *prima facie* evidence indicates. In these articles, I pointed out the inconclusiveness of such arguments for late date as are derived from the presence of the words "synagogue" and "captivity," and referred also to the false claim of lateness based upon the presence of alleged Aramaisms in certain of the Psalms. This matter of Aramaisms I have also discussed at length² with a view to proving

¹ In this REVIEW for 1926, pp. 1-37, 353-395.

² In an article, "The Aramaisms in the Old Testament," in this REVIEW for 1925, pp. 234-266.

that Aramaisms are not an indication of the lateness of a Hebrew document and that most of the alleged Aramaisms are not Aramaisms at all.

The most important of the alleged evidence in favor of the lateness of many of the Psalms that still remains to be considered is that which is based on the names for Deity employed in them. It is my purpose in this article to investigate the use of these names in the Psalter, and the bearing of their use upon the date and authorship of the Psalms in which they are found. But before doing this attention must be called to four studies which I have already published upon the general subject of the names and designations of the Deity, which may be regarded as preparatory to the present investigation. The first of these, entitled "The Use of 'God' and 'Lord' in the Koran," shows that every kind of variation in the use of the designations of the Deity that is met with in the Bible is found also in the Koran. Since these variations do not controvert the unity of the Koran, so, also, they do not overthrow the unity of the Pentateuch. The other articles are entitled "Use of the Words for God in the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical Literature of the Jews," "The Names of God in the Old Testament" and "The Names for God in the New Testament."³ From the collections of designations given in these articles, we learn that most of the arguments based upon the use of the words for God in the documents of the Old Testament are specious and inconclusive, because the induction of the facts in evidence was incomplete. While the evidence does not show, in every case, that the critics are wrong, it does show that the Bible cannot be proved to be wrong. This is sufficient to justify our belief in the substantial veracity of the Scriptures. For it cannot be demanded of us that we should explain all the apparent inconsistencies or alleged inaccuracies of any author or document. The *prima*

³ These articles were all published in this REVIEW for 1919-1921, and are based upon a complete collection gathered from concordances and a reading of the books themselves, where no concordances had been made, with special reference to the ancient versions.

facie evidence of the Psalms and of their headings is confirmed by the evidence derived from palaeography, philology, and history; and the critics have no right to reject this evidence simply because it does not please them or because they do not understand it, or because they cannot explain it. Does the use of the names for God in the Psalter discredit the headings, or make it impossible to maintain that it was completed before the year four hundred B.C.? This is the question which we shall now consider.

First, let me present in tabular form the number of times the principal words and phrases for God occur in the five books of the Psalter.

		JEHOVAH	ADONAI	ELOHIM	ELOAH	EL	ELYON	SHADDAI
Book	I	271	12	20	1	11	4	0
"	II	26	14	155	1	5	3	1
"	III	43	14	44	0	14	9	0
"	IV	101	1	6	0	4	4	1
"	V	223	4	9	1	6	1	0
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		664	45	234	3	40	21	2 ⁴

I shall now proceed to discuss the use of: (1) Adonai and Jehovah; (2) Elohim and Jehovah; (3) Jehovah Elohim, Jehovah Adonai and Adonai Jehovah; (4) Jah; (5) Eloah; (6) El; (7) Elyon; (8) Shaddai; (9) Sebaoth; (10) The Holy One; (11) The Name; (12) The Rock; (13) The Mighty One.

I. THE USE OF ADONAI AND JEHOVAH

In the Bampton Lectures for 1889,⁵ Professor Cheyne says "it is our duty to enter into the feelings of those who in certain passages changed 'Yahweh' (Jehovah) into 'Elohim' (God), and of those who afterwards by degrees substituted 'Adonai' (the Lord) for 'Yahweh'."⁶ If by this "substitu-

⁴ Complete tables of names for God for the whole Old Testament will be found in this REVIEW for 1920, pp. 461-472.

⁵ T. K. Cheyne, *The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter in the Light of Old Testament Criticism and the History of Religions* (1891). Wherever Cheyne is cited the references are to this book.

⁶ P. 287.

tion" of Adonai for Jehovah be meant merely that the Jews, at some time after the Old Testament books were written, came to *pronounce* and afterwards to *point* the Tetragrammaton (Jehovah), when standing alone, as if it were written Adonai, he is certainly correct. But if he meant that a written Adonai was substituted intentionally, or frequently, for a written Jehovah, the evidence seems to me to be decisively against him. That he did think, however, that the presence of a written Adonai in a document was a proof of the late date of the original document itself and not merely an evidence of a possible change made by a copyist, is manifest from the fact that he says that Psalm ii. "is post-Davidic because of Adonai which belongs to the prophetic literature"⁷ and that if Adonai in Ps. xvi. "means the Lord (absolutely), as Delitzsch assumes, the Psalm is post-Davidic, if not post-exilic."⁸

There are three or four reasons why we cannot accept the statement that the use of Adonai is a sign of the lateness of a document:

1. The Egyptians and Babylonians both addressed the gods as *Lord*. Thus in the "Tale of the Two Brothers" the younger addresses Ra-Harmachis: O my good Lord (*neb*). In the "Festival Songs of Isis and Nephthys," Osiris is called Lord (*neb*).⁹ In the *Tel Amarna Letters*, the king of Egypt is called "my Lord (*bêlia*), my God, my Sun."¹⁰ In the Code of Hammurabi, Marduk is called "Lord" (*bêl*).¹¹

2. In Phoenician, "lord" (𐤊𐤍) is a favorite appellation of Eshmun, Baal and Baalshamim.¹²

⁷ P. 463.

⁸ P. 465. By "absolutely," Delitzsch means as an expression for Lord rather than my Lord, compare the English Milord as used in some of the older novelists.

⁹ See Budge, *Egyptian Reading Book*, 13. 2, 50. 3.

¹⁰ See my article in this REVIEW for 1905 on the "Titles of the Kings in Antiquity" and also The Tel-el-Amarna Letters by Winckler, or by Knudtzon.

¹¹ See Harper, *Code of Hammurabi*.

¹² See Lidzbarski, *N. S. Epigraphik* p. 152, and Schröder, *Die Phönizische Sprache*, pp. 226, 228 et pas.

3. In the Old Testament, "Lord" (אֲדֹנָי) is used of God in J (Gen. xviii. 3, 27, 30, 31, 32, xix. 18, Ex. iv. 10, 13, v. 22), E (Gen. xx. 4, Ex. xv. 17), JE (Ex. xxxiv. 9 *bis*, Num. xiv. 17, Josh. vii. 8). Besides, it is found twice in Judges, 4 times in Kings, 22 times in Is. i-xxxix and only once in Is. xl-lxvi, 4 times in Ezekiel, 4 times in Amos, and once each in Micah and Zechariah. It occurs 14 times in Lam. i-iii, 11 times in Daniel's prayer (and also in i. 2) and also in Mal. i. 14, Ezra x. 3, Neh. i. 11, iv. 8. In the Psalms it occurs 12 times in Book I, 14 in Book II, 14 in Book III (9 of them in Ps. lxxxvi), once in Book IV, and 4 times in Book V; *i.e.* 45 times in the Psalter and 80 times in all the other books together.

4. Furthermore the evidence of the Hebrew manuscripts does not support the supposition that the tendency of the scribes and copyists was to change an earlier *Jehovah* into an *Adonai*. For example, in 158 out of 272 manuscripts of the Psalms collated in Kennicott, the number of times that *Adonai* is changed to *Jehovah* in a single MS. varies from 1 up to 37 of the 45 occurrences of *Adonai* in the Psalter, making 987 variations out of 12240 possibilities; whereas in 118 out of 272 MSS. *Jehovah* is changed to *Adonai* from 1 to 61 times out of 664 cases of the occurrence of *Jehovah*, making 195 variations out of 180,608 possibilities.¹³ That is, in one out of 12 possible cases *Adonai* has been changed, in one MS. or another, to *Jehovah*; whereas in only one case out of 926 has *Jehovah* been changed to *Adonai*. There is no proof, therefore, in the Hebrew MSS. that there was a tendency or an intention to change *Jehovah* to *Adonai*, but rather the reverse.

¹³ Since the *Textus Receptus* of the Psalms contains *Adonai* 45 times and *Jehovah* 664 times, these numbers should be multiplied by 272, the number of the MSS., to get the number of the possibilities of variation in the readings. For example, of the 195 variations for the 664 occurrences, 61 occur for Ps. xxx. 9 alone, making 61 MSS. for the change and 211 against. In lxxxix. 2, we have 20 to 252 and in lxxx. 5, we have 13 to 259, but in most only 1 to 3 against 269 to 271.

5. Nor can any proof of the change of Jehovah to Adonai be derived from Hebrew documents outside the Canon nor from the versions.

a. It is well known that the Greek Septuagint ordinarily renders both Jehovah and Adonai by *κύριος*.¹⁴

b. The Syriac Peshitto commonly uses Moryo' for both Adonai and Jehovah and Aloho' for Elohim, El and Eloah; and the Latin Vulgate uses Dominus for Adonai and Jehovah and Deus for the three words for God.

c. When we come to the Aramaic Targums, we find neither conformity nor consistency in the way the names for the Deity are rendered. Thus, the Targum of Onkelos uses יי for Elohim, Jehovah and Adonai; while that of Jonathan uses יה for the words for Lord and אלקים for Elohim. The Targum on Ecclesiastes uses יהוה for Elohim; on Proverbs אלהא for יהוה; on Job יהוה for יהוה. The Samaritan Targum transliterates Jehovah.

d. The Hebrew of Ecclesiasticus never has Adonai (though אדון is used 4 times). It has אלה 3 times; אלהים, 25 times; and יי 53 times. In view of the uncertainty of the abbreviations of the Targums, it is impossible to determine whether these Yodhs of Ben Sira stood for one or both of the names for Lord.¹⁵

e. The Zadokite Fragments never use Adon, Adonai, Jehovah nor any abbreviation for them. Elohim and Eloah, also, are never used. But El occurs 59 times.¹⁶

f. Jehovah, as the name of the God of Israel, occurs in line 18 of the Moabite inscription of Mesha, dating from

¹⁴ Thus *κύριος* renders Adonai about 100 times and *θεός* at most 4; Jehovah is rendered by *κύριος* over 6000 times and by *θεός* 165 (31 with variant readings in Greek); Elohim by *κύριος* 88 times (and with variant readings about 115 more) and by *θεός* over 1000; El by *κύριος* 44 times and by *θεός* 140; Eloah by *κύριος* 20 times (all in Job) and by *θεός* 24.

¹⁵ This information comes from a concordance on the Hebrew of Ben Sira which I have prepared.

¹⁶ These statements are based on a concordance which I have.

about 850 B.C.,¹⁷ and יהוה a number of times in the Egypto-Aramaic papyri of the 5th century B.C.¹⁸

In view of the preponderance and the quality of the above testimony the conclusion seems inevitable that in every case of the occurrence of Adonai in the Psalter, the *Textus Receptus* is probably correct; and that there is in no case more than a bare possibility that it is wrong.

II. THE USE OF ELOHIM AND JEHOVAH

It was the claim of Dr. Driver that

The exceptional preponderance of *Elohim* over *Jehovah* in Book II (Ps. xlii-lxxii) and Ps. lxxiii-lxxxiii, cannot be attributed to a preference of the authors of these Psalms for the former name; not only is such a supposition improbable in itself, but it is precluded by the occurrence of the *same two* Psalms, in the double recension just spoken of, once with *Jehovah* (Ps. xiv.; xl. 13-17) and once with *Elohim* (Ps. liii; lxx.): it must be due to the fact that Book II and Ps. lxxiii-lxxxiii have passed through the hands of a compiler who *changed* "Jehovah" of the original author into "Elohim." The reason of this change probably is that at the time when this compiler lived there was a current preference for the latter name (comp. the exclusive use of the same name in Ecclesiastes, and the preference shown for it by the Chronicler).¹⁹

Since Professors Cheyne, Driver, *et al*, claim that this use of Elohim instead of Jehovah is a proof of the lateness of the Psalms in which Elohim occurs, what becomes of their theory that E (the Elohist document) is the earliest part of the Hexateuch and one of the oldest documents of the whole Old Testament? Again, if the editors of the second and third Books of the Psalms changed Jehovah to Elohim for subjective reasons, why may not the author, or editor, of Gen. i have changed Jehovah to Elohim? Again, if Elohim be a sign of lateness, why does Haggai have Jehovah 28 times and never Elohim? Why does Zechariah have Jehovah

¹⁷ See Lidzbarski, *N. S. Epigraphik*, and Nordlander, *Die Inschrift des Königs Mesa von Moab*.

¹⁸ Thus in the *Aramäische Papyrus* of Sachau I. 6, II. 15, 24, 26, 27, III. Ob. 7, 24, 25, IV. 5, 8, XII. 1, XVIII. K. 2, 1, XX. K. 7, 4, XXXII. 36, 4, XXXVII. 43, Ob. 2. LX. 15, and in Cowley's *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century, B.C.* 19 times.

¹⁹ See *The Literature of the Old Testament* (abbrev. LOT), pp. 371-372.

143 times and Elohim only once? Why does Malachi have Jehovah 46 times and Elohim but once? Why is Job appealed to as evidence, when it has Jehovah 32 times and Elohim only 16? Why does Chronicles have Jehovah 547 times and Elohim only 120 times, or Ezra have Jehovah 57 times and Elohim but 13? And why does the Greek of Ecclesiasticus written in 180 B.C. have Lord 214 times and God only 11, and the Hebrew of Ecclesiasticus have יי (i.e. Jehovah) 53 times and Elohim only 22? Why does Pirke Aboth use Jehovah 8 times and Elohim but 4? And why does the Aramaic Targum of Ecclesiastes always have יהוה for the Hebrew Elohim? That the evidence is for individual, rather than for current preference, appears, also, from the fact that the author of Ecclesiastes uses Elohim 40 times and Jehovah never; that the author of Gen. i-ii. 3 uses Elohim 35 times and Jehovah never (i.e. if this passage belongs to P and if P is late); that the author of the Letter of Aristaeus uses God 105 times and Lord but once; that 4 Maccabees used God 40 times and Lord never; that the third Book of the Sibylline Oracles uses God 41 times and Lord never; and that Tobit, Esdras, Judith, 1, 2 and 3 Maccabees, and 4 Enoch never use Jehovah. In fact this evidence indicates that this argument for individual rather than for current preference was valid all through the centuries. But in view, especially, of the fact that according to the critics the E document always uses Elohim and P always uses it up to Ex. vi. 3, it is inconsistent for the critics to say that a preference for Elohim over Jehovah cannot be attributed to the author of the Elohistc psalms or that such a preference is "improbable in itself," even if these psalms were written at an early date. For anyone who claims that the E document of the Hexateuch used only Elohim and the J document only Jehovah must admit that there may have been psalmists living in the same time as the authors or redactors of J and E who used only Elohim or Jehovah.

As far as Psalms xiv. and liii. are concerned there is more

evidence in the MSS. and versions that Elohim was changed by scribes to Jehovah than contrariwise.²⁰ That late writers may have preferred Lord to God is abundantly shown by the following table:

	ESD.	SIRA (LXX)	AZARIAH	5 ENOCH	ODES OF SOL.	BARUCH (LXX)
Lord	95	194	43	37	93	32
God	16	11	2	1	11	3

That other late writers preferred God to Lord we have shown above. That others may have preferred to use both is clear from the following table:

		XII	SUSANNAH		PSALMS	ASSUMP.	
	JUB.	PAT.	(LXX)	(THEOD.)	OF SOL.	I BAR.	OF MOSES
Lord	184	229	98	83	105	25	19
God	73	124	77	99	112	29	15

That some writers used neither Elohim nor Jehovah is shown by Esther, the Song of Songs, Judith, 1, 2, 3 Mac-cabees and by the Zadokite Fragments. Any "current preference" for either name from the earliest literary period of the critics' own devising (850-700 B.C.) down to 135 A.D. is, therefore, ruled out by the evidence. *Individual* preferences there were, but *current* preferences not. The Chronicler does not show such a preference as Dr. Driver claimed that he did. A comparison between Chronicles and Samuel-Kings in both the parallel and non-parallel passages gives the following results. In the parallel passages Elohim occurs in Chronicles 80 times and Jehovah 220, whereas in Samuel-Kings Elohim occurs 31 times and Jehovah 302 times; but in the non-parallel passages of Chronicles, Elohim occurs 76 times and Jehovah 327 times, whereas in Samuel-Kings, Elohim occurs 97 times and Jehovah 383 times. When we

²⁰ Thus, for the four Jehovahs in Ps. xiv. two MSS. give Elohim in vs. 4 and one in vs. 7, whereas for the Elohim in Ps. liii thirteen MSS. give Jehovah in vs. 5, one in vs. 6a, one in 6b, and eight in vs. 7. The Targum to xiv. gives יי not merely for Jehovah but also for the Elohim of vs. 5 and in liii. for the Elohim of vss. 3, 5, 6b and 7. The Syriac always has Lord in xiv. and also in liii. 7. The LXX agrees with the Hebrew *Textus Receptus* except in liii. 7 where it has Lord for God. The Latin always has *Dominus* in xiv. and also in liii. 5, 6b and 7.

remember that all but some half dozen of the changes from the Jehovah of Samuel-Kings are not into Elohim but into Ha-Elohim the assumption of numerous, or consistent, preferential changes on the part of the compiler of Chronicles (or even of a copier) is rendered the more absurd.

In view, then, of the above evidence it would seem best to postpone an attempt to account on grounds other than the individual preference of the respective authors for the use in Books II and III of the Psalter, of Elohim instead of Jehovah. Until it shall be proven by sufficient objective evidence, such as manuscripts and versions, that such changes were made, and by whom they were made, it seems futile to attempt a solution.

III. JEHOVAH ELOHIM, JEHOVAH ADONAI AND ADONAI JEHOVAH

1. In the Psalms, the combination Jehovah Elohim occurs only in lxxxiv. 12; and yet, Professor Cheyne remarks that it "characterizes the widened theological outlook of the Persian period."²¹ This he does notwithstanding the fact that it is found 19 times in Gen. ii-iii and in Ex. ix. 30 both of which passages are assigned by the critics themselves to J, a document said to have been written somewhere about 800 B.C. It occurs, also, in 2 Sam. vii. 22, 26, 2 Kings xix. 19, Jon. iv. 6, and nine times in Chronicles. Driver follows Wellhausen in asserting that the phrase in Samuel is a mistake for אֲדֹנֵי יְהוָה. But, if it is a mistake in Samuel why not in 2 Kings xix. 19? The great versions agree in all these places with the Hebrew text. And, if the text should be changed in other places, why not in Gen. ii-iii? In other words, why not change it everywhere it suits us to change it? Why not change it in Chronicles and Jonah, also? If we do, we could say that Jehovah Elohim never occurred anywhere except in Ps. lxxxiv. 12. But then, again, what about the Jehovah Elohim of the so-called second account of the Creation in Gen. ii-iii, written according to the radical

²¹ P. 132.

critics about 800 B.C.? What, also, about "the widened theological outlook of the Persian period"?

But suppose we change some, or all, of the phrases "Jehovah Elohim" to "Adonai Jehovah" or "Jehovah Adonai," how will the argument for lateness of authorship be affected? For, Adonai Jehovah occurs in Ezekiel 217 times, in Amos 21 times, six times in 2 Samuel, twice each in Genesis, Deuteronomy, Judges, and 1 Kings, and once each in Joshua, Obadiah, Micah, Habakkuk, Zephaniah and Zechariah, 24 times in Isaiah (11 in i-xxxix and 13 in xl-lxvi), and 8 times in the Psalms—294 times in all; and Jehovah Adonai, in Hab. iii. 19, Ps. lxxviii. 21, cix. 21, cxl. 8, cxli. 8. If either of these combinations is late, why does neither occur in H or P, nor in Job, Jonah or Joel? Are we to cut Adonai Jehovah out of Deut., Judges, Samuel, Kings, Amos (21 times!), Micah, Habakkuk, Zephaniah and the first part of Isaiah, just to support a theory? Such conduct would be destructive of all the *prima facie* evidence of every document ever written and would reduce textual criticism to an absurdity. As to Jehovah Adonai, it can perhaps only be said that the evidence is not sufficient to justify any argument as to the date of any of the psalms; but the one occurrence in Hab. iii. 19 certainly does not support the conclusion that the combination favors the Maccabean period for the authorship of any of them.

2. That the combination "Lord God" was used in the older documents is confirmed by the fact that it occurs frequently in the extra-canonical books. Thus Tobit used it 4 times, 1 Esdras 2, Judith 4, Bel and the Dragon 7, 2 Macc. 2, 3 Mac. 1, and 1 Bar. 16 times. Besides, the pseudepigraphical works use it as follows: Ahikar (Syr) once, Jubilees, 27 times, XII Patriarchs 3, Psalms of Solomon 1, 3 Macc. 1, Secrets of Enoch 7, 2 Bar. 4, and 4 Ezra 8 times. And lastly, in the New Testament, we find it in Mat. 3 times, Mark 2, 1 Pet. 1, Luke 5, Acts 3, Jude 1, and Revelation 46 times. This evidence seems to show that the "widened outlook" extended all through the Hebrew literature

from Moses, or certainly from Samuel and Kings, to the second century, A.D.

3. Not much of an argument for date can be derived from the "Adonai Elohai" of Ps. lxxxvi. 12. Adonai Elohim occurs only in Dan. ix. 3 and Adonai followed by our God, etc., seems to be confined to Dan. ix. Thirty-four MSS. read Jehovah instead of Adonai in Ps. lxxxvi. 12. The versions, it must be remembered, as also the works preserved only in Greek, Syriac, Aramaic, Latin, and Ethiopic, do not distinguish between Jehovah and Adonai, rendering both of them by the same words for Lord.

IV. THE USE OF JAH OR YAH

As to the date of Psalm lxviii Professor Cheyne says: "Pre-Exilic it cannot be. . . . It was written either towards the close of the Exile, or during one of the dynastic wars between Egypt and Syria for the possession of Palestine; either in the sixth century (more precisely, a little before the defeat of Croesus at Sardis in 549 B.C.); or in the third (probably between 220 and 217, or between 203 and 198 B.C.)."²²

One of the main arguments for the exilic, or post-exilic, date of Ps. lxviii is derived from the use of many different words for God. Thus, Cheyne says that "יה" occurs perhaps in v. 5 of the psalm (lxviii), and certainly in v. 19; also in Ex. xv. 2, xvii. 16 (the first of which may be, and the second must be, Pre-Exilic); and in Cant. viii. 6 (which may be Pre-Exilic); but also forty-two times in Biblical passages which on various other grounds are all most probably (I speak within bounds) either Exilic or Post-Exilic."²³

The following points are to be noted:

1. Yah in lxviii. 5 occurs in all the Hebrew MSS.²⁴ of the Psalms, and in all the primary and secondary versions. Why say that "perhaps" it occurs there?

²² Pp. 112, 113.

²³ P. 124 (note b).

²⁴ That is in all the MSS. collated in Kennicott's *Vetus Testamentum Hebraicum cum Variis Lectionibus*.

2. Psalm lxxviii is assigned to David in all the Hebrew MSS. and in all the primary and secondary versions.²⁵ The *prima facie* evidence is, therefore, all in favor of David having written it.

3. In Ex. xv. 2 and Is. xii. 2, Yah occurs in the same phrase as in Psalm cxviii. 14. The Hebrew text of Ex. xv. 1 says that the song comprising Ex. xv. 1-19 was sung by Moses and the children of Israel, after the crossing of the Red Sea. Psalm cxxii is assigned to David in the Hebrew MSS. and in most of the versions. Isa. xii. seems a fitting conclusion of the first twelve chapters of Isaiah's works. If we refuse to accept this *prima facie* evidence as to the date of these documents, we can only say in the words of Prof. Cheyne²⁶: "what means have we for fixing their date?"!

4. If Ex. xvii. 16 "must be pre-Exilic," then other documents containing Yah may also be pre-exilic. Cheyne's "must" doubtless arises from the fact that the critics assign this verse to E. This in the opinion of the critics will place the date of the verse before about 750 B.C.²⁷

5. Dillmann in his edition of Knobel's commentary on Exodus maintains that Ex. xv. 1-3 belongs to the time of Moses²⁸ and gives many grounds for concluding that the whole song was written in "high antiquity."

6. Ewald, Hengstenberg, and Delitzsch give the date of Ps. cxviii as shortly after the Exile. Murphy assigns it to the time of David, and Schultz to that of Nehemiah. Apparently, the indications of authorship and date are inconclusive.

Finally, Yah is most probably an abbreviated form of Jehovah. We find יהלליה in Ps. cii. 19, and יהללויה in cxv. 17, and יהללו יהוה in Ps. xxii. 27, Neh. v. 13. It is used in composition in the form "ya" (e.g. the "jah" in Adonijah) at the end of proper names in the Bible, and in the form "yô"

²⁵ See the evidence in my article on "The Headings of the Psalms" in this REVIEW for 1926.

²⁶ P. 31.

²⁷ Driver, LOT. p. 123

²⁸ P. 154.

(e.g. the "jo" in Joram) at the beginning of them. In the Samaritan Ostraca we find Yô at the beginning of three proper names and at the end of five.²⁹ The Egypto-Aramaic papyri give יהו for יהוה,³⁰ like the ending of the name Hezekiah in Hebrew (חזקיהו) and in Assyrian.³¹ The Targum of Jonathan abbreviates into 'ה,³² and Onkelos and other Targums into י (used often also for Adonai and Elohim), and the Hebrew of Ben Sira into יי.³³ The Samaritan Targum has יהוה for the Hebrew יה in Ex. xv. 2.³⁴ The Septuagint and Peshitto render by the same word for Lord that they use for Adonai and Jehovah. Since, according to the Samaritan Ostraca, the time when these abbreviations began was as early at least as 850 B.C., its presence in a document will certainly not favor setting the date of an original document later than that time. Besides, such an abbreviation may readily have been introduced into a copy made at a later time without witnessing to the date of the original.

V. ELOAH

Professor Cheyne says that Ps. xviii. cannot have an early date because of "the points of contact between the psalm and the so-called Song and Blessing of Moses (Deut. xxxii.)."³⁵ One of these points of contact he claims to be the name "Eloah." He speaks of the "invention or revival of the names 'Elyōn and Eloah'," as if it were a post-Deuteronomic matter;³⁶ and he states that Ps. xviii. "belongs at the earliest to the reign of Josiah, for, as Ewald suggested and

²⁹ See Lyon in *Harvard Theological Review* for 1911, p. 141.

³⁰ See Sachau, *Aramäische Papyrus* and Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century, B.C.*

³¹ See Schrader in KAT².

³² See Ginsburger, *Pseudo-Jonathan nach der Londoner Handschrift*.

³³ See both Smend's and Strack's editions of the Hebrew of Ben Sira (*Ecclesiasticus*).

³⁴ See Petermann, *Pentateuchus Samaritanus*, in loc.

³⁵ Pp. 204-205.

³⁶ P. 206.

Baethgen has carefully argued, אֱלֹהֶה was probably invented as the singular of אֱלֹהִים by the author of Deut. xxxii."³⁷

Now, there are four psalms in which the word Eloah is found, to wit: xviii. 32, l. 22, cxiv. 7 and cxxxix. 19. The 18th and 139th are in the headings ascribed to David. To show that David cannot have written them the argument is made that the author of these two psalms was dependent for the use of the singular upon Deut. xxxii. which was post-Deuteronomic and at the earliest from the time of Josiah. The author of Deut. xxxii. is said to have "invented or revived" the use of the singular, Eloah, as a designation of God.

First of all, let us refer to the *prima facie* evidence of the Scriptures themselves.

1. In the context immediately preceding Deut. xxxii., we read (Deut. xxxi. 25-30), that Moses commanded the Levites saying: "Gather unto me all the elders of your tribes and your officers [or scribes] that I may speak these words in their ears and call heaven and earth to record against them. . . . And Moses spake in the ears of all the congregation of Israel the words of this song." Then follows Deut. xxxii. 1-43. In verses 44, 46, we read that when Moses had come and spoken all the words of this song, he said: "Set your hearts unto all the words which I testify among you this day." The day, when "Moses wrote this song," we learn from xxxi. 2, 22 was the day he spake the law unto the children of Israel in the plains of Moab. The words were written as a final testimony before he died (xxxi. 14). We thus find that the date, place, occasion and purpose, or motive, of the song are explicitly given. The claim of the context of Deut. xxxii., then, clearly is that the song was composed by Moses.

Without discussing other objections that might be made to this claim, let us examine the *prima facie* evidence of the song itself. Does any one know enough, or have the evidence,

³⁷ P. 467.

to show that there are corruptions in the text, or words, or phrases, or ideas, that countervail the *prima facie* evidence of Mosaic origin? Here, let us, for lack of time confine ourselves to the words for god and demon, mentioned by Professors Baethgen, and Cheyne, i.e., *Shedim* and *Eloah*, Shaddai, 'Elyōn, Jehovah, El and Šur. All of these except *Shedim* and *Eloah* are discussed elsewhere in this article. As to *Shedim*, there is no doubt that it is the same as the Babylonian word *Shedu*, defined by Muss-Arnolt³⁸ as (a) a destructive god and (b) a protecting deity. As to *Eloah*, the earliest records in both Aramaic and Arabic (Sabean, and Minean) give it as the common word for "god." Since some of the Sabean inscriptions probably go back to the year 1600 B.C., there is no reason why Moses also may not have used it in a Hebrew document. יידי is used for God as well as *Adonim*;³⁹ and so, *Eloah* may have been used as well as *Elohim*, so far as anyone *knows*. To be sure, Baethgen states that *Eloah* has been substituted for an original *El* in Ps. xviii. 32, followed by Ps. xlv. 8; for an *Elohim* in Pss. ii, xxii and cxiv. 7; and for a *Jehovah* in Prov. xxx. 5 and Hab. iii. 3; but whether this was done, or when it was done, or why it was done, no one knows. It is pure conjecture, except that in the *present* text they differ.

2. Professor Baethgen says that it seems as if either the author of Deut. xxxii. or of Job had first coined the word *Eloah*. But since the scene of the poem of Job was the land of Uz it was natural for the author to have Eliphaz, Zophar and Elihu use the name of God to which they were accustomed, just as Daniel has Antiochus Epiphanes refer to the god of his fathers (xi. 36-39).

3. Baethgen says simply that "Ps. cxxxix. is very late," implying that this accounts for its use of *Eloah*. To be sure *Eloah* occurs twice in Ben Sira (xxxv. 13, xlv. 23) while *Elohim* is found 22 times; but it is not found in the Zadokite

³⁸ *A Concise Dictionary of the Assyrian Language*, p. 1014.

³⁹ Ex. xiii. 17, xxxiv. 23 (E), Is. i. 24, iii. 1, x. 16, 33, xix. 4, Mal. iii. 1, Ps. cxiv. 7.

Fragments. Ecclesiastes, which the critics place in the second century, B.C., has Elohim 40 times and Eloah never. We see, therefore, that the use of Eloah as against Elohim is in itself no proof of lateness.

VI. THE USE OF EL

El alone is found in the Old Testament 145 times, and 79 times in 52 combinations. It is found alone in the Pentateuch 15 times, in the Prophets 30, in the Poetical Books 95, and in the Historical Books 5 times. In the Psalms, it occurs alone 11 times in Book I, 5 in II, 14 in III, 4 in IV, and 6 in V, i.e., 40 times in all; and 54 times in Job. In combinations, it occurs 34 times in the Pentateuch, 17 in the Prophets, 17 in the Poetical Books (all in the Psalter), and 8 times in the Historical Books. Of the 17 times in the Psalms, 4 are in Book I, 3 in II, 5 in III, 3 in IV, and 2 in V. From the above enumeration, it is easy to see why no argument for the date of a psalm can be based on the use of El. It is to be noted, further, that El is the ordinary word for God in Phenician and that it is equivalent to the Babylonian *ilu* found in the earliest Babylonian inscriptions, even before Hammurabi. It is found, also, in the Aramaic inscription of Hadad from the 8th century B.C., though not used in later Aramaic except in translations and proper names. It is surprising to find it used 57 times in the Zadokite Fragments, being the only name meaning God occurring in this work. It is, thus, used in the earliest and latest works of the Old Hebrew language.

VII. THE USE OF ELYON

According to Professor Cheyne, 'Elyōn is a mark of "a late date."⁴⁰ "Not only the pre-Exile prophets and Ezekiel, but even the pre-Exile narrators, avoid this name."⁴¹ "Num. xxiv. 16 and Deut. xxxii. 8 are the only undoubtedly pre-exilic passages in which 'Elyōn occurs (Gen. xiv. 18-24 being post-exilic) and these are poetical. The first prophet who

⁴⁰ P. 75.

⁴¹ P. 84.

uses the name is *exilic* (Is. xiv. 14) and he only uses it in a poetical speech given to the king of Babylon. Post-exilic writers were specially fond of using it, or its Aramaic equivalent (see especially Daniel, Enoch, and Sirach).” Speaking of Psalms xci and xcii, Professor Cheyne says of the ‘Elyōn that it is found in the first verse of each, and that it is a mark of the late date of the Psalms.⁴²

1. In addition to the passages mentioned by Professor Cheyne in the above excerpts, ‘Elyōn occurs in 2 Sam. xxii. 14 and Lam. iii. 35, 38. Thus, not merely do pre-exilic prophets and “narrators” avoid the name, but the post-exilic as well! It will be observed, also, that in order to say that its use outside the Psalter is exilic or post-exilic, it must be assumed that Gen. xiv, Num. xxiv, Deut. xxxii, and Is. xiv are exilic, or post-exilic; and, to make its use post-exilic, that Jeremiah did not write the book of Lamentations. The evidence from Daniel is vitiated, first, by the fact that ‘Elyōn never occurs in the Hebrew of Daniel but only a corresponding word in the Aramaic; secondly, by the fact that in nine out of the fourteen cases, it is found in passages addressed to, or spoken by, or occasioned by, Nebuchadnezzar and Belshazzar. In chapter seven we find the plural form used by Daniel the same as in the case of Elohim in Hebrew. This is the only place I have found where the plural of majesty is used in Aramaic. The appropriateness of Daniel’s using the phrase Most High for God is shown by the fact that its Babylonian equivalent *šîru* was a beloved designation of the gods in the case of Nebuchadnezzar and Nabunaid. They use *šîru* of Marduk, Ninmena, Ninkanak, Ninmak, Gula; and *šaḫu* of Marduk. Besides, Jehovah, Elohim, Adonai and Shaddai are not used in any Aramaic dialect and El only in certain proper names and transliterations in versions.⁴³ For the sake of variety, Daniel might be expected to use designations of the Supreme Being found in so many

⁴² P. 73.

⁴³ In the peculiar Aramaic of the Sendschirli Inscriptions El occurs twice in Hadad. See Lidzbarski’s *Epigraphik*.

other languages, and used in documents supposed by him to have been written by Moses, David, Isaiah and Jeremiah.

2. 'Elyōn occurs, also, in Is. xiv. 14. There is, we believe, no sufficient reason for doubting that this passage on Babylon, embracing chapters xiii and xiv, was written by Isaiah. Dr. Driver, indeed, says that "the situation presupposed by this prophecy is not that of Isaiah's age";⁴⁴ and that "upon the grounds of analogy the prophecy xiii. 2-xiv. 22 can only be attributed to an author living towards the close of the exile and holding out to his contemporaries the prospect of release from Babylon, as Isaiah held out to *his* contemporaries the prospect of deliverance from Assyria." These views of Dr. Driver's are based upon the general presupposition that it was the office of the prophet of Israel to address himself to the needs of his own age "and that it was alien to the genius of prophecy . . . to base a promise upon a condition of things *not yet existent*."

There is nothing in any of these alleged reasons to entitle us to place this prophecy in the age of Nebuchadnezzar or Cyrus rather than in that of Sargon or Sennacherib. Jacob is mentioned twice in xiv. 1 and Israel in xiv. 1 and the Assyrian in xiv. 25. Babylon, it is true, is named in xiii. 1, 19, xiv. 4, 22; but, it will be remembered, that Sargon, Sennacherib and Esarhaddon, were all kings of Babylon as well as of Assyria.⁴⁵ In 689 B.C., Babylon was overthrown by Sennacherib just as "when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah" (xiii. 19). Sennacherib says in his own inscriptions,⁴⁶ that he overthrew the city of Babylon taking as booty gold, silver, precious stones, palace women, and servants, musicians, and all the troops and portable things. He surrounded the city with a cordon and filled the streets with the dead bodies of her inhabitants, small and great. He took the gods and brake them in pieces, taking away their treasures. Sennacherib's son, Esarhaddon says that the dwellings and temples had

⁴⁴ LOT, p. 212.

⁴⁵ See K B, II, 289.

⁴⁶ K B, II, 83, 84, 105, 117, 118.

been made like plowed land and the inhabitants had gone to be distributed as slaves to the yoke and chains.⁴⁷ Esarhaddon says that eleven years later he was called by Marduk to rebuild Babylon and that he rebuilt the free city, brought back from afar the Babylonians and gave them back their rights, renewing the idols of the great gods and setting them up anew in their holy places.

These differing attitudes of Sennacherib and his son Esarhaddon toward Babylon are due to the fact that there were two great political parties in Nineveh, dating as far back as the time of Tiglath-Pileser III,—the militaristic and the priestly parties.⁴⁸ Babylon was in somewhat the same relation to Assyria that Rome was to the German empire in the time of the Hohenstaufens. Babylon was the older city and her literature and her gods and temples never lost their hold upon the kindred people of Assyria nor upon its kings. Isaiah was perfectly right in denouncing Babylon, knowing as he must have done, that the power behind the throne of Sargon and Esarhaddon was the hierarchy of which Babylon was the centre. Till Babylon was destroyed, it made little difference which city was the seat of government. The Assyrians, the Chaldeans, and the Babylonians, stood to Babylon as France, Austria and Spain, did to Rome in the 15th and 16th centuries of our era.

But, someone will say, why does he mention the Medes? To which one might answer, why not? Already, in 844 B.C., Shalmanezar III had conquered the Medes to the east of Lake Ooroomiah.⁴⁹ Tiglath-Pileser III had sent expeditions against them and settled in their cities many of the captive Israelites,⁵⁰ and Sargon and the later kings of Assyria were in frequent conflict with them.⁵¹ It was perfectly proper and

⁴⁷ K B, II, 121-125.

⁴⁸ See Winckler's able discussion of these parties in his *History of Babylonia and Assyria*.

⁴⁹ K B, I, 142.

⁵⁰ K B, II, 7. 2 Kings xv. 10, 29.

⁵¹ See, especially, Winckler's *History of Babylonian and Assyria*.

possible for Isaiah to discern in these eastern and northern enemies of Assyria and Babylon the probable future cause of their downfall and destruction, just as for hundreds of years before the fall of the Roman empire the Germans from Varus on foreboded the Alarics and Theodorics of the future. Besides, in accordance with the custom of the warring forces in the time of the last Assyrian kings, auxiliary and mercenary forces served in the armies of Sennacherib and Esarhaddon, and probably the most valiant and least corrupt of these "who did not regard silver nor delight in gold" (Is. xiii. 17) were the Medes, the shock troops who dashed in pieces the young men of Babylon and spared not her children and laid in the dust the beauty of the Chaldee's excellency.

In view of all these facts, and especially that the Babylonians so frequently call their gods "the high ones," who can deny that the heading of chapter xiii is correct and that chapters xiii and xiv are indeed the burden of Babylon which Isaiah the son of Amoz did see? And of course, if it is Isaiah's vision, he must have seen it long before the captivity of Judah in 586 B.C.

In saying this with regard to the prophecy against Babylon, it is my aim simply to point out that from the critics' own standpoint this prophecy is not nearly as remote, as out of relation with the Assyrian period in which Isaiah lived, as the critics have so often asserted. Babylon was a potential menace even in the days of Hezekiah. But the points which I have mentioned and which relate it to Isaiah's day do not in any sense satisfy the language of the prophecy nor empty it of its predictive import. It clearly points to a far distant future and does not find its adequate fulfilment until centuries after the time of Hezekiah or of Cyrus.

3. As to Lamentations, its date is hard to fix. Lohr⁵² dates it from 570 to 530 B.C., and Dr. Driver⁵³ seems to follow him. The Aramaic Targum, the Peshitto, the Septuagint

⁵² ZATW, 1894.

⁵³ LOT, p. 465.

and the Latin Vulgate, all name Jeremiah as the author; and Josephus in Book X, v. 1, of his *Antiquities* says that Jeremiah composed an elegy over Josiah. This elegy may have been the book of Lamentations. There are two main arguments used by Dr. Driver against the authorship by Jeremiah. The first is that "it may perhaps be doubted whether a writer, who, in his literary style, followed, as Jeremiah did, the prompting of nature would subject himself to the artificial restraint implied by the alphabetical arrangement of c. 1-4."⁵⁴ There is absolutely no evidence in such a statement as this. It is another of Dr. Driver's favorite telescopic observations made at long range into the psychology of the prophets of Israel. Having told us that "Jeremiah's style is essentially artless" and without "artistic finish" and that "in his treatment of a subject he obeys no literary canon," he argues as if Jeremiah would not, or could not if he would, "subject himself to the artificial restraint implied by the alphabetical arrangement of c. 1-4."

This all sounds very fine, but yet, after all, it is but an opinion of Dr. Driver as to the mental and literary capacity of Jeremiah, based upon a study of one kind of Jeremiah's writings. One might as well maintain that a man who wrote a work like Milton's *Christian Doctrine* would not, or could not, write *Lycidas* or the *Areopagitica*. But, who knows the unrevealed motives of the human heart and the literary possibilities of a Milton, a David, an Isaiah, or a Jeremiah? Out of the eater comes forth meat and honey from the carcass of a lion. The beautiful face of a Beatrice Cenci may hide the brain of a patricide.

Full many a gem of purest ray serene,
The deep unfathomed caves of ocean bear.

It is time for the critics of literature to stop trying to measure with their little yardsticks the abysmal depths and sidereal heights, the capabilities, of men like Homer, Shakespeare, Moses and Jeremiah. After the marvels of ingenuity

⁵⁴ P. 274.

performed by Abd-Ishu in his *Paradise of Eden*,⁵⁵ shall we deny to the great prophet Jeremiah an ability to write in the simplest form of this alphabetical species of composition? To all who indulge in this kind of motivating and depreciating criticism of the Scriptures, the best reply is in a "few episodical poohs and pshaws."

The second of Dr. Driver's reasons for not accepting the Jeremian authorship of Lamentations is derived from the fact that we find in Lamentations certain words not occurring in the prophecies.⁵⁶ Thus שׁוּעַ (iii. 8) does not occur in Jeremiah. True; but, if this argument is valid, scarcely a chapter in the Old Testament could be assigned to the author of a book. For, since there are about 1500 words found but once in the Hebrew Bible, few chapters could be discovered without words not used elsewhere by the author of any given work. Scores of words are used but once by Mohammed⁵⁷ and Milton.⁵⁸ In the *Paradise Lost*, Milton uses "chaos" 26 times but not elsewhere in his poetical works.

That Adonai therefore should be used twice in chapter 1 of Lamentations, seven times in chapter 2, and four times in chapter 3 is noteworthy; as is, also, the fact that it is never

⁵⁵ 'Abd-Ishu' bar Berikha (d. 1318) was the last great writer of the Nestorian Church. His principal poetical work was the *Paradise of Eden*. (See Wright's *Syriac Literature*, p. 287f.) The writer of this article has in his possession a beautiful copy of this great work, secured in Ooroomiah about forty years ago. While all the poems contained in this volume are acrostic or abecedarian, there are numerous variations, so that we find from one to eight couplets successively beginning with the same letter; and some, where every couplet ends in the same syllable. In the two parts, also, the first three poems begin with Aleph and the last two with Tau whereas the twenty poems intervening follow successively in the order b, g, d, as in the Hebrew alphabet. It is certainly an elaborate work of art, and one in comparison with which the book of Lamentations is mere child's play.

⁵⁶ LOT, p. 463 (note).

⁵⁷ See Flügel's *Concordantie Corani Arabicæ*.

⁵⁸ See the *Lexicon to the English Poetical Works of John Milton* by Laura E. Lockwood, Ph.D. (Yale). This work and others like it are an excellent preparation for the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament, especially when it comes to *Hapax Legomena* and an author's right to use a variety of expressions.

used in chapters 4 and 5. But this does not show that the book is not by a single author nor that the author was not Jeremiah. The occurrences of Jehovah and Adonai in Lamentations are as follows: Jehovah, i. 5, 6, 11, 12, 17, 18, 20; ii. 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 20; iii. 22, 24, 25, 26, 40, 50, 55, 59, 61, 64, 66; iv. 11, 16, 20; v. 1, 19, 21; Adonai, i. 14, 15 *bis*, ii. 1, 2, 5, 7, 18, 19, 20; iii. 31, 36, 37, 58. Or they may be presented in tabular form thus:

CHAPTER	I	II	III	IV	V	TIMES
Jehovah	7	6	11	3	3	30
Adonai	3	7	4	0	0	14

Kennicott's MSS read Adonai for Jehovah only 67 times in 30 cases; but Jehovah for Adonai 399 times in 14 cases. Such readings as these do not militate against the unity of the authorship of Lamentations; nor, against the authorship of the Prophecy and the Lamentations by Jeremiah. For Mohammed in the Koran uses Rahman for God in only 17 out of 114 suras. He omits Rab from 21 suras and Allah from 27. In sura xix, Rahman occurs 16 times; Allah, 6 times; and Rab 23 times. As such variations in the use of terms do not destroy the unity of the Koran; so also they do not argue against the authorship of Lamentations by Jeremiah.

However, since Jerusalem was destroyed in 586 B.C. and the critics date Lamentations from 570 to 530 B.C., it is agreed that the book of Lamentations was written at about the time of Jeremiah's death; and it is impossible to argue from the use of a word in a sixth century document that another document containing the same word was written in the 2nd century B.C.

4. As to Gen. xiv, no one but a supreme egotist will deny without qualification that the events recorded in it are true.⁵⁹ Jerusalem has certainly been in existence almost continuously for 3500 years. Why not for 4000? Why not in the time of Abraham and Hammurabi? And if it did exist, why may it not have had a king named Melchizedek, who was a

⁵⁹ See my *Scientific Investigation of the Old Testament*, p. 20f.

priest to the Most High God? We know that people speaking Hebrew lived in Palestine as early as the time of Thothmes III. Hence, the name Melchizedek as well as that of Jerusalem is possible at that time and also both El and 'Elyōn.⁶⁰

5. As to Num. xxiv, one of the Balaam chapters, no one without a theory would think of putting the account of Balaam as late as the captivity, and the same may be said of Deut. xxxii. Dr. Driver assigns the Balaam story to JE⁶¹ and Deut. xxxii between a time earlier than JE and the time of Jeremiah and Ezekiel.⁶² There is no objective evidence to show that they do not both come from the hand of Moses. And certainly no one would suppose that a word occurring in documents admitted to be at the latest as early as Ezekiel in the sixth century B.C. would be evidence that another document containing the same word was written in the second century B.C.

6. Lastly, Professor Cheyne says that post-exilic writers (especially Daniel, Enoch and Sirach), were especially fond of using it (*i.e.* 'Elyōn) or its Aramaic equivalent.

As to Sirach, the original Hebrew, discovered since the time that Professor Cheyne's Bampton Lectures were given, shows that 'Elyōn is used alone ten times (xli. 4, 8, xlii. 2, xliv. 2, 20, xlv. 4, 1. 14, 16, 17); and preceded by El three times (xlvi. 5, xlvii. 5, and xlviii. 20). My readers will remember that Sirach is poetry, and that in the parallel sentences of Hebrew poetry it is customary to use synonymous expressions. This is sufficient to account for the large number of 'Elyōns in the work of Sirach. He might readily have used a word which, he must have believed, had been employed by Moses, David and Isaiah.

7. Enoch, also, is mostly poetical. The word for Most High is used only six times in the parts put by Professor Charles in the second century B.C. One line containing the

⁶⁰ See further on in this article.

⁶¹ LOT, p. 67.

⁶² *id.*, p. 97.

word is rejected as not genuine by Professor Charles and in one he presupposes ׀ as the original. The sixth section of Enoch, not having been written till the first century B.C., will not bear evidence of the prevalence of the word in the early part of the second.

8. The Book of Jubilees and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, though not known in anything but versions and versions of versions, make use of the expressions the Most High, or Most High God, with frequency. Thus Jubilees has Most High twice and Most High God twenty-one times; and the Testaments use Most High eighteen times and Most High God, once. This frequent use is due, doubtless, to the fact that Jubilees is a commentary on Genesis and that both imitate the phraseology of that book. Nevertheless, Jubilees uses *Lord* and compounds with it 219 times and God and its compounds 152 times to Most High and its compounds 24 times; and the XII Patriarchs, Lord and its compounds 232 times and God and its compounds 243 times to Most High and its compounds 19 times.⁶³ This seems to indicate that for the author of both of these books Most High was after all but an occasional appellation of the Deity.

9. That the same author could in his various works use a great variety of appellations or designations of the Deity, I have shown abundantly and conclusively in my articles in this REVIEW for 1919-1920. Milton, also, shows this; for he uses Almighty for, or of, God in *Paradise Lost* 30 times and elsewhere in his poetical works only in his translation of Psalm cxiv. 4. Further, he uses the Highest and the Most High 16 times in *Paradise Lost*; and, elsewhere, only once in *Paradise Regained* and twice in his translations of Psalms.

Again, it must be remembered that the ancient translations of words for Deity often obscure the original word. Of course, this is true most frequently in such words as those denoting "Lord" and those denoting God, such as Jehovah and Elohim. But, that these words are frequently inter-

⁶³ See article on the "Use of Words for God in the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical Literature of the Jews" in this REVIEW, Jan., 1920.

changed in the versions is abundantly illustrated in Ecclesiasticus. Here, the Hebrew has Lord and its compounds 53 times and the Greek 214 and the Hebrew God and its compounds 87 times and the Greek only 25.

Further, the frequency of the use of The Most High in some works written from 100 B.C. to 150 A.D. may be due to the desire to employ in certain connections a less ambiguous term than Lord or God to denote the deity. It is well known that the later kings of Egypt and Syria were hailed as *θεός* and this name is found in their titles. Though Augustus and Tiberius are said to have refused the title Dominus, it was freely given to the succeeding emperors and such terms as Dominus, Deus and Divus were common appellations of nearly all the pre-Christian Caesars. For this reason some of the Jewish writers may have avoided these terms at times and have used instead the less ambiguous terms "The Highest" or "The Highest God." This would account for the fact that the fifth section of Enoch uses it 9 times; the 3rd book of the Sibylline Oracles, 19; 2 Baruch, 25; 4 Ezra, 71; 3 Maccabees, 7; and the Odes of Solomon 27. The authors of the books of the New Testament, writing for readers who were imbued with the ideas of the Old Testament and acknowledged no man as God, did not think it necessary to avoid the use of God and Lord. The true Christians bravely sung hymns to Jesus Christ as Lord, even though it brought them under suspicion of disloyalty to the emperor and led inevitably to death.⁶⁴

In conclusion, it seems evident that any writer from Abraham to Hadrian may have used 'Elyōn, or its equivalent, as an unambiguous designation of the Highest of all, *i.e.*, of God. How often and when one should be expected to use it, we do not know enough to say, whether of Moses, David, Daniel, or any other writer. We do know, however, that any one of these may have used it, and that, consequently, the

⁶⁴ See correspondence between Pliny the Younger and the Emperor Trajan in *C. Plinii Caecilii Secundi Epistolae et Panegyricus*, liber X. and especially letters 97 and 98.

occurrence of it in a psalm, or prophecy, or other document, is no proof of its lateness.

VIII. THE USE OF SHADDAI

Professor Cheyne says in treating of Ps. lxxviii,⁶⁵ that שְׁדַי "first appears in authoritative religious literature at the close of the Exile." Elsewhere, he adds: "Ps. xci is also a Shaddai psalm (like Ps. lxxviii)."⁶⁶ Again he says: "It is clear that this name, like 'Elyōn, was discountenanced by the pre-exilic prophets and narrators (*i.e.*, those who are admitted as such by all critics)." In treating of Ps. xci, he declares that "the two divine names 'Elyōn and Shaddai [both of which occur in xci. 1] are both marks of a late date, and more especially the latter."⁶⁷

This is one of the finest examples extant of what the logicians call "begging the question" or "arguing in a circle," or "assuming the question at issue." Thus, he assumes and asserts, that the word "first appears in authoritative religious literature at the close of the Exile." But this is the very thing that he ought to prove. The heading of the 68th Psalm ascribes its authorship to David. From this ascription, there is not a single variation in the 400 or more Hebrew manuscripts. All the primary versions,—the Aramaic Targum, the Latin, the Syriac, the Septuagint and, so far as we know, Aquila, Symmachus and Theodotian agree with the Hebrew in this ascription. All the secondary versions, also,—the Sahidic and Memphitic Coptic, the Harklensian Syriac, the Itala, the Armenian, the Arabic, the Ethiopic—agree with the Hebrew, as do all the ancient commentators.⁶⁸ Among the great modern commentators who ascribe the psalm to David, or his time, are Calvin, Ladvoat, Clericus, Rosenmüller, De Wette, Hengstenberg, Tholuck, Murphy, Perowne, Reinke, Reinhard, Stier, Hofmann, Cornill (?) and Bruston. Besides,

⁶⁵ P. 124.

⁶⁶ P. 84.

⁶⁷ P. 73.

⁶⁸ See the testimony at length in this REVIEW for 1926.

those who deny the Davidic authorship differ so much among themselves as to invalidate the conclusions of their criticism. They vary from Hitzig who puts its date at 825 B.C. to Olshausen who dates it about the middle of the second century B.C.

The date of Ps. xci is so hard to determine, that Perowne, Delitzsch, Schultz, Hengstenberg and even Olshausen do not attempt to fix a date for it. Murphy puts it in the time of David, and Hitzig in 151 B.C. Professor Cheyne argues as if Shaddai was late because it is only in these psalms⁶⁹ and in Job, Joel, Ruth, Ezekiel i. 24, x. 5, Is. xiii. 16, Gen. xliii. 14 and Num. xxiv. 4, 16. When we turn up the commentaries of the radical critics on those passages, we find them all arguing that the passages are late because this word is in them. Thus we have the vicious argument in a circle: The passages are late because this word is late and the word is late because the passages are late. But let us examine these passages. Of Gen. xliii. 14, Professor Cheyne remarks that "no critic will doubt that 'El Shaddai' is due to the hand of the editor"; but Professor Driver says⁷⁰ that it belongs to E, a work written according to him some time before the 8th century B.C.⁷¹ Of Num. xxiv. 4, 16, Cheyne says only that it is in the poetical speeches of Balaam. Dr. Driver assigns this passage to JE⁷² and says that J and E were combined in the 8th century, B.C.⁷³ Shaddai may have been discountenanced by pre-exilic prophets but it is found in the poetical part of Num. xxii-xxiv which was written at the latest in the 8th century, B.C. How, then, is the occurrence of Shaddai in psalms lxviii and xci an argument against their pre-exilic date? Are they, then, not poetry? Is. xiii I have already discussed under 'Elyōn, giving my reasons for believing that it was written by Isaiah. Of

⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that it does not occur in either Ecclesiasticus or the Zadokite Fragments.

⁷⁰ LOT, p. 17.

⁷¹ *Id.*, p. 66.

⁷² *Id.*, p. 66.

⁷³ *Id.*, p. 116.

Ezekiel i. 24, Cheyne remarks that codex "B of the Sept., the Hebrew original of which is alone correct, does not contain it." It is true that it is not in codex B, but A has it and the Coptic, Armenian and Arabic versions of the Greek, as also all MSS but one of the Hebrew and the Syriac (Aloho), Aramaic Targum (שְׂדֵי), and the Latin (Sublimus Deus). Of Ezek. x. 5 he says only that "Cornill has shown it to be an interpolation." But all the Hebrew manuscripts have the word and, also, codices B and A of the Sept., the Vulgate, Peshitto (Aloho) and the Arabic, Coptic and Armenian versions of the Greek. As to Ruth, Dr. Driver says that the beauty and purity of the style point decidedly to the pre-exilic period as the time of its composition.⁷⁴ As to Joel, as long as different critics place its date at from about 900 B.C. to about 400 B.C., it seems reasonable to hesitate about accepting its testimony as to the time of the use of this word.⁷⁵ Besides, although the Targum, Peshitto and Vulgate and all the Hebrew MSS have read Shaddai in Joel i. 15, the Greek, followed by all of the versions from it, has, probably through reading the Yodh at the end of the word and the Yodh at the beginning of the next word as one Yodh instead of two, read שְׁדֵי instead of שְׂדֵי. Lastly, before the rise of the extreme radical school of modern criticism, not one of the great commentators saw any ground for placing Joel after the captivity; and, so far as I have seen, no one even of them cites Shaddai as an evidence of lateness—no one, that is, except Professor Cheyne.

As to Job, the one remaining book to which Professor Cheyne appeals for the lateness of Shaddai, both Cornill⁷⁶ and Driver⁷⁷ place its composition at about 550 B.C. This affords little support to those who would put the date of either Ps. xci or lxviii in the second century, B.C.

As to the word Shaddai, there is uncertainty as to its root,

⁷⁴ LOT, p. 455.

⁷⁵ *Id.*, pp. 309-313.

⁷⁶ *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 433.

⁷⁷ LOT, p. 422.

form, and meaning. If it were from a root שָׂדֶה, it would be of the same form as *sadai* which is sometimes read in the Hebrew text instead of *sade* "field."⁷⁸ In Babylonian the root *shadu* means "to be high," and derivatives mean "mountain" and "the summit of a mountain" and perhaps "majesty." In this case, we might take *shaddai* as a synonym of 'elyōn "Most High," as used in Gen. xiv.

A second derivation is from the root *shadad* "to be strong." The ending *ai* is found also in חָרִי (Isa. xix. 9) and in נֹבֵי (Am. vii. 1, Neh. iii. 17) and perhaps in כִּלִּי (Isa. xxxii. 5).⁷⁹ This ending is found also in Arabic and Ethiopic.⁸⁰ If from this root the word *shaddai* would mean "might, strength." The Greek translator of Job apparently had this derivation before him when he rendered *shaddai* by παντοκράτωρ, "Almighty,"⁸¹—a translation which has been generally followed in the English version. In the Syriac an equivalent word *hassino* "strong" is found in Job vi. 4, viii. 3, 5, xi. 7, xiii. 3, xv. 25, xxvii. 2, 13, xxix. 5, xxxvii. 23.

A third derivation is from the relative pronoun (שֶׁ) and the word "sufficiency" (דִּי). The Greek *ikavósti* found in Job xxi. 15, xxxi. 2, xxxix. 32, Ruth i. 20, 21, Ezek. i. 24, comes from this interpretation. It also accounts for the usual rendering of *shaddai* in the Samaritan version and in the Arabic version of Saadya. The Arabic always renders it *al kafi*, "the sufficient," and the Samaritan always *safuka*, except in Num. xxiv. 4, 16, where it has read *sadai* (field).

Some, also, have conjectured that the original form was *shēdi*. שֶׁדִּי is found in Deut. xxxii. 17 and Ps. cvi. 37, translated in the English version by "devil," and in the Greek and Latin by "demon."⁸²

⁷⁸ In fact, the Samaritan Targum reads *sadai* in Num. xxiv. 4, 16.

⁷⁹ Olshausen, *Lehrbuch* p. 216.

⁸⁰ Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, I. p. 220; Dillmann, *Aethiopische Grammatik*, p. 204.

⁸¹ Fifteen times in all, to wit: v. 17, viii. 5, xi. 7, xv. 25, xxii. 17, 25, xxiii. 16, xxvii. 2, 11, 13, xxxii. 8, xxxiii. 4, xxxiv. 10, xxxv. 13, xxxvii. 22.

⁸² Muss-Arnolt in his *Assyrian Dictionary* defines *shedu* as a destructive god. Brünnow No. 11308 gives it as a synonym of *ekimmu* and *utukku* and in 11314 as a synonym of *utukku* and *rabišu*.

Our ignorance of the real meaning of the word is further illustrated by the fact that the Greek translators of the Pentateuch invariably render both Shaddai and El Shaddai by *θεός*, that the translation of Job renders it eight times by *κύριος*, that the Syriac version renders it twenty-two times by *Aloho* (God), and in the Pentateuch usually transliterates it.

In conclusion, the evidence clearly shows that the Hebrews who translated the Old Testament, or part of it, into Samaritan, Syriac, Greek, and Arabic, knew nothing of a god called Shaddai or of Shaddai as a name for God. Only in the Greek of Ezek. i. 24 and in the Syriac of Gen. xvii. 1, xxxv. 11, and Ex. vi. 3 is there any indication that either El Shaddai or Shaddai was ever considered to be a proper name like Jehovah.

It will thus be seen that Professor Cheyne has appealed to every passage in the Old Testament which contains Shaddai except to six places in the Pentateuch, to wit: Gen. xvii. 1, xxviii. 3, xxxv. 11, xlviii. 3 and Ex. vi. 3, all assigned by the critics to P and Gen. xlix. 25. The last of these Driver assigns to J,⁸³ Cornill to about 850 B.C.,⁸⁴ and McFadyen thinks that it is at least as late as the period of the Judges.⁸⁵ It is such differences among the radical critics that reveal the unconvincing character of the evidence upon which they base their conclusions. Of the five other passages mentioned above (all assigned by the Wellhauseans to P, some of them almost entirely because Shaddai occurs in them) it may be truly said, that the evidence derived from the word Shaddai is equally void and fantastic. Where, for example, would the writer of P, even if, as Cornill thinks⁸⁶ he wrote *circa* 500 B.C., have gotten the idea that the patriarchs used Shaddai as a designation of the Deity, or to denote the God of the fathers? Neither Ezekiel, Job, J, E, H, D, Joel, Isaiah, Ruth,

⁸³ LOT, p. 17.

⁸⁴ *Introduction*, p. 117.

⁸⁵ *Id.*, p. 16.

⁸⁶ *Id.*, p. 114.

nor the Psalms, connects the name with the patriarchs. Cheyne himself says that "no critic will doubt that the El Shaddai of Gen. xliii. 14 is due to the hand of the editor."⁸⁷ The same may equally well be said of Gen. xlix. 25. This would leave the writer of P no authority but Balaam for his assumption that the patriarchs used Shaddai. And it is passing strange, that no author of any of the books acknowledged by all critics to be post-exilic, *i.e.*, of Daniel, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Esther, Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah, ever uses the word. Whether we take the traditional view of the post-captivity literature, or the radical, there is therefore no undisputed, or conclusive, evidence to show that the hypothetical writer of P, not even Ezra if he were himself the writer, was in his use of Shaddai as a name of the deity, in harmony with contemporaneous usage and ideas.⁸⁸ Further, neither the Hebrew of Ben Sira, nor that of the Zadokite Fragments ever uses the word; nor does that of the Pirke Aboth. The Greek *παντοκράτωρ* in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha is ambiguous since it renders the Hebrew *Sebaoth* as well as the less frequent Shaddai. Even then, it occurs in the Apocrypha only in 1 Bar. iii. 1, 4, Jud. 5 times, and in the Prayer of Manasseh once, also in the phrase "Lord Almighty" which in the Septuagint is always the rendering of "Jehovah of hosts." In Jubilees xv. 4, xxvii. 11, "God Almighty" is found in two citations from Genesis where Shaddai occurs in the original Hebrew. It is found, also, in the Sibylline Oracles III. 71. In 3 Baruch, it occurs in the phrase "Lord God Almighty," which is obviously the equivalent of "Jehovah God of hosts," as often in the Old Testament. Possibly, also, Shaddai may have been the Hebrew original (if it had one) of the phrase "Most Mighty" in the Decree of Artaxerxes in the Additions to Esther xvi 16. Finally, God Almighty occurs in 2 Mac. viii. 18, 3 Mac. vi. 2, and six times in the Letter of Aristeas. Since all of these apocryphal and pseudepigraphical works which use the word Almighty,

⁸⁷ P. 84.

⁸⁸ See this REVIEW, XXII, 110.

were written long after the Septuagint version of the Hebrew Pentateuch was made, and since all of the authors were certainly acquainted with the Pentateuch, it is easy to see where they got the appellation. But to say that the word Almighty was common in any age is overstating the case. The Letter of Aristeas alone makes a relatively common use of it and that only six times and in a letter addressed to the king of Egypt, who himself claimed to be a god. In the New Testament "Almighty" alone is found only in Rev. i. 8, and Almighty God and God Almighty in Rev. xvi. 14 and xix. 15. Lord Almighty (*i.e.* Jehovah of hosts) is found only in 2 Cor. vi. 18 and the phrase Jehovah God of hosts (Lord God Almighty) in Rev. iv. 8, xi. 17, xv. 3, xvi. 7, xix. 6, xxi. 22. "Lord of Sabaoth" occurs in Rom. ix. 29, James v. 4.

It seems to me that the evidence given proves conclusively that the presence of Shaddai in a document is not a mark of the late date of that document, and that its presence in Pss. lxviii and xci affords no evidence that they are post-exilic.

IX. SEBAOTH

The word "Sebaoth" preceded by Jehovah, Elohim, or both of them is found fifteen times in the Psalms, to wit: Book I, xxiv. 10; II, xlvi. 8, 12, xlviii. 9, lix. 6, lxix. 7; III. lxxx. 5, 8, 15, 20, lxxxiv. 2, 4, 13, lxxxix. 9.

1. Jehovah of hosts occurs in xxiv. 10 (David), xlvi. 8, 12 (Korah), xlviii. 9 (Korah), lxxxiv. 2, 4, 13 (Korah). That this designation may have been used as early as David is shown by the fact that it appears in 1 Sam. i. 3, 11, iv. 4, xv. 2, 2 Sam vi. 2, 18, xii. 8. That it may have been used in a psalm from the time of Isaiah is shown from its occurrence 41 times in chapters i-xxxix and 4 times in chapters xl-lxvi, and also in Micah. That it may have been used at any time from 700 to 400 B.C., is shown by the fact that it occurs in 1 Kings xviii. 15, 2 Kings iii. 14, 19, 31, Na. ii. 14, iii. 5, Hab. ii. 13, Zeph. ii. 10, Hag. i. 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, ii. 4, 8, 9 *bis*, 11, 23 *bis*, Zech. i. 3 *bis*, 4, 6, 12, 14, 16, 17, ii. 12, 13, 15, iii. 7, 9, 10, iv. 6, 9, v.

4, vi. 12, 15, vii. 3, 4, 9, 12 *bis*, 13, xiii. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 *bis*, 7, 9 *bis*, 11, 14 *bis*, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, ix. 15, x. 3, xiii. 2, 7, xiv. 21 *bis*, Mal. i. 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, ii. 2, 4, 7, 8, 12, 16, iii. 1, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 19, 21. 1 Chr. xvii. 7, 24 are parallel to 2 Sam. vii. 8, 26, and the only other place where the phrase is met with in Chronicles is in 1 Chr. xi. 9 in a statement made about David.

It is significant that neither Ecclesiasticus nor the Zadokite Fragments has the word *Sebaoth* at all. Nor does 2 Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, or Esther, have it. It is not found in any of the apocryphal or pseudepigraphical writings, nor in the New Testament. The evidence from comparative literature is clearly, then, as far as this phrase goes in favor of a date before 400 B.C. for the composition of Psalms xxiv, xlvi, xlviii and even and especially lxxxiv.

2. God of hosts occurs in the Old Testament only in Ps. lxxx. 8, 15 and Amos v. 27. It is found nowhere else except in the Secrets of Enoch lii. 1A from the first century A.D.

3. Jehovah, God of hosts, occurs in Pss. lxxx. 5, 20, lxxxix. 9 and in 2 Sam. v. 10, 1 Kings xix. 10, 14, Hos. xii. 6, Am. iv. 12, v. 14, 15, vi. 8, 14, Jer. v. 14, xv. 16. The evidence, here, is in favor of an early use for the phrase.

4. Jehovah, God of hosts, the God of Israel. This phrase occurs only in Ps. lix. 6 and in Jer. xxxv. 17, xxxviii. 17, xlv. 7, not being found even in the apocryphal, pseudepigraphical or New Testament literature.

5. It appears from the evidence that the occurrence of *Sebaoth* in a document is an indication that the document is as early, at least, as 400 B.C., and that it may be as early as the time of David.

X. THE HOLY ONE

Professor Cheyne argues further that "the Holy One" (הַקְדוֹשׁ) was a common designation for the Deity in the Maccabean times and hence that its presence in a psalm indicates that the psalm was from those times. That קְדוֹשׁ was a name of God might be inferred from Ps. xcix. 5; but the

word occurs usually in the phrase "the Holy One of Israel" in Pss. lxxi. 22, lxxviii. 41 and lxxxix. 19,—the first in Book II of the Psalter and the other two in Book III. The 71st and 78th are assigned in the headings to Asaph and the 89th to Ethan. It seems certain that this title of God cannot be used as evidence that the psalms in which it occurs were written in Greek times. For it is found in 2 Kgs. xix. 22 and 11 times in the first 39 chapters of Isaiah, and 12 times in the last 27, in Jer. i. 29, li. 5, and Ek. xxxix. 7; but not elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. It is found in the Hebrew of Ben Sira l. 17 but not in the Greek, or Syriac versions. Since the Hebrew of Ben Sira had not been discovered when Professor Cheyne wrote, he cannot have appealed to its evidence. The phrase occurs once also in the Testaments of the XII Patriarchs (Dan. lxxv.). Upon these two instances found in the voluminous literature written after 550 B.C., as against 27 instances in the Biblical literature from Isaiah to Kings, did Professor Cheyne base an argument in favor of putting three psalms in the Greek period!

But some one might say that he refers to the use of "the Holy One" and not to the use of "the Holy One of Israel." This cannot be for the obvious reason that "the Holy One" does not occur in either of these psalms. And, even if it did, the phrase "the Holy One" is found in the Old Testament only in Is. x. 17, Hab. i. 12, iii. 3, Job. vi. 10 and in the obscure verses Prov. ix. 10, xxx. 3, and Hos. xii. 1. In the works from the second century B.C., it is used in Ben Sira in the Hebrew text only in ix. 14 and xxxix. 35. In the three parts of Enoch placed by Professor Charles in the second century, it occurs once in each, and in the third book of the Sibylline Oracles twice. In the New Testament, it is found only in the phrase "holy and just one" of Acts iii. 14. In other Jewish literature outside the New Testament dating between 100 B.C. and 135 A.D., it stands alone only in 6 Enoch once, in 1 Baruch 3 times, and in Pirke Aboth 4 times. Seeing, then, that it is found from the time of Isaiah and Habakkuk to the year 135 A.D. in these few places only, what argument

as to the age of a document could have been based upon its occurrence in an Old Testament composition, even if it had so occurred?

XI. THE NAME

Professor Cheyne states that "words like heaven," "the name," and "the Holy One" would generally meet "any need" as substitutes for Jehovah.⁸⁹ He says in a note on the same page that "a later scribe (surely not the original writer) sought by substituting יהוה for השם to avoid an unpleasant collocation." Taking up this last statement first, it should be sufficient to ask, how did Professor Chyne *know* that some one substituted "the Name" for Jehovah; how did he know that it was surely not the original writer; and how did he know the motive for the substitution? He did not know and he could not know. All the evidence is against him—the Hebrew text, the Samaritan Hebrew text and version, the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan, the Syriac, Greek and Latin versions.⁹⁰

Taking up the second statement, implying that in the Macabean times "the Name" was a substitute for Jehovah, we may be pardoned for asking for the evidence for such an implication. In the Old Testament, Lev. xxiv. 11 is the only place where the Deity is called "the Name"; but such phrases as "my name" always seem to denote Jehovah. In the New Testament "the Name" is never used. In apocryphal and pseudo-epigraphical and other literature of the Jews up to 135 A.D., it is never used. The only item of possible evidence is the fact that the Pirke Aboth uses it once in the fifth section, which was probably not written before the end of the second century A.D. The sentence reads: "The wild beast comes on the world for false swearing, and for profaning of the Name." This is an evident reference to Lev. xxiv. 11.

Upon such slender evidence does Professor Cheyne con-

⁸⁹ P. 300.

⁹⁰ For a further discussion of this title see this REVIEW, for January, 1924, pp. 114-116.

clude that "the Name" was a substitute for Jehovah in the second century B.C.!

XII. THE ROCK

It is worth noting that the Septuagint renders צור by θεός "God" 6 times in Deuteronomy xxxii. and 11 times in the Psalms, to wit: xvii. 4, 50, xxvii. 1, xxx. 3, lxi. 2, 7, lxx. 3, lxxii. 25, lxxx. 15, xci. 15, xciv. 1, cxliii. 1. In 2 Kings xxii. 32, they have rendered it κτίστης, evidently connecting it with the Arabic *sawwar* "to form, or fashion." From this stem we get the noun *musawwir* "an epithet of God as the Former, or Fashioner, of all existing things."⁹¹ In Is. xvii. 10, צור is rendered by κύριος. There seems to be no doubt, therefore, that the Greek translators interpreted the Hebrew in Deut. xxxii and 11 times in the Psalms as *sawwar* "creator" i.e. God. Ben Sira, also, in chapter iv. 6 renders it by ο ποιήσας. Were it not for this obvious derivation, one would have been tempted to connect the Greek rendering "God" with the Babylonian *širu* "high" making it a synonym of 'Elyōn. Whatever, however, be the derivation, it is evident that, even if the word stands for God in the Psalms mentioned above and in Ben Sira iv. 6, it cannot be used as a proof of late date, inasmuch as it occurs six times in Deut. xxxii and once in 2 Kings and in Is. xvii. 10, as a designation of the Deity.

XIII. THE MIGHTY ONE

In Ps. cxxxii. 2, 3, the LXX renders אֱלֹהֵי by θεός as is the case, also, in Is. lx. 16. In Is. xlix. 26, it is rendered by ἰσχύς and in Is. i. 24 by ἰσχύων in the phrase the Mighty One of Jacob, or Israel. The phrase occurs, also, in the Hebrew of Ben Sira li. 12, and in the text of the XII Patriarchs once. Since the author of the 132nd psalm is not named in the Hebrew text, though David is the subject of the prayer in verse 1, there is room for an open discussion of the date of this psalm.

⁹¹ Lane, *Arabic Dictionary*, p. 1745

CONCLUSION

At last, then, we have brought to a conclusion this wearisome examination of the names for God in the Psalter. No one is more conscious than the writer of the unsatisfactory character of parts of the discussion owing largely to the lack of direct evidence bearing upon the particular words. But, of so much we can be sure, the *prima facie* evidence is in favor of the headings of the psalms and no convincing proof to invalidate the testimony of the headings is to be derived either from the headings themselves, or from the contents of the psalms, including the names for God found in them. In accordance, therefore, with the law of evidence, the presumption is, and must remain until evidence invalidating them is found, that the headings are trustworthy, that David wrote many of the psalms and may have written, so far as we know, seventy-three of them, and that Christ and the Apostles and the Church in all ages have been right in treating all of them, headings included, as a part of the infallible Word of God.

Princeton.

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DOES THE BEHAVIORIST HAVE A MIND?

There is a good deal to be said on both sides of this question. The behaviorist himself assures us that he, or at least the subject of his investigations (for he disclaims introspection), has no mind, no instincts, no will or purpose, in fact no consciousness at all as distinct from bodily reaction to physical stimuli. Stimulus and response tell the whole story, and the response is always of the type of congenital or conditioned reflex action. If the behaviorist should be conscious of his reflex actions he would be acting out of character and would be false to his professed principles. His own answer to the question of our title is in the negative. He does not claim to have a mind, he will not admit that he has a mind as distinguished from the body, and if the stimulus of the question, "Do you have a mind?" should be presented to him, the response to be expected would be an indignant and emphatic, "No."

There is, however, another side to the question. The behaviorist in spite of his protestations certainly acts as if he had a mind. His pursuits are wholly in the intellectual realm. His main business is nothing else than writing books and articles for learned magazines, conducting experiments which demand some mental equipment to estimate their bearing and value, teaching the young idea that there are no such things as ideas, and instructing classes of other minds that there are no minds at all. The behaviorist uses all the weapons in the arsenal of debate, ridicule, assumption of superior intelligence and learning, and calling of names such as "medievalist" and "mystic." His aim, it is true, (although he admits no such thing as purpose) is to convert people to his way of thinking and to affect the thinking processes of the scholastic world in such a way as to bring them all to the opinion that there is no mind; but his manner of doing this is that of the "high-brow" and the intellectual. He is incurably intellectual even when he vilifies the faculty of reason which is the candle of the Lord within us.

Both sides in the discussion should be aware of the fact that the case is so foolish and so absurd on the face of it that it is in danger of being thrown out of court. The behaviorist who maintains that he has no mind cannot help refuting himself every time he utters a word, or frames an argument, or puts pen to paper. The defender of the affirmative on the other hand—who maintains that the behaviorist has a mind—is placed in the uncomfortable position of one who can simply vociferate the obvious. He cannot use effectively the method of *reductio ad absurdum* because nothing in his view can be more absurd than the position with which the behaviorist begins. He can apparently do little more than ring the changes upon the characterizations, “glaringly inconsistent” and “palpably absurd.”

A university president in the Mid-West recently said that in taking up administrative duties he was compelled to commit intellectual suicide, and another president in the East admitted that he had become a “talking machine.” If the personalities of these two presidents should be merged into one—if the intellectual suicide should be turned into a talking machine—it is to be feared that the resulting utterances would not be very significant. The behaviorist is a kind of dual personality. On the one hand he claims (or admits) that he has no mind or will or purpose, but on the other hand he says that “the interest of the behaviorist in man’s doings is more than the interest of the spectator—he wants to control man’s reactions as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena.”¹ As a behaviorist he has no mind of his own and no purpose of his own and as a strict determinist he cannot control his own conduct, but in his efforts to reduce psychology to a natural science he wishes to control and predict the conduct of everybody else. There must be a contradiction here somewhere. The behaviorist cannot play both rôles at once. But if there is an inescapable contradiction or mental twist in the behaviorist’s mind in his

¹ John B. Watson, *Behaviorism*, p. 11.

fundamental assumption that "‘consciousness’ is neither a definable nor a usable concept,"² we fear that there may be a moral twist in the kind of conduct he wishes to produce and control. If the behaviorist should be allowed full sway in regulating conduct, we fear that the result would be thoughtless activity, and meaningless behavior, and conscienceless conduct.

Psychology is no longer merely an academic discipline fitted to provide pleasant mental exercise for the classroom. It has entered our homes and our business as well as our schools, and has invaded the realms of ethics, jurisprudence and religion. The salesman in approaching his prospect or seeking to become a super-salesman, the corporation executive in selecting his personnel and in promoting efficiency, the advertiser in attracting the public, the struggling clerk aspiring to the presidency of his concern, the statesman who would prevent war and the reformer who would repress crime, the young man in search of a wife and the mother anxious for the upbringing of her children,—all are invited to sit at the feet of the psychologist. The educator with his methods and projects and programs of study is peculiarly at the mercy of the psychologist, and the Church is beginning to realize that her whole program of religious education may, for good or evil, be profoundly modified under the influence of popular psychological theory. As a thoughtful student of the subject has said: "In the new educational enterprises of the Church a matter of utmost concern is the selection of a psychological basis on which the new program is to stand. A choice between the schools has to do with something more important than methods and materials. It has to do with the maintenance or the abandonment of certain elements of the Christian religion which have heretofore been considered essential."³

When the behaviorist seeks by logical argument to abolish

² P. 3.

³ W. A. Squires, *Psychological Foundations of Religious Education*, pp. 30, 31.

logic, and from his platform of mechanistic determinism announces his ambition to control the thought and conduct of the world, we are tempted to attribute his inconsistencies to mental obtuseness or perversity, and following the advice of the Wise Man to "answer a fool according to his folly." This, however, is not to deny that the behaviorist in his experiments has made contributions of value to psychological science, or that in spite of his disclaimer of introspection he has sometimes shown a shrewd and penetrating insight into human nature.

It will prove instructive to glance at the newest book in the field of psychology, *Psychologies of 1925*, containing lectures given at Clark University in 1925 and in the early months of 1926 by leading psychologists. Their names in alphabetical order are Madison Bentley, Knight Dunlap, Walter S. Hunter, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Morton Prince, William McDougall, John B. Watson, and Robert S. Woodworth. McDougall of Harvard tells us that the mechanists in psychology would have us believe that men are "Robots," this name being applied in a recent play to ingeniously constructed machines in the shape of human beings. McDougall adds that "the view that men are merely such Robots is now being dogmatically taught to thousands of young students in the psychological departments of the universities of this country."⁴ He finds that this view is now enjoying an alarming popularity, and that the spread of this way of thinking among psychologists has gone so far that those who do not accept it are regarded as "cranky persons wedded to medieval metaphysics" and as "queer survivors from the dark ages," incapable of joining in the triumphant march of modern science. The behaviorists may be Robots in whom reflex action takes the place formerly assigned to reflection, but they are sure that their reflexes are right and that the reflexes of others, the upholders of rival theories, are wrong. They differ also from the real Robots in the fact that,

⁴ P. 275

as we have seen, they have far-reaching and revolutionary plans for the application of their doctrine not only in the sphere of psychology but in the fields of education, philosophy, ethics and jurisprudence. Look first at the application in the realm of philosophy. Holding that all the objects in our environment are ultimately electric charges, W. S. Hunter adds that "so likewise is the human animal and the aggregations of human animals which make up society. If the phenomenon of a storage battery is a matter of electrons and protons, so is the phenomenon of family life."⁵ Hunter is naturally indignant with the older psychological method "which is inseparably bound up with the ancient philosophical concepts of mind and consciousness as aspects of the universe which differ from the physical."⁶

John B. Watson, the recognized leader of the behaviorist group, finds a "mystical" element even in Hunter's exposition. He is uncompromising in his purpose to rule mind and consciousness out of the picture, and in the interest of behaviorism would revise ethics and jurisprudence, and would apparently do away with the church and religion altogether. It would be interesting to see what kind of a code of ethics the new "experimental ethics" of behaviorism (which Watson admits does not yet exist) would formulate. It would be still more interesting to discover the kind of behavior in the moral sphere in which the principles of behaviorism when freely carried out actually eventuate. Watson would like to make some profound changes in the field of jurisprudence. He would do away with punishment in the rearing of children and the treatment of criminals. He tells us that "punishment is a word which never ought to have crept into our language"⁷—which raises the question whether the man who first introduced it ought not to have been punished. Watson is at pains to emphasize the fact that "the behaviorist is a strict determinist."⁸ It follows then, as he declares in italics, that "the child or adult has to do what he does. The only way

⁵ P. 90.

⁶ P. 107.

⁷ P. 71

⁸ P. 71

he can be made to act differently is first to untrain him and then retrain him." Naturally the untraining and retraining must be done by the behaviorist; the other people or psychologists of other schools have no power to retrain the behaviorist. There are of course no criminals in the usual sense of persons who have committed acts that deserve punishment. There are only "deviants," and these are of two kinds, the insane and the "socially untrained." The insane should be sent to the asylum and the socially untrained should be sent to school. We may remark here that even Watson has not been able wholly to emancipate himself from the ideas of free-will, responsibility and desert, so deeply imbedded in our thought and our vocabulary. He will allow a gentle rap on the knuckles of the child if promptly administered; and if the socially untrained deviants through obtuseness or obstinacy refuse to take on the training that will fit them to re-enter society, he would even for "ten to fifteen years or even longer" make them "earn their daily bread, in vast manufacturing and agricultural institutions, escape from which is impossible."⁹ "Strenuous work sixteen hours per day," Watson naively adds, "will hurt no one." Of course it is insisted that the care of such deviants should be in the hands of behaviorists. Such a reform in criminal jurisprudence, Watson admits, is only a pious dream "until all the lawyers and jurists decide to become behaviorists." Now since every lawyer and jurist together with every other adult "has to do what he does," what probability is there that any lawyer or judge will "decide" to change his mind and act differently? The only way to reform the lawyers and jurists is to put them where they deserve to be, in a "school" (not a prison of course for this would savor too much of the "religious theory" of retaliation) where they could be restrained while they are retrained and be made to work for sixteen hours a day, until under the gentle tutelage of behaviorist wardens they come to see the error of their ways

⁹ Pp. 71-74.

and give evidence of true repentance for doing what they couldn't help doing. Like other mechanical determinists who would do away with the guilt or fault or responsibility of the offender against society, Watson can only transfer these notions of guilt and responsibility from the criminal to his social environment. It is our own "fault," he says, that is the fault of parents, teachers and others of the group, if individuals "go wrong" or deviate from set standards of behavior.

If the insane should be placed in asylums and the socially untrained in schools, how can we tell which is which? If it be found that an alleged criminal does not know what he is doing, how does he differ from anyone else? If he does know what he is doing, then there is something—knowledge or awareness or consciousness—that is of a non-material character and is distinct from, and over and above, his bodily action. Again, how can the behaviorist distinguish between the socially trained and the socially untrained? Let us suppose that a gun is discharged and a person is killed. How is the behaviorist, who denies that purpose influences behavior, to distinguish between accidental homicide and deliberate murder? The whole question, as Prince points out, is whether there is "criminal intent," and the question is unanswerable on behaviorist principles. Carl Murchison, the editor of the volume, makes a point as old as the reply of Zeno to his thieving slave when he insists elsewhere that a philosophy of rigid determinism "is sheer nonsense when applied only to the individual offender and not also to the community which contains him. If it has been determined by circumstances that an individual commits a crime, let it also be determined by circumstances that a social community will strike back with sure and swift punishment."

Before going further it may be worth while to glance at the historical antecedents of behaviorism and at the criticism which it directs against other psychological schools, and then we may look a little more in detail at the objections which may be made against behaviorism itself.

In taking up the book of Clark University lectures we are bewildered by the present variety of conflicting theories in the psychological field. We find here represented Schools of Behaviorism, Dynamic Psychology, Gestalt, Purposive Groups, Reaction Psychology, and Psychologies called Structural. One lecturer, Knight Dunlap, says: "The announcement of a new book on *The new psychology and the preacher* might, so far as anyone could predict in advance, be a treatise based on the Freudian or some other psycho-analytic system; it might be an exposition of 'new thought' or some other vagary of the Quimby brood; it might be an application of the theories and methods of 'intelligence testing'; it might be propaganda for the theories and practices of M. Coué; it might be one of the numerous embodiments of phrenology under its more recent name of 'character analysis'; it might be a book on psychic research concerning spooks and other magical notions; or it might be one of the less easily nameable nostrums which strut before the public in borrowed plumage, calling themselves 'the new psychology'."¹⁰ Dunlap himself, in contrast to the host of pseudo-psychologists and to the older "Malebranchian psychology," is an exponent of "scientific psychology" which does away with the superstition that "mind" is "distinct from, but miraculously related to the body."¹¹

In tracing the pedigree of behaviorism we find that in the past generation at least four different schools of psychology, each of them associated with some movement in science or philosophy, have successively held the field. There was first the psychology of the soul, and this soul had "faculties" such as memory, imagination, will and so forth. It was then objected that the assumption of a soul was unnecessary for purposes of science and that the separate faculties were abstractions, and it was maintained that the proper study of the psychologist was consciousness, or conscious states or processes in more or less close association with brain con-

¹⁰ P. 309.

¹¹ P. 312.

comitants. The soul according to James had "worn out both itself and its welcome," and according to Wundt it was "a metaphysical surplusage for which psychology has no use." Later there arose the functional psychology, studying the mind or consciousness as a servant of the organism and as a means of adjustment of the organism to its environment. Finally the behaviorist, denying the utility of introspection, banished consciousness entirely from the psychological field or reduced it to a name for the relation between the nervous system and its stimulating environment. We may remind ourselves that the psychology of consciousness and its processes (or of ideas and their associations) was stimulated by the growing knowledge of brain physiology, and its philosophical background was the traditional English empiricism coming down from Locke and Hume. The functional psychology was an application of popular biological categories to the study of mind, and it was associated with the pragmatic movement in philosophy. Behaviorism was an outgrowth of the study of animal behavior, and its philosophical affinities are with eighteenth century materialism and with the New Realism which in its revolt from subjective idealism would define consciousness as a name for the relation between the object and the nervous system.

Behaviorism is a sort of "psychological materialism," to borrow a phrase from Dr. Patton's recent volume. It first dismissed the consciousness of animals and then of human beings as inaccessible to knowledge, and holds that when we attempt to peer into the secrets of our own "minds" all we discover is a feeling of flexed muscles, of visceral movements, and of laryngeal movements associated with spoken language or "silent" language. Consciousness as something distinct from bodily movement does not exist. It is either a myth or is only another name for the relation between the bodily organism and the physical stimulus. Plainly behaviorism is directly opposed to the fundamental convictions of religion, that there is a spirit in man and that the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding, and that there

will be a conscious existence of the individual after the death of the body.

A characteristic of behaviorism is the boldness of its negations and the thoroughness with which it disposes of the spiritual or non-material element in man. The soul with its faculties, the mind with its categories, the will with its purposes and freedom, consciousness with its processes and concomitant brain processes, ideas with their associations, and even the instincts with their evolution are all thrown upon the scrap-heap. Behaviorism has not only cleaned house but has moved out of its house. One behaviorist, Hunter, would give over the term psychology to the exponents of antiquated methods, while coining the term "anthroponomy" to describe behaviorism or the "science of human behavior."¹² We recall the witty criticism directed against Hume, that he went outside his house and looked in at the window and could find no one at home. The behaviorist has not only gone outside his house, but has closed the shutters and moved away.

The defender of spiritual realities and values will find something instructive in the behaviorist's critique of his predecessors and rivals in the psychological field. The same methods by which the psychology of ideas or of consciousness disposed of the soul as a spiritual entity are adopted by the behaviorist in disposing of ideas and consciousness altogether. If the soul was inaccessible to knowledge, so also is the mind or consciousness as a separate entity. If the old-fashioned faculties and functions were abstractions or myths, so also are the more modern ideas and their associations. The weapons used by the psychology-without-a-soul are now turned against itself by the psychology-without-a-mind. Watson insists that consciousness is "merely another word for the 'soul' of more ancient times," and that the metaphysical implications of the two terms are identical.¹³

¹² P. 83.

¹³ *Behaviorism*, pp. 3, 5.

Behaviorism is in fact psychology without a soul reduced to absurdity.

It is interesting and somewhat comforting to notice further that some popular and ultra-modern theories which have been regarded as hostile to a religious view of things are by behaviorism buried as deep as the old soul-psychology. Empiricism with its exploiting of impersonal ideas, physiological psychology with its concomitance of conscious process and brain process, epiphenomenism which treated mind as a fly upon the fly-wheel of matter, psychophysical parallelism which chained mind to matter without allowing it any influence upon the movements of matter, Freudian psychoanalysis which substituted the unconscious wish for the "will that can," and even evolutionary ideas of mind which assimilated the mind of man to that of the brute, are all junked without ceremony to make way for the up to date machinery of behaviorism.

The behavioristic materialist takes a short method with the spiritualist. He rightly fears that consciousness even if cast in the modest rôle of epiphenomenon may by some ingenious turn assume the leading rôle. The only safe way is to exclude it from the cast altogether. Consciousness may start the voyage as a stowaway in the cargo of mechanism, but there is always danger that it may mutiny and take command of the ship. Consciousness may be tied securely to brain process, but Bergson may be right when he says that conscious activity overflows brain activity on all sides. Consciousness may be merely an instrument of adaptation in the struggle for existence, but in the end the servant may become the master and the development of mind and freedom may be seen as the end of the whole process. The only safe way for the mechanical behaviorist is to exclude altogether this uncomfortable and dangerous intruder, consciousness. "Nowhere is it necessary to introduce the concept of consciousness, or experience, conceived as another mode of existence, or as another aspect of the physical world."¹⁴ Of course the

¹⁴ Hunter, p. 104.

intelligence tests will have to go, for there is no such thing as intelligence; and it is to be hoped that the reactions to the College Entrance Board examinations now demanded of young students will be greatly simplified.

The behaviorist has to do his fighting on two fronts. On one front are the introspectionists, the purposivists, and the metaphysical and theological opponents of materialism; but on the other front he finds arrayed against him the popular evolutionary and psycho-analytical schools. Watson is contemptuous of all that has been written about the evolution of instinct and the classification of instincts. Instinct is defined as "a combination of congenital responses unfolding serially under appropriate stimulation." What we call instincts are for the most part "learned" or "conditioned" reflexes. Going as he admits beyond the evidence, Watson holds that there is no inheritance of mental traits or aptitudes, and he makes training and environment all-powerful. Human beings of all geological ages, of all races and conditions have the same set of unlearned responses—"be it in Africa or in Boston, be it in the year six million B.C. or in 1925 A.D."¹⁵—and these responses are due to the material out of which men are made and the way this is put together. Most of the treatises on instinct have been written by the "armchair" psychologists who have not studied the behavior of young animals or babies from birth. The Darwinian geneticists "are working under the banner of the old 'faculty' psychology."¹⁶ In fact the whole concept of instinct has become "academic and meaningless," and "actual observation thus makes it impossible for us any longer to entertain the concept of instinct."¹⁷

The behaviorists and the Freudians were quite friendly ten years ago, but now no love is lost between the two schools. Psycho-analysis is in fact introspectionism and introspectionism raised to the *n*th degree. The Freudian delves

¹⁵ P. 3.

¹⁶ P. 6.

¹⁷ P. 32.

into the mysteries not only of consciousness but of the sub-conscious and the unconscious. He deals with dreams, with suppressed wishes, and with unconscious complexes. He is naturally *persona non grata* with the behaviorist, and the Freudian emotions go the way of the evolutionary instincts. The elaborate writings of the Freudians, enough in the past twenty years we are told to fill a good-sized room,¹⁸ are consigned by Watson to the waste basket.

"The history of modern philosophy," says Will Durant in his *Story of Philosophy*, "might be written in terms of the warfare of physics and psychology." But in recent times these two antagonists seem to have changed sides. The physicists have been spiritualizing matter, interpreting it in terms of energy and even of will, while the psychologists have been busy in banishing soul and spirit and even consciousness and purpose from the universe. President Butler of Columbia University has said that "psychology has demonstrated its capacity to become both frivolous and inconsequent;" and in his latest annual report he maintains that "The new and numerous Philistines are the proud discoverers and professors of a new doctrine of behavior which finds nothing to behave and no purpose in behaving. Where they have touched education they are reducing it to a costly pantomime." But perhaps we ought to distinguish between varieties or schools of behaviorism. McDougall distinguishes three schools, the Strict Behaviorists, the Purposive Behaviorists, and the Near Behaviorists. We are not concerned with the purposive behaviorists, although it must be recognized that some psychologists can use the term "purpose" as if it were something inherent in the object rather than the subject. E. C. Tolman, a purposive behaviorist, is careful to state that his own doctrine is "not a mere Muscle Twitchism of the Watsonian variety."¹⁹ If the strict behaviorists may be called muscle twitchers the near behaviorists should be termed "steam whistlers." Thus Morton Prince (in the volume of

¹⁸ P. 37.

¹⁹ P. 279n.

lectures before us) reminds us that Huxley as long as fifty years ago spoke of consciousness in brutes and then in men as only a collateral product of the working of the bodily mechanism, and "as completely without the power of modifying that working as the steam whistle, which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine, is without influence upon its machinery."²⁰

The near behaviorists do not deny that consciousness exists, but adopting the Huxleyan automatism they have as little to do with consciousness as possible and do not allow it to do anything. The strict behaviorists, of whom Watson is the principal spokesman, do away with mind or consciousness altogether. Watson will not admit that mental states exist and he says that behaviorism ignores them just as chemistry ignores alchemy. "The behaviorist does not concern himself with them because as the stream of his science broadens and deepens such older concepts are sucked under, never to reappear."

By his assumption that there is no such thing as mind or consciousness the behaviorist has thrown out a protective mechanism that is impervious to the weapons alike of argument and of ridicule. When he reduces instincts to the congenital responses of fear, love, anger, etc. (he apologizes for the continued use of these "literary" terms), or to love behavior, rage behavior and fear behavior, it is useless to point out to him that there is a conscious content in these primary responses and a great gulf fixed between them and purely mechanical action. When Watson says again: "By 'memory,' then, we mean nothing except the fact that when we meet a stimulus again after an absence, we do the old habitual thing—that we learned to do when we were in the presence of that stimulus in the first place,"²¹ we would waste our breath if we insisted that we could never recognize the stimulus as the same nor the response as the same without the aid of the discarded memory. And when, further, responses and re-

²⁰ P. 200.

²¹ *Behaviorism*, p. 190.

flexes are substituted for purpose it is idle to declare, using the words of John Dewey, that "complete adaptation to environment means death. The essential point in all response is the desire to control the environment." The trenchant arguments of J. B. Pratt in his *Matter and Spirit*, of Lovejoy in his "Paradox of the Thinking Behaviorist,"²² and of McDougall and Prince in the volume we have been considering seem to make no dent in the behaviorist's armor. Perhaps our only refuge is in the hope that you can't fool all the people—even all the psychologists—all the time.

Possibly we may find a vulnerable point in one of Watson's favorite illustrations, used in his lectures in *Psychologies of 1925* and in his *Behaviorism* (1925), for the purpose of proving that "psychology is a natural science—a definite part of biology."²³ "I have in my hand a hardwood stick. If I throw it forward and upward it goes a certain distance and drops to the ground. I retrieve the stick, put it in hot water, bend it at a certain angle, throw it out again—it goes outward, revolving as it goes for a short distance, turns to the right then drops down. Again I retrieve the stick, reshape it slightly and make its edges convex. I call it a boomerang. Again I throw it upward and outward. Again it goes forward revolving as it goes. Suddenly it turns, comes back and gracefully and kindly falls at my feet. It is still a stick, still made of the same material, but it has been shaped differently. *Has the boomerang an instinct to return to the hand of the thrower?* No? Well, why does it return? Because it is made in such a manner that when it is thrown upward and outward with a given force it must return (parallelogram of forces)."²⁴ The application is obvious. "Man is made up of certain kinds of material—put together in certain ways. If he is hurled into action (as a result of stimulation) may he not exhibit movement (in advance of train-

²² *Philosophical Review*, March, 1922.

²³ See p. 34 of the former volume, from which we quote.

²⁴ Pp. 12, 13.

ing) just as peculiar as (but no more mysterious than) that of the boomerang?"²⁵

Sometimes the boomerang returns to smite the thrower. The two objects compared, boomerang and man, differ in several essential respects. The man knows what he is doing when he makes the boomerang, and he makes it for a special purpose, so that something beside the boomerang illustration is needed to banish consciousness and purpose from the universe. Perhaps the mechanical action of the boomerang will illustrate action of the simple reflex type, but even this is doubtful. Kurt Koffka says that "Marina dissected the inner and outer muscles of the eyes of monkeys and connected them crossways. An impulse sent to contract the external muscle of the right eye ought now to result in a movement toward the left and *vice versa*. The monkey should look to the left when a bright spot appears at the right. In reality, however, nothing of the kind took place. As soon as the wounds healed the animal moved his eyes as normally as before the operation. Thus the conception of a merely contingent connection between situation and response breaks down even at the reflex level."²⁶

It is fortunate that the boomerang cannot "deviate" or be guilty of "socially untrained" conduct, but this emphasizes the fact that it cannot be trained to make "learned" or "conditioned" responses. What a world of mental activity in both learner and teacher may be concealed under the term "learned responses"! Why cannot the boomerang learn? Another difference, and one that opens the gap between man and boomerang still wider, is that a man, if he is a behaviorist, can alter or condition the actions of people, if he can catch them young enough, to an indefinite extent. If the behaviorist had his way with children the babies would stop crying (except when in actual pain) and would no longer be frightened by black cats or other animals, the preachers would stop preaching, the introspectionists would stop introspect-

²⁵ P. 13.

²⁶ P. 131.

ing, the judges would leave the bench, psychology would become "a natural science," and everybody would be happy. It is a paradox that people who insist upon putting on others the strait jacket of "strict determinism" reserve for themselves the liberty of influencing the thoughts and conduct of their fellows in a way that almost approaches omnipotence. When it comes to pass that boomerangs begin to instruct and reform their fellow boomerangs and teach them to deviate from the path of "congenital response," then the analogy between boomerang and man, between boomerang and behaviorist, will be more convincing.

Another striking fact, not to overdo the matter, is that a boomerang cannot talk. We strongly suspect that man is a talking animal because he is a thinking animal, and we recall the statement of Max Müller to the effect that "the formation of language attests from the very first the presence of a rational mind." To be on safe ground the behaviorist should stop talking and, as one of his critics advises, "content himself with relaxing and contracting his muscles." As soon as the behaviorist (even if it be in Carnegie Hall at two or three dollars per ticket) begins to debate the question, "Is Man a Machine?" he *ipso facto* ceases to be a machine. He should not only stop talking, but should stop being conscious that he is stopping. The only consistent behaviorist is the behaviorist when he is asleep and not dreaming.

We suspect that what the behaviorist has in mind when he denies the existence of mind or consciousness is an objection not so much to the existence as to the efficiency of consciousness. With proper scorn and in italics Watson remarks that "no psychologist today would like to be classed as believing in *interaction*.—If '*mind*' acts on body, then all physical laws are invalid."²⁷ The editor of the Clark University volume, Carl Murchison, shrewdly remarks that he is convinced "that experimental methods are largely instances of the more or less systematic theories of the experimenter."

²⁷ *Behaviorism*, pp. 242, 243.

The shortcomings of the behavioristic psychologists are due to the philosophy of materialism and mechanism which underlies their psychology. It is this that leads them sedulously to avoid "anthropomorphism" even when dealing with human nature, and to side-track at all costs the problems of knowledge, of purpose and of the psychophysical relation.

Consciousness—that is, efficient consciousness—is the Great Intruder in a mechanical or naturalistic scheme of the universe. At all costs it must be kept from doing anything, and the only safe way to keep it from doing anything is to exclude it from real existence altogether. Huxley's "steam whistle" theory was only partially satisfactory, and the theory of parallelism, which was popular twenty years ago but is now rather *démodé*, while it effectually side-tracked consciousness and kept it from any influence upon events in the physical world, at least allowed to it a quasi-activity in its own sphere. The method of the modern psychologist is more drastic. He ignores the very existence of consciousness. In haughty disdain he passes it by without recognition. If compelled to notice it at all he at once merges it into the organism on the one hand or the environment on the other. If a behaviorist of the Watson school, he identifies it with bodily movement, especially laryngeal vibration. If an evolutionist of the Dewey school, he characterizes it as a quality of the "real object." The same motives that induce the naturalistic theologian to deny miracle and the supernatural, so as to shut out the activity of a personal God from nature, history and experience, operate with the naturalistic philosopher or psychologist and lead him to exclude an efficient consciousness from his scheme of things altogether. The result is what may be called an intellectual apostasy in our intellectual centers and our great universities. The intellect in circles in which it should magnify its office, that is in the departments of philosophy and psychology in our universities, sees fit to abdicate its throne, and to immolate itself upon the altar of materialism and mechanism. The young people in our schools are forbidden to believe in that essen-

tial quality of human nature which distinguishes man from the brute. They are forbidden to look backward in memory, or inward in introspection and self-examination, or forward in purpose, or upward in worship. They are asked to accept a philosophy which makes the philosopher (to borrow a phrase from Durant's *Story of Philosophy*) "an automaton automatically reflecting upon his own automatism."

After all the strongest indictment against behaviorism is not that it is hopelessly inconsistent and palpably absurd but that it obliterates all moral distinctions. What sort of behavior will behaviorism legitimately promote? This is the most important question when multitudes of the youth in our colleges and universities are being taught its principles. The plain fact is that morality as a binding restraint upon human conduct and with it reverence for life and for the sacredness of human personality are by the progress of behaviorism "sucked under, never to reappear." If the conduct of man is first assimilated to that of the animal, and then the behavior of both animal and man is further reduced by a rigid determinism to the type of mechanical action, if unsocial conduct is simply that which the majority dislikes, although a more enlightened minority may think it desirable for its purpose, then the safeguards thrown by morality and religion around human life and the family relation and the obligations of law and the rights of property are broken down. Then the legitimate fruit of behaviorism in the sphere of moral behavior is indicated by the statement of one of the principles in a famous murder case, that it is as justifiable to kill a human being for the purposes of science as to stick a pin through a beetle.

What is needed today is, to use an expression of the late Professor Ormond, the "re-ification of the Ego." When consciousness goes conscience goes with it, and when free-will and responsibility are denied their place is taken by lawless individualism and an ethic of self-assertion.

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HOLY SCRIPTURES AND IMAGINAL CONTEXTS

In one of our very progressive theological schools there was not long ago a student who noticed that in the courses he attended doubt was expressed now concerning this and now concerning that passage of Scripture. As he reflected upon the matter he conceived the singular idea of purchasing a copy of the Bible and cutting out those portions the authenticity and authority of which were called in question by his teachers. In the accomplishment of this task he found himself obliged to excise more and more extensively until the mutilated Bible was but a shadow of its former perfection. As it lay on his table its outward appearance was indeed unchanged because criticism even the most radical spares the bindings, but when opened it was discovered to be riddled from cover to cover as though by some voracious and corrupting worm. The fame of this progressively diminishing holy book became widespread. Student pilgrimages were made to inspect the projection *per lacunas* of the scriptural teaching of this school of the prophets, until finally the President of the Seminary became aware that something unusual was taking place. He also came, ascertained the facts, and returned to the Executive Mansion taking with him the maltreated volume. Whereupon, in the language of diplomacy, the incident was declared closed.

Who now was right, the student or the president? The former finding himself in an institution that was making the transition from the older Protestantism for which Scripture was central to the newer Protestantism for which it is peripheral, quite naturally concluded that a Scripture passage doubted was even as a Scripture passage discarded. His president, however, was older and more experienced. No protest on his part is recorded, it is true, against the centrifugal tendency mentioned, but he somehow felt that to doubt Scripture is not of necessity the same as to discard Scripture, and therefore he courteously and tactfully rebuked his student for so supposing.

As we read these lines we are doubtless inclined to see a good reason for the attitude of the student. He probably regarded the Bible as Holy Scripture, as the Word of God. Its interest and value as far as he was concerned lay in its trustworthiness and authority as a revelation from God, a declaration of His saving purpose in the sending of His Son to be the Saviour of the world. Deny its trustworthiness, reject its authority, and it ceased to be for him of any real value; it might as well be destroyed at once and forever as to live on shorn of its unique significance. If it could not any longer be regarded as Holy Scripture it was worthless.

Nevertheless a plausible plea may be offered *pro praeside*. Such gentlemen are always keenly sensitive to practice, if not to theory, and this one probably felt that the student was mistakenly supposing that the aim of the Seminary was to abolish Holy Scripture as *text*. For no well-endowed Seminary wishes to commit suicide, which it would do, at least in that considerable department of itself occupied in giving instruction in the Old and New Testaments and the disciplines derived therefrom, if Holy Scripture as text were annihilated. *De non ente nihil praedicatur*. Therefore, as Hegel remarked concerning the bad State, the Bible would continue to have existence, even when it had lost reality. The president must have known that in this paradoxical world doubt becomes impossible without an object to doubt, comment ceases in the absence of somewhat upon which to comment, radical criticism like the sabre-toothed tiger passes into extinction when its natural prey dies out. Origen felt called to defend Christianity against the attacks of Celsus. He did so, and Celsus lives on immortalized by the efforts of his enemy to destroy him. Indeed our president might have anticipated the day so eagerly described by "progressive" Christians when the old Bible will owe its continued existence to those whose occupation as "critical" students of it would cease if it were destroyed. The student therefore was wrong to this extent. Holy Scripture as text was in no immediate

danger of annihilation, and the president was acting correctly in courteously indicating to him his mistake.

The text of Holy Scripture may therefore be expected to remain, but its meaning may change. The "Book" is still printed in enormous numbers, and is easily the world's "best seller." It is being translated into more and more of earth's Babel tongues, while we English speaking people may read it in the homely Saxon of the King James version or the "modern" speech of London, Glasgow, or Chicago. It is preached each Lord's day from ten thousand pulpits, as *terminus a quo* at least, and it is still part of the curriculum of "religious" education. The commentaries upon it still pour from the printing presses, and ignorance of it is evidence of deficient culture. Holy Scripture as text is thus still with us and may be counted upon to stay, but just as certainly its meaning is constantly subjected to change, and this arises because it is always in the presence of what we shall call *imaginal contexts*.

An imaginal context accompanies every experience.¹ When we read a novel or a history or some work of descriptive science or any literary product whatever, when we engage in conversation or listen to sermons or lectures or addresses, there are of course the externally aroused perceptions, and there are also the internally aroused imaginal contexts. The former need be present merely in the degree necessary to touch off the latter; and in fact the former may recede so to speak into the background leaving the important place to the latter. Such imaginal contexts are present not only in the configurations called percepts, but in all apprehension, comprehension and elaboration of the "given" factor of our experience. If we apply this thought to the topic in hand, we must recognize that Holy Scripture as an externally perceived or apprehended magnitude is in the presence of a myriad variety of imaginal contexts, and that the effect of such accompaniment is a major problem for any branch of

¹ Cf. Madison Bentley, *The Field of Psychology*, 1925, p. 266.

Protestantism that *ex professo* acknowledges the authority of the Bible. For we must not think that these imaginal commentaries are unreal. It is true that the term imaginary is often used for what has subjective but not objective existence, but as psychological fact, and it is with psychological facts that we are here dealing, it has just as much reality as any other psychological fact. Furthermore, we shall use meaning in the sense of reference, and it is mind in possession of imaginal contexts that recognizes the reference of what is given to something else. A train perceived in the block ahead means caution in approach or complete stopping if such percept enters into relation with the imaginal context of the mind of the engineer of the train following. Three yellow lights seen in the horizontal position at night may serve as a symbol of the same meaning provided the beholder has the appropriate mental context. Historic Protestantism has always considered Holy Scripture as significant, that is to say as filled with meaning, and in its thinking it has used these meanings to gain knowledge of a new order, and in its acting it has used them to set the task and determine the course of the movement. But this demands a congenial imaginal context, a fact that has been recognized practically by all who have dealt with the matter. In the epistle to the Hebrews there is a passage which Westcott translates "For indeed we have received a message of good tidings—a promise of rest—even as also they. But the word did not profit them because it was not incorporated by faith in them that heard." That is to say the divine message was indeed apprehended as *text*, but not finding itself in the proximity of the imaginal context desired, the eventuating mental structure could not be qualified by the word faith. In Romans xii. 6 Paul writes: "And having gifts differing according to the grace that was given to us, whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of our faith." Here the reference is to action. Faith is itself, according to verse 3, a gift of God, and it must condition all the other gifts. In particular the "prophet," the man who speaks for God, must guard against deflection by alien

imaginal context, and must make all square with the truth concerning Christ revealed to his faith. The same thought is also implied in the statement of the Westminster Confession that "the infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself," a principle followed by all the Protestant leaders of the "classic" days—Luther, Melancthon, Zwingli, Calvin, Owen, Edwards, etc.—whose elaborative work and evangelistic activity show what happens when the Scripture text is received into an imaginal context which is itself also scriptural.

It is this latter sort of context that is so difficult to secure today, how difficult may be realized by carefully trying to estimate the influence of the following tendencies in contemporary thought: the scientific movement, the historical, the psychological, and the sociological.

Science in the wide sense denotes knowledge due to the systematic and trustworthy functioning of our powers of cognition; in the narrow sense it is applied to the result of an investigation limited to phenomena and the laws of phenomenal reality. In modern times Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the thinker who imagined the future, for which the patient genius of Galileo (1564-1642) and Isaac Newton (1642-1727) provided the principles. In France, Germany and England during the first half of the nineteenth century a multitude of thinkers cooperated in applying these principles to the remarkable increase of human knowledge. The second half of the nineteenth century saw each of the scientific fields mapped in outline during the first half develop into a vast domain far beyond the ability of any one man to master no matter how great his native capacity nor how encyclopedic his knowledge. The result has been not only a great expansion of wealth and socialization, but a complete transformation of the world of the understanding.²

If the fifteenth century may be characterized as the age of the Renaissance, the sixteenth as the age of the Reformation,

² Cf. Th. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. I., pp. 1-301.

the eighteenth as that of Philosophy, the nineteenth may be fittingly designated the century of Science. It is, therefore, no wonder that some enthusiasts claim for science all authority in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of earth to cause all things to undergo its inquisition and conform to its comments. How this bears on the reading and the hearing of Holy Scripture is quite plain. From a mass of statement that indicates what the imaginal context of science is in this regard let us select the following by Professor C. C. J. Webb:

This (viz. the ideal of religion associated with Christianity) may be presented in a pictorial guise. It is so in the familiar scheme of a historical process which, starting from the creation of man, his temptation and fall, leads through the selection and discipline of a peculiar people from whom the Redeemer should in the fulness of time proceed, to the redemption of the whole race by Jesus Christ, the incarnate son of God, and the offer of a share in this redemption to all mankind through the missionary activity of the Christian Church; and culminates in the second coming of Jesus Christ in glory, to exercise the final judgment of God upon every individual human being. This scheme, which satisfied the imaginations of Augustine and of Dante, of Milton and of Pascal, it is not indeed possible for us to accept as more than a symbolic picture. It is too late in the day to rehabilitate the credit of the book of Genesis as a faithful record of the origin of the world and of mankind, or that of the New Testament eschatology as an accurate forecast of their future destiny. Nor can those whose conception of the extent and duration of the physical universe and of the process of evolution whereof human nature and human civilization are the outcome has been moulded by the scientific discoveries of the last four centuries be content with an account of the world's history which presupposes the cosmology of an age in which these discoveries were undreamed of. But the traditional picture which has so long been associated with the Christian religion may suggest an ideal of a religion for all mankind, capable of being expressed in terms that do not presuppose obsolete beliefs.³

This attitude to the Holy Scripture in general is exemplified in the attitude assumed to particular statements and doctrines. As solution of the problem of the relation between God and the universe Scripture asserts the origin of the world in creation and its upholding in providence. This is in marked contrast to the eastern solution of the problem by emanation, and the western by materialism. Creation's purpose is de-

³ *Science, Religion and Reality*. Edited by Joseph Needham. 1925. p. 335.

clared to be the manifestation of the divine power, wisdom and goodness, while providence coextensive with creation is asserted to consist in preservation and ruling, and to be teleological—consciously intended to secure the realization of the divine perfections. But all of these views tend to throw out of equilibrium the imaginal context of science and are therefore either ignored or changed into their opposites. The evolutionist of the right may, as does Professor Osborne, favor belief in a First Cause, but at once he minimizes the scope and the importance of His operations. The evolutionist of the left extends so widely the concepts of mechanistic biology and behavioristic psychology that all statements made by the Scriptures concerning the necessity of a personal God at the beginning or later sound to him like the profitless prattle of pre-scientific childishness.

Running through Scripture like a scarlet thread is the reiterated promise of redemption and the complementary recognition of human sin and guilt. No explanatory theory is offered to solve the mystery of sin's entrance, but man's original state is described as sinless, from which by a deliberate act of wilfulness he fell into depravity and ill-desert. But this view does not make a harmony with the notes already in the scientific mind. Professor H. H. Newman⁴ gives the "consensus" of scientific opinion on the origin of man as follows: The *Hominidae*, comprising the Java man, the Heidelberg man, and the Piltdown man, or *Pithecanthropos*, *Paleanthropos*, and *Eoanthropos* respectively, date from 100,000 or more years ago. *Homo* contains three species, the Neanderthal man, a being of low stature, stooped shoulders, long, flat and relatively large head, apelike brow ridges, narrow forehead, protruded countenance, taurodont teeth, and large brain, deficient however in those portions associated with the higher mental processes; the Rhodesian man, and the Cro-magnon man or *homo sapiens* of 25,000 years ago, a race to which we have the good fortune to belong. Man is

⁴ In Chapter VIII of Professor Shailer Mathew's volume, *Contributions of Science to Religion*, 1924.

thus in every part of his being, body and mind, a slow growth upward from the animal. If this be true, the Scripture's information concerning a state of innocence and a fall must be a Semitic myth, for evolution knows neither the one nor the other. Scripture teaches that sin was no inevitable necessity for man, but evolution defines sin as survival of what in its day was useful, but with the lapse of time is no longer so, and sees in such evil an unavoidable accompaniment of development. Once again no evenly balanced configuration is possible unless one side or the other is transformed. Either Scripture must be modified or the imaginal context of science must change, and under the circumstances it is the former alternative that many take.

Scripture also presents for our consideration many miracles or events in the external world which are to be interpreted as indications of the continuing creative power of God. To these the imaginal context of science is openly antagonistic. The reasons are many, but they can be reduced to two. Miracles violate the principle of uniformity and are therefore impossible. This was the objection of Spinoza in his *Tractatus Theologico-politicus* (1670),⁵ where he argues that the general laws of nature are God's eternal decrees from which everything must follow with mathematical exactitude. Therefore miracles as exceptional events are excluded. Again, no amount of testimony can establish the fact of miracles since the probability that the witnesses were mistaken will always be greater than the probability that the miracles actually happened. This was the objection of David Hume in his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1777).⁶

In the Scripture text there is also exhortation that prayer should be offered to God coupled with the reminder that all acceptable prayer must be through our Lord's mediation and the Holy Spirit's help. In possible prayer it includes gratitude, penitence, hope, submission, confidence, desire, and petitions for blessings temporal and spiritual. Prayer in any

⁵ Chapter VI.

⁶ Section X.

form is not seldom condemned by the scientist. But it is the petitionary aspect of prayer that meets most frequently the disapproving commentary of the scientific mind, since the determinism of the scientist implies the absolute continuity of natural law, and interprets the divine immanence in such a way as virtually to imprison God in His universe, and he therefore feels impelled to do one of the following: either ignore this aspect of prayer,⁷ or hold that petitionary prayer to a Personal Being by one holding the scientific concept of reality is a contradiction that will probably always be unsolved,⁸ or definitely exclude petition and reduce prayer to subjective contemplation of the "All-loving."⁹

Finally Holy Scripture asks us to believe in the resurrection of the body, and in personal immortality. Every lover of the Bible has found comfort and inspiration for continued efforts in right living in these plain statements, but here again no answering echo comes back from the imaginal comment of the scientist. Kant in his departmental survey of human faculties found no place for personal immortality in the halls of reason, although he did admit its value as a demand of ethical practice. But the dwelling place of science is in the former, not the latter, and therefore there is the possibility that Professor Leuba's statistical proof is correct¹⁰ that the majority of present day scientists either reject the belief *in toto* or seriously doubt it.

A second type of imaginal context is that of the modern historian, and we shall, therefore, endeavor to ascertain the character of the mental structure resulting in this type of thought when Holy Scripture attempts to enter the configuration. History is the science which ascertains and records past

⁷ As for example Professor E. G. Conklin in *The Direction of Human Evolution*.

⁸ So Professor Shailer Mathews in *Contributions of Science to Religion*.

⁹ So S. T. Klein, in *The Meeting Place of Science and Mysticism*, the Tenth Essay in *The Power of Prayer*, 1920.

¹⁰ Contained in his *Belief in God and Immortality*, 1916.

events,¹¹ and its "logic" deals with method, while its "philosophy" deals with place and value. It attempts unlike sociology first to grasp man's social activities in their individuality, and then to group them into a developing complex of events. In its carrying out of this task history reconstructs past actions from their residues which may be either remains or traditions. The historian assembles his sources, criticises them and sifts them, groups them into logical and chronological complexes, and then writes his story in the clearest prose he can command, adding footnotes and appendices in which he enumerates his sources and gives critical discussion. Assuming the truth of our description, it becomes evident that Holy Scripture is for the historian merely material from which, plus other sources, by the application of the historical method a provisionally finished product may be constructed. Thus the imaginal context of the historian continuously sets him the task of reconstructing Scripture in accord with some value adopted as norm of what should be included or excluded from the synthesis. As example of what this means notice the following from Professor Fling:¹²

It is affirmed in an historical document that on a certain occasion water was changed into wine. The affirmation cannot be localized, that is, we do not know who saw this performance nor when he made a record of what he thought he saw, but even if the affirmation were of a more valuable nature, even if it could be definitely localized, it would not establish the probability of the thing asserted, *because all reliable human experience indicates that the thing could not have taken place*. We know what the chemical composition of wine is and what the chemical composition of water is and we know of no way in which the elements of water—oxygen and hydrogen—can be combined to produce wine, *i.e.* fermented grape juice. If the witness believed that he saw water changed into wine, he was self-deceived.

If these are the assumptions the historian acts upon, the result must mean a complete transformation of Scripture and a consequent transfer of authority from the Scripture

¹¹ Ernst Bernheim's *Lehrbuch des historischen Methode*, 6th edit. 1908, is generally accepted as an authoritative treatise on the method of history. F. M. Fling in his *The Writing of History*, 1923, popularizes Bernheim and adds from his own experience.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

known by the Church to the Scripture as reconstructed by the historical critic. But criticism shows that the origin of the Bible was rational and natural. Therefore verbal inspiration cannot be maintained and infallibility must be abandoned. *The only condition on which modern thought can recognize the authority of Scripture is the proof or conviction that Scripture teaching is itself rational.*¹³ Therefore the historian like the scientist finds that Scripture, when part of his mental configuration, means something entirely at variance with the historic understanding of it in Christianity generally.

Let us now turn our investigation to psychology with the aim of ascertaining the mind of the psychologist when Holy Scripture presents itself to his apprehension. Our endeavor will be facilitated if we examine first the historical development of psychology and then its chief present tendencies. The history of opinion concerning psychology shows that the start was made with the soul and that the method was to deduce the characters of the soul from its definition and then by analysis to ascertain their implications and relations. This was the so-called Rational Psychology in the development of which various *nuances* are distinguishable. With respect to the soul's nature this psychological tendency might be either spiritualistic or materialistic, and with respect to the relation between soul and body either dualistic or monistic. We might, therefore, think that there would be four kinds of Rational Psychology, but since the dualistic view if consistent must look on the soul as spiritual and the body as material, while monism may be either spiritual or material, there are only three schools of Rational Psychology: the Dualists, exemplified by Plato, Aristotle, the Scholastics and Descartes; the Spiritual Monists, exemplified by Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Kant, and Lotze; and the Materialistic Monists, exemplified by Hobbes, Diderot, Moleschott, and Büchner. But Rational Psychology is from today's viewpoint not psychology but metaphysics, and is largely of

¹³ So Prof. A. C. Knudson in *Present Tendencies in Religious Thought*, 1924, Chap. II.

historical interest merely. What we have now is Empirical Psychology, or the kind that bases its conclusions not on a *a priori* deduction, but on observation and experiment. It has also passed through various stages. Faculty Psychology observed mind under the influence of the hypothesis that it was composed of "faculties," a term first used by C. Wolff (1679-1754), who conceived them as independent but interacting forces. He divided them into "acted on" (knowledge and desire) and "active" (will). Later J. N. Tetens (1736-1807) introduced the three-fold division into intellect, feeling and will, which adopted by Kant is now the common property of the man on the platform and the man on the street. Association Psychology saw in every idea an independent, permanent and revivable entity with power of fellowship with other ideas. Hume and Hartley began this tendency, and Mill, Bain, Herbart, and Spencer continued it. But neither the Faculty Psychology nor the Association Psychology is now in favor since each makes assumptions that are not verifiable by experience. But while there is practical unanimity in this rejection, there is by no means a similar unanimity in what should replace them. In the Powell Lectures in Psychological Theory given at Clark University during 1925,¹⁴ gave opportunity for expression of the following five contemporary tendencies: Behaviorism, represented by J. B. Watson and W. S. Hunter, which holds that psychology should confine itself to the study of man's "repertoire of responses"; Dynamic Psychology, represented by R. S. Woodworth, which looks upon psychology as essentially a study of processes all of which whether bodily or mental may be conceived under the formula of stimulus and response; *Gestalt* Psychology, represented by Kurt Koffka and W. Köhler, which in opposition to the undue use of analysis advocates psychology as the study of the structural wholes or unities of phenomenal experience; Purposive Psychology, represented by Morton Prince and Wm. McDougall, which is

¹⁴ Published in 1926 under the title of *Psychologies of 1925*.

convinced that men cannot be treated as machines, but should be looked on as purposive intelligent agents striving to improve themselves and their environing conditions; Reaction Psychology, represented by Knight Dunlap, which holds that all the problems of the scientist should be attacked by the laboratory methods of observation and experiment, aided by all the refinements of measurement possible. It is significant that Freudism is conspicuous by its absence. The fact is that notwithstanding its train of adulators, male and female, and its vogue in the psychology of religion¹⁵ psychology applied to religious education, and psychological "therapy," especially in those who write on these matters in Great Britain, the notions it uses in psychoanalysis are really speculative and metaphysical, not empirical,¹⁶ and therefore, in spite of the fact that it has emphasized certain matters that scientific psychology tends to overlook and has certain "cures" of mental disorder to its credit, it occupies a relation to the "orthodox" psychology of the time somewhat analogous to that of osteopathy and chiropractic to the theory and practice of medicine taught in our "standard" medical schools. But after remarking upon this omission, we find ourselves faced at present not by psychology, but rather by "psychologies." As Madison Bentley said in his Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association at Ithaca, December 29, 1925:

The present sharp antithesis among the fundamental concepts of psychology calls for serious remark, for it is not usual for any established science to sustain radically divergent views upon the essential nature of its material. Diverse views upon method and procedure we frequently find, as well as disagreements upon the ultimate use or the outside relations of a discipline; but it is rare to find antithetical positions held upon the very objects and processes which compose the fabric of a science. Now this is virtually the state of psychology today, etc.

¹⁵ So called, but really a "border line" science filled with material from anthropology, sociology and philosophy of religion.

¹⁶ And yet R. H. Thouless in his *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, 1923, does not hesitate to call Professor Freud the greatest name in psychology since Aristotle!

We may now attempt to estimate how Holy Scripture fares in the imaginal context of the psychologist. The Scripture frequently mentions conversion both in allusion and by example, assigning as its efficient cause, God who works on human nature to bring about a rebirth from despair to hope, unbelief to faith, sin to repentance, death to life. But this assigns conversion to a metempirical cause, and the context of the psychologist, dealing as it does only with observable instrumental causes, is prone to assert that these are all there are, and to settle into an equilibrium of structure in which the distinctive viewpoint of Scripture has no place.¹⁷ The Holy Scripture also asks a favoring response to the dictum that the ethical life it describes as well pleasing to God is inspirationally revealed as to its content and supernaturally conditioned as to its realization. But again the imaginal context of present psychology recoils from such authoritative utterance. Its "inner voice" urges that the content of the holy life is composed of ideals that should be selected because of their utility for modern circumstances, and that they can be realized by appropriate pedagogical

¹⁷ Jung, although belonging to the unwillingly recognized tendency mentioned in the foregoing, illustrates the same naturalistic tendency in his treatment of the conversion of St. Paul (quoted in R. H. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, 1923, p. 189f.) His view is that although the moment of a conversion seems sometimes quite sudden and unexpected, yet we know from repeated experience that such a fundamental occurrence always has a long period of unconscious incubation. It is only when the preparation is complete, that is to say, when the individual is ready to be converted, that the new view breaks forth with great emotion. St. Paul had already been a Christian for a long time, but unconsciously; hence his fanatical resistance to the Christians, because fanaticism exists chiefly in individuals who are "compensating" for secret doubts. The incident of his hearing the voice of Christ on his way to Damascus marks the moment when the unconscious complex of Christianity became conscious, etc. Jung then proceeds to explain Paul's vision of Christ as the projection of an unconscious complex on to the external world, while the apostle's blindness was psychogenic, etc. Similar thoughts were previously put forth by Wm. James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, and they are to be found in practically all of those who write on the psychology of religious states.

methods. The old-fashioned appeal of the Bible, therefore, meets from the psychologist the same lack of sympathy that it found in its approach to the scientist and the historian. Here as there the lacking factor is a congenial imaginal context.

Let us now use the best information we can find to form an opinion concerning the imaginal context of the sociologists when Holy Scripture attempts to impress itself upon their mental structures. We may clarify our task somewhat by distinguishing sociology and politics as sciences that describe actual social and political institutions in the present and in history, and as philosophy concerned with the ethical ends or values involved in these same social and political establishments. We shall find it necessary to bear both in mind. The problem of all social workers and thinkers is set by Rousseau as follows:

To discover a type of association which will defend and protect with all the power of the community the person and the goods of each of its members, yet by which each one, while uniting himself with all the rest, will at the same time obey himself only and remain as free as before.¹⁸

This sets the problem of the reconciliation of freedom and government, of individualism and collectivism, and brings it about that in the science we are estimating the task of description is closely allied to that of valuation. "Theories" of society, therefore, may be employed either as ideas by which to organize subject matter, or as formulas by which the problem of Rousseau may be solved. Five historical solutions may be distinguished, and there are three present views.¹⁹ The historical theories are those of Plato, whose "perfect" city is based on division of labor and fulfilment of function; of the Stoics and Romans, whose ideal was that of an empire embodying completely the concept of natural

¹⁸ "Trouver une forme d'association que défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun, s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même, et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant." (*Contrat Social*, I. Ch. VI).

¹⁹ Cf. N. Wilde, *Ethical Basis of the State*, 1924, one of the best and clearest of recent introductions to the modern theory of society.

law and natural right; of Thomas Hobbes, who believing that men are innately and incorrigibly selfish, outlined a state that would provide the maximum of individual gratification; of John Locke, in whose ideal state sovereignty would rest with the people and procedure would be guided by justice; and of Rousseau, whose attempt was to exhibit the features of a state that would embody the general will. The present views are those of the Absolutists, for whom the state embraces all good; of the Anarchists, for whom the state embodies no good; and of the Pluralists, who as represented by H. J. Laski²⁰ argue that the state is but one of a plurality of coordinate institutions competing for the loyalty of its included members. What now is the reception accorded by the imaginal commentary which these views build up in those who study them towards Holy Scripture?

God's Word, as historical Protestantism takes it to be, calls on men to believe in the existence of a society called the Church, organized by Christ, and composed of believers and their children. It ascribes to this society a variety of supernatural endowments, chief of which is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit of Christ, and asserts that it has a distinct function to perform in the world. But these notions do not combine in a complete and pleasing harmony with the imaginal context of the sociologist. His study reckons with other forces than those which Scripture describes as operative in the production of the Church, and he is inclined to deny the existence of the latter. The climate in which he lives most enjoyably is that of "dynamic democracy," in which all problems are settled by socio-economic interests. For him progress is a law of nature; evil and immorality tend to disappear; political and economic measures should replace the need of moral and spiritual regeneration, and the Church, if the gates of Hades are not to prevail against it,²¹ must believe itself a society to

²⁰ In his book entitled *The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays*, 1921, and in later writings.

²¹ A fate which the well known sociologist, Professor J. M. Mecklin, in his *The Survival Value of Christianity*, 1925, prophesies will overtake

promote good will among men without inquiring too inquisitively whether God is well pleased with them or not. But this is not the relation of Church and State as historic Protestantism on the basis of Holy Scripture understands it.

In the situation we have endeavored to describe is a new form of the problem that has confronted Protestantism ever since the Reformation rediscovered the Scriptures and assigned to them the normative function in religious belief and ethical practice. Two solutions of this problem.²² are theoretically possible and historically actual. One is that of Liberal Christianity, the other is that of Historic Protestantism.

Liberal Christianity always aims at the reconciliation of religion and culture, and its method has always been that of concession and adaptation. Thus, Humanism found difficulty in accepting many of the tenets held by the Reformation, but the "advanced" Protestant of the time soon discovered a way whereby the Humanist could without embarrassment enter into fellowship with him. The years passed by and the tide set as strongly as ever against Reformed Christianity. The Holy Scripture on which it based its faith was subjected to radical and destructive criticism; all the beliefs based on Scripture as to Christ, pre-existent, supernaturally incarnated, essentially divine; and man, sinful, depraved, guilty, needing salvation, redemption, immortality, judgment, heaven and hell, were all called in question; all the conduct derived from Scripture was examined in order to determine its utility for men progressively "modern." The situation seemed threatening. Could historic Protestantism survive? Might it not become of "historic" interest only, that is to say of next to no interest at all, and without efficiency for present practice? While many questioned these things and the hearts

it unless it ceases to be controlled by obscurantists who oppose scientific education, popular enlightenment, and freedom of thought and who further such mistaken activities as the "Scopes trial," laws against the teaching of evolution, etc.

²² We do not count as solutions any plan that would discard Holy Scripture completely. Such procedure is equivalent to the child's solving of the problems set him in arithmetic by wiping the slate clean.

of many failed them for fear, there arose J. G. Herder (1744-1803) with the exact slogan needed, "Let us humanize Christianity, and Christianize humanity." The first part of this endeavor has been very successfully completed by Liberal Christianity, the second is not yet accomplished. Let us examine how the former part stands by examining a concrete illustration taken from a recent volume written as auxiliary text for beginning classes in the study of philosophy or method of science.²³ The traditional and liberal views of the Old Testament are contrasted, and the familiar arguments are marshalled to show that all men who claim culture must accept the latter—the Bible contains many errors, its moral and religious teaching is seriously defective in many parts, its cosmology is pre-scientific, etc. All claims that the Bible was supernaturally produced must therefore be frankly renounced, and it must be assigned merely the first place in the spiritual literature of the world. But even this first place cannot be awarded to all of it, but merely to certain parts selected according to Coleridge's rule that inspiration attaches only to those sections of the Scripture that rouse in us an adequate spiritual response. To quote:

From this point of view the Bible owes its unique position in the religious world, partly to its high insights expressed in everyday speech, and partly to the fact that so many generations of men of aspiration have approved those insights and witnessed to them in, and sometimes with, their lives. Coleridge's test of spiritual truth, mentioned above, is evidently not a scientific one; for it does not appeal to a standard which is, or can be, *common* to all trained minds. On the contrary it appeals to the *individual* mind. The teachings which actually awoke within him a spiritual response were doubtless dependent for their effect upon his emotional sensitiveness; and this is by no means alike in men of equal intellectual competency.²⁴

Liberal Christians (taking their profession at its face

²³ *An Introduction to Reflective Thinking*. 1923. By Columbia Associates in Philosophy. Chapter VIII, from which our remarks are taken, is entitled *How Reflective Thought Deals with the Past, as Illustrated by the Criticism of the Pentateuch*, and was prepared under the helpful advice of Professor Henry Preserved Smith of Union Theological Seminary, New York.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 210f.

value) recognize that the naturalistic and rationalistic viewpoint if allowed full control would be fatal both to the Bible as source of revelation and to the revelation itself. They take to themselves the credit of having in no small degree averted this disaster, and they can point with pride and satisfaction to the imposing number of eminent scholars in all departments of theological study who have worked so successfully in the humanizing of Christianity that the Christianizing of humanity would seem to follow as a matter of course. For, to borrow from Professor Gustav Krüger of Giessen²⁵ "we cannot forget that their answer (i.e. the answer of the Reformers as to the place of the Bible in the Church) is embedded in the world-view of bygone times, in that primitive topography which talked of heaven and hell as eschatological realities in the literal sense, and for which there existed angels and demons and a God enthroned above the clouds," and that "even today millions of persons, in spite of all the talk about the Copernican world-view and the Darwinian theories of evolution,²⁶ stand before the Bible and its sacred story like children before a fairy-tale; they see Adam and Eve walking in the Garden of Eden, regard as the corner stone of their faith the marvellous story of Jesus, as summed up in the second article of the Creed, and picture to themselves the end of all things with the imagery of the Revelation of St. John." We agree that if the salvation of Christianity means its uniting with the culture of the age, so that the *intelligentsia*, in whom the fate of humanity is bound up, may find Christianity acceptable, the simple believers described, who accept the Bible *sans phrase*, are quite incapable of the task. Liberal

²⁵ *The Harvard Theological Review*, July, 1926, p. 251f.

²⁶ And yet the volume, *Science, Religion and Reality*, 1925, edited by a foremost student of Bio-chemistry in Cambridge, allows the Dean of St. Paul's to assure us, p. 369, "The legacy of Darwin is now in a state of chaos. Some reject natural selection and the struggle for existence altogether as explanations; indefinite variation is opposed by orthogenesis, slight variations by saltatory mutations. There are neo-Lamarckians and neo-Vitalists. But besides this, reflection on Darwinism proper, when treated as a philosophy, shows that its outcome is not Naturalism, but something more like sceptical pragmatism. etc."

Christianity is capable, and has done it. But what of the result?

This space-time universe in which we dwell has a curious fashion of testing the individual entities that compose it, and the test of the solution we have described came in Europe by the calamity of the World War, and is now on us in America in the more subtle and more merciless test of unparalleled prosperity. The millions of Protestants who returned home after the terrific experiences of the World War—did they find a sustaining spiritual food in the smooth-running Liberal Protestantism, for which no difficulties existed in Scripture, since modern scholarship had abolished all of them, and none in theology, since all the old troublesome metaphysics had been excluded, and replaced by the sincere and simple social Gospel of "God's palship" under the guidance of the beautiful life of Jesus, as all we know in this life and all we need to know? Our answer is that they did not. Why, they queried, adapt Christianity to a "culture" which had employed all its resources, scientific, economic, mathematic, chemic, and philosophic, in bringing upon the earth more woe than all previous wars together had engendered? What *is* Christianity, was the question, with this bankrupt culture subtracted from it? But to this Liberal Christianity can give no answer, for the simple reason that it has none to give. A similar result is more slowly coming to notice under the unparalleled prosperity of our own country. The effects are more difficult to discern because in the nature of the case statistical proof is excessively hard to get, and therefore we must depend on individual observation and (always to be cautiously made) induction from it. But one is led to suspect a high positive correlation between the absence of vital Christian faith and the presence of the views mentioned. There is social activity of a sort, pan-aestheticism, polite speech and good manners, but no evidence of conviction as to either the existence or character of God, faith in the Redeemerhood of Jesus Christ, recognition of the awfulness of sin, no belief in immortality. The absence of these

things may "humanize" Christianity, but is the result "Christianity"?

Our conclusion is, then, that the present liberalizing movement has tended to failure just as similar movements have done in the past. We shall offer two explanations why it cannot achieve the end it seeks. The first is that its method of arriving at the object of religion can never yield that object. Religion is impossible without faith, and faith is impossible without an object, and the object, if it is to have religious value, must be fixed and final, the same yesterday and today and forever. But the scientific methods of which Liberal Christianity is so proud can never yield such an object. Science as the study of the general can never give it, because science goes from one hypothesis to another in an endless series of ever greater inclusions and generalizations. History as the study of the individual that never repeats itself is equally powerless, because it furnishes merely an endless series of probabilities. Liberal Christianity is quite consequent in adding to its scientificism and historicism the principle of Coleridge (or of Schleiermacher?), it is equally consequent in its frank acknowledgment that this principle is non-scientific, but it is inconsequent in thinking that thus the object of faith can be reached, and that a social religion can be based on what it itself concedes is a non-social or individual principle of evaluation.

The second explanation is psychological. A medicine that fails to take account of the physical constitution of man is fore-doomed to failure, and equally so is a movement that would Christianize humanity and yet fails to note the psychological conditions. Of course humanity is a social entity, but it is made up of individuals and can only be understood by studying the individuals on their social side. The individuals, further, can be understood psychologically only by using the methods of empirical science and taking great care not to substitute hypothetical powers for the sober facts given by observation and experiment. What then do we find? That we are mistaken if we assume that when a system of belief and prac-

tice is analyzed and logically arranged according to some organizing idea, it will function in that way in the mind of the person who apprehends it. But actual observation and experiment leads us to believe that what for conceptual analysis is a series of separate existents, becomes a unified configuration which may function as the topic of some mental elaboration or the determiner of some action or the "situation" for some emotion. Now our claim is that in these mental structures the dominant tone is in the generality of cases given by the imaginal context mentioned in the foregoing. How hopeless then to suppose that the total configuration will become qualifiable by the epithet Christian, until the imaginal context into which the new state is supposed to merge, is itself Christian. But this is exactly the hope of the Liberal Christian. He works out a beautiful conceptual scheme whereby Christianity becomes both scientific and historical in order to Christianize the scientist and the historian, but in vain, since until the imaginal contexts of the latter become Christian, what of Christianity they apprehend becomes in the process un-Christian.

Therefore there remains the solution proposed by our Reformed confessional orthodoxy. We freely agree that these ideas of the fathers lie "embedded in the world view of bygone times," but we do not therefore conclude that it is necessary to take these ideas and embed them in the science of the day, from which our grandchildren must excavate them to re-embed them in the science of tomorrow. Nevertheless we do not belong to the ignorant despisers of science and history, but we would demand that such studies give truth, and truth exists when we come to know things as things really are. Thinking thus Reformed Confessionalism has never been afraid of any scientific investigation of the form or the content of Scripture, provided that care is taken to adhere scrupulously to the "rules of the game." But this the view we contest has not done, for no scientific laboratory would allow the procedure of radical criticism: first to set up a hypothesis, then to shift the data to conform to the hypothesis,

and then to use the data as shifted to confirm the hypothesis. The first rule of all scientific research is "the inviolability of the given." If this rule be broken, then what we observe is not the given, but our own manipulation. In the confessional statements we have in mind three factors appear—Holy Scripture itself, the Holy Spirit's help, and the individual. Scripture itself is presented as the revelation of God's will to men and the description of how men either accepted or rejected that will. Scripture is therefore a *fait accompli*, a *given*, and like all such capable of the most intense study scientific and historical. But Reformed confessionalism laid down two limits to such study: the results might not be substituted as means of revelation for Scripture itself, and they must not contradict what Scripture declares to be the will of God for our salvation. Or in other words, such study must like all history and science cause us to know the truth concerning the data, and the truth is, to repeat, always how things really are. So much then for what may be called the conceptual analysis of the doctrine of Holy Scripture, which thus understood fulfils the requirements for an object of faith. More, however, than conceptual analysis is demanded, as we saw in the foregoing, and more is given in the ideas we are presenting. Individuals who will apprehend and act upon Scripture are implied, and these individuals are constantly in the flux of a developing life. How then secure that amidst all changes the imaginal context, no matter into what key it may be transposed, will always be dominated by the will of God whose expression is Scripture? Following the word of the Master, Reformed confessionalism asserts the help of the Holy Spirit, the phenomenal manifestation of whom in the individual life is "the mind of Christ," not, however, in any mystical sense, but as meaning that things mental tend to accord with God's will for us as expressed in His word according to the selected portion that may form an ingredient of the configuration of the moment.

Can this view be maintained? We are convinced that it can. Will it accomplish that Christianizing of humanity that

both Liberal and Conservative professedly desire? We are sure that it will for it has in fact been followed by this result wherever tried. It is the account that Scripture gives of itself, and it meets man's need for salvation—which in the last analysis is to stand in the presence of God who speaks to us in the Word Incarnate who is the subject of the Word Written, and who through the proffered help of the Holy Spirit invites us to abandon all else and cast ourselves on His mercy.

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CHRIST IN THE LIGHT OF ESCHATOLOGY

The previous century was an era of unusual theological activity. The discussions carried on were mostly Christological; they centered about the historical Jesus. Without any exaggeration it may be said that the *Leben-Jesu Forschung* in Germany constituted one of the chief characteristics of the age from a religious point of view.

These discussions differed materially from those of the earlier centuries that witnessed the great Christological controversies. The simple faith of the Church Fathers was replaced by a cold critical attitude; the believing study of the Word of God changed into a highly complicated process of sifting sources and of extracting from a confused mass of traditional material the elements of truth that had almost suffered a total eclipse. The metaphysical problems that were prominent in the earlier Christological controversies, were not altogether neglected, but completely overshadowed by historical interests.

If the discussions of the early centuries took their starting-point in the Divinity of Jesus Christ, and perhaps emphasized it unduly without doing justice to His true humanity, those of the present day move in the opposite direction. They approach the study of Jesus in a historical way. The searchlight is focussed on the *man* Jesus to such an extent that His Divinity is obscured, if not entirely lost to sight. While in previous centuries the *death* of Jesus and its atoning significance held the attention, during the nineteenth century the *life* of Jesus was stressed as the really important thing. Many denied that Jesus Himself ever ascribed any redemptive significance to His death, and regarded the Pauline interpretation of it as a corruption of the simple Gospel.

Since the days of Strauss the Lives of Jesus have multiplied rapidly, until they now form a rather respectable library by themselves. And, sad to say, the great majority of these "Lives" are of a negative type. When one reviews the long list, one is involuntarily reminded of the word of

Simeon: "Behold, this child is set for . . . a sign which shall be spoken against."

Under the influence of the German enlightenment a strong aversion arose to the supernatural, and daring attempts were made to interpret Christianity in a perfectly natural way. The immutable laws of nature, it was thought, shut out the possibility of the miraculous, so that no sane man could believe in the immediate intervention of a supernatural force in the course of events. The origin of the Bible itself was explained without reference to any special divine factor, as a record of the religious experiences of the ancient Hebrews. And these experiences themselves were regarded as the product of a long process of evolution that was and is carrying the human race to ever higher altitudes of spiritual development. It was but natural, therefore, that the finality of historic Christianity should also be denied. There is today a growing conviction that many of its teachings are already superseded, and that, as evolution accomplishes its perfect work, it gives birth to a religion that is superior to the Christian faith.

But facts are stubborn things, and consequently naturalistic theology has had hard sledding. Many parts of the Bible, many revelational facts, and many phenomena of Christianity utterly defy its attempts at natural and historical interpretation. And Jesus Christ Himself proved ever and again to be the greatest stumbling-block. He is the Rock of Ages against which all the furious waves of unbelief dash in impotent rage. He bids defiance to the votaries of evolution, is the despair of naturalism, the crux of historical interpretation, and the greatest unsolved riddle of the universe. It is no wonder, therefore, that naturalistic theologians address themselves ever anew to the solution of the baffling problem of His unique personality, which challenges them to do their utmost. Representatives of the liberal school attempted again and again to solve the mystery, but were found impotent. They proved to be like moths that flit around the tempting light until with singed wings they fall to the ground. The liberal school proved a failure. Its strength was spent in a

futile endeavor to give a satisfactory historical interpretation of Jesus Christ; and finally it came to a dead stop from sheer exhaustion. But its virtual collapse did not mark the end of the *Leben-Jesu Forschung*. Another school had already made its appearance. During the last three decennia the attempt has been gaining favor, to interpret the life and teachings of Christ eschatologically.

Before entering upon a brief review of the position of the eschatological school, we shall give an account of the rise of the new interpretation. It may be regarded as, at least in part, a reaction against the so-called liberal school. The main characteristic of the latter is found in its modernization of the picture of Jesus. It made a persistent attempt to interpret the life of our Lord in a purely naturalistic way, and to represent Him as a thoroughly modern man. The older liberalism, of which Keim was the chief representative, found the secret of Jesus' greatness in His exalted teachings, while the later liberalism of Pfeiderer, the Holtzmanns, Harnack, Weinel, Wernle, Bousset, etc., derived the special importance of His teachings from His personality. This more recent liberalism felt constrained to admit the presence of certain transcendental elements in Jesus' self-consciousness, and thus harbored ingredients which it could not assimilate and which spelled its ultimate defeat. Thus Bousset frankly admits that the question who Jesus believed Himself to be, is one of the hardest to answer. He finds that Jesus wanted to be something more than "a mere member of a band, even if the band were that of the prophets"; and "that we cannot eliminate from His personality without destroying the trait of super-prophetic consciousness, the consciousness of the accomplisher to whose person the flight of the ages and the whole destiny of His followers is linked." He admits that Jesus expected shortly to appear upon the clouds of heaven, and yet maintains that He "never overstepped the limits of the purely human."¹

¹ *Jesus*, pp. 166-211; cf. also Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*, I, p. 37 ff.

In order to arrive at its picture of Jesus, the liberal school had to resort to the complicated process of sifting and dissecting sources. The Epistles of Paul were repudiated as containing what really constituted a transformation of the original Jesus. They represent Him as an object of faith, and ascribe atoning significance to His death, a representation that is foreign to the genius of the Gospels. The Gospel of John, too, was brushed aside as unhistorical and merely embodying second century speculation about Christ. Only the Synoptics were regarded as accredited sources for the life of Jesus, and they teach nothing, says Wernle, "concerning redemption, atonement, regeneration, reception of the Holy Spirit." But it was felt that even the Synoptics had to be critically analyzed, in order to extract from them the real picture of Jesus. Even they, it was thought, are not free from later accretions. It was no mean task to detect the genuine elements among the rather confused mass of traditional lore. But the liberal scholars were equal to the occasion. Says Harnack: "Whoever has a good eye for the vital and a true sense of the really great must be able to see it, and distinguish between the kernel and the husk." As a matter of fact, however, the procedure of these scholars was distinctly subjective, they did not agree among themselves, and in their portraiture of Jesus they drew rather freely on their imagination. Each writer simply objectified his own ideal of a pure and holy life, as seen in an Oriental peasant of two thousand years ago. There are about as many different portraits of Jesus as there are liberal Lives of Jesus.

A second characteristic of the liberal Life of Jesus study was that it largely detached Jesus from the historical circumstances in which He lived. It ascribed to Him a great measure of independence with respect to the current conceptions of God and man, of the Messiah and His Kingdom, and of redemption and the future. His view of things, we are told, was not determined by the world of thought in which He moved, but by His own inner consciousness of the unique filial relation in which He stood to God, and the re-

sulting conviction that God is the Father of all men, and that they, consequently, form a universal brotherhood, Harnack and Haupt point out that it is a mistake to judge truly great personalities, and especially geniuses, first of all by what they have in common with their contemporaries, and to disregard the personal psychological element, which alone will account for their original and therefore really important contributions. There is, no doubt, an important element of truth in this statement, which might be pondered with great profit by the adherents of the present religious-historical method. But the liberal school went too far in dissociating Jesus from His environment and modernizing Him, and thereby laid themselves open to the charge that their representation of Jesus is entirely unhistorical.

It is of importance for us to notice particularly the attitude which the liberal school assumed to the eschatological elements in the teaching of Jesus. They revealed a persistent tendency to reduce the eschatological element in the Gospels as much as possible and to minimize its importance. Such writers as Colani, Volkmar, Weiffenbach and Wellhausen contended that the eschatological element in the Gospels was due to a reading back of later, perhaps second century, hopes into the record of the sayings of Jesus. In the case of Colani this led to a complete denial of the eschatological outlook of Jesus as it is mirrored in the Gospels. What may be regarded as a special application of this general principle is found in the surmise of Weiffenbach, H. J. Holtzmann, and Wellhausen that the Evangelists incorporated in Mark xiii and parallels a small Jewish or Jewish-Christian apocalypse, dating from the troublous times immediately preceding the fall of Jerusalem. These scholars are not all agreed as to its exact contents. It was thought, however, that its removal from the text, would rid it of some contradictory elements, and at the same time appreciably reduce the eschatological material.²

² Cf. Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 382 ff. For criticism of this position cf.

Haupt, a scholar of a somewhat different type, while quite willing to accept the eschatological element in the Gospels as a part of the authentic teachings of Jesus, regarded them as being in the main but the pictorial form in which the Lord clothed His thoughts respecting the completion of the Kingdom. He emphasized very strongly the original and independent character of Jesus' teachings, and was of the opinion that, though the Lord expressed His ideas respecting the future in the common parlance of His day, He infused into the ancient forms and expressions new meanings that were mediated by His own self-consciousness.³

Later writers of the liberal school, such as Bousset, Weinel and Wernle make greater allowance for the eschatological element in the teachings of Jesus. In some of their expressions they seem to approach the position of Johannes Weiss. Yet they do not subscribe to historical realism, but maintain that the Lord transformed many of the historical conceptions, and showed Himself in a measure independent of Jewish eschatology.

The attempts to eliminate the futurist elements from the teaching of Jesus, which cannot be pronounced successful even from a critical point of view, were bound to excite reaction. And the character of this reaction was determined by a twofold development in the line of theological research. In the first place the new historical method, applied to the Old Testament by the Graf-Kuenen-Wellhausen school, was also followed in the study of the New Testament, and particularly in that of the life of Jesus. The necessity of studying this seemingly unique life in a genetic way was emphasized, with the result that Jesus was looked upon in an ever increasing measure as a child of His age and people, to be understood only in the light of contemporary Judaism. The work of such men as Hausrath, Stapfer, and especially Schürer prepared the way for the eschatologists.

Metzger, *Der Begriff des Reiches Gottes*, p. 178 f.; Muirhead, *Eschatology of Jesus*, p. 140 ff.; Worsley, *The Apocalypse of Jesus*, p. 132 ff.

³ *Eschatologische Aussagen Jesu*, p. 53 ff.

In the second place the study of the Jewish Apocalyptic literature shed new light on the Messianic hopes that were current in the time of Jesus. This literature had long been a sealed book, but was now made accessible to the Christian world especially through the labors of Hilgenfeld, whose *Jüdische Apokalyptik* is still regarded as a standard work. He was followed in this particular field by Bousset, Kautzsch, Stanton, and Charles, the greatest living authority on Apocalyptics today. The historical study of the life and teachings of Jesus in the light of Judaism gradually engendered a feeling that this furnished the key to their proper understanding.

The way was paved step by step for the eschatological interpretation of the life of Jesus. Baldensperger's epoch-making work on, *Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der messianischen Hoffnungen seiner Zeit*, appeared in 1888, in which he brought all the apocalyptic material which he could gather to bear on a psychological analysis of the self-consciousness of our Lord. According to Sanday he "struck a compromise between the picture that came out from a study of the Jewish contemporary writings and that which appeared to result from modern criticism of the narratives of the Gospels."⁴ In 1891 two Leiden prize dissertations on the Kingdom of God in the New Testament were published, the one written by Issel, and the other by Schmoller. The latter especially emphasized the influence of eschatology, and approached very closely the position of the later eschatologists.

The consistent treatment of the teachings of Jesus from the point of view of eschatology began with the publication in 1892 of *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes* by Johannes Weiss. It was a work of small compass, numbering less than one hundred pages, but of epoch-making significance. Schweitzer grows enthusiastic over it. Says he:

In passing from Weiffenbach and Baldensperger to Johannes Weiss the reader feels like an explorer who after weary wanderings through billowy seas of reed-grass at length reaches a wooded tract, and instead

⁴ *The Life of Christ in Modern Research*, p. 55 f.

of swamp feels firm ground beneath his feet, instead of yielding rushes sees around him the steadfast trees. At last there is an end of 'qualifying clause' theology, of the 'and yet,' the 'on the other hand,' the 'notwithstanding'! The reader had to follow the others step by step, making his way over every foot-bridge and gang-plank which they laid down, following all the meanderings in which they indulged, and must never let go their hands if he wished to come safely through the labyrinth of spiritual and eschatological ideas which they supposed to be found in the thought of Jesus. In Weiss there are none of these devious paths: 'behold the land lies before thee.'⁵

As might be expected of one so enthusiastic, Scheitzer followed the trail blazed by Johannes Weiss. He set his face as a flint in the direction of eschatology, and published his ideas in his *Das Abendmahl*, of which the second part was translated into English under the title, *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God*; and in his far more notable book, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, or *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (Eng. tr.). He even outstrips Weiss and prefers to speak of his own view as connected or thorough-going eschatology, since in distinction from Weiss, he does not limit the application of eschatology to the *teachings of Jesus*, but also utilizes it in the interpretation of *the life of our Lord*, and in the solution of *the historical problems presented by the New Testament generally*.⁶ It is a rather striking fact that the Modernists of the church of Rome, such as Abbé Loisy and Father Tyrrell, were attracted by the eschatological rather than by the liberal interpretation of the life of Jesus. La Tuche ascribes this to the fact that, while liberalism over-emphasizes the characteristically Protestant doctrine of the immanence of God, the eschatologists stress the transcendentalism of our Lord's thought, and the divine transcendence, so dear to the heart of Roman Catholics. But this explanation may be doubted in view of the fact that the Modernists themselves in their *Programme* declare that they are immanentists.⁷

⁵ *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 237.

⁶ Cf. Sanday, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, p. 77 f.

⁷ *The Programme of Modernism and the Encyclical of Pius X*, pp. 99-115.

But we must hasten on to describe Jesus, as He is seen by the eschatologists. While the liberal scholars sought to interpret the life of Jesus almost exclusively in terms of contrast with the thought of His age, the eschatologists seek to understand Him in the light of contemporary thought, and especially of the eschatological views that were current in the first century A.D. They point to the fact that during the life of our Lord many believed that the end of the world-age in which they lived was at hand, and that the present order of things would then be completely changed by direct divine interposition. The new world-order would then be ushered in by the establishment of the Kingdom of God. The prevalent conception was that the Messiah would be God's agent in founding the Kingdom. And while the kingdoms of the world were destroyed, the Kingdom of God, supernatural and universal, would stand throughout all ages.

Now Johannes Weiss proceeded on the assumption that the preaching of Jesus, and in particular His preaching of the Kingdom, was largely determined by this eschatological outlook. He denied, on the one hand, that Jesus' conception of the Kingdom was historically determined by the political view of an earthly kingdom that was common coin in rabbinical literature; and, on the other hand, that He spiritualized the idea of the Kingdom and thus transformed it completely. The Kingdom which Jesus preached, was the Kingdom of Daniel and of the Apocalyptics. It stood for the rule of God made effective in all the world, which implied the overthrow of all His enemies, and especially of the power of Satan. It represented a condition of moral and religious perfection, a state of perfect bliss and of eternal duration, in which the righteous of all ages would share in the triumph of their King.⁸

Their establishment of the Kingdom is regarded as being exclusively a matter of the future age. It is preceded by the resurrection, the judgment, and the parousia of the Son of

⁸ *Jesu Predigt*, p. 123 f.

Man.⁹ We are told that Jesus did not regard the Kingdom as present in the proper sense of the word, though He sometimes speaks of it as such by anticipation in view of the nearness of its coming, and of the fact that the powers of the future age were already apparent. According to Weiss it is present like the clouds that presage the coming storm.¹⁰

Again, it is asserted that, in the representation of Jesus the Kingdom is in no sense the fruit of man's labors, but is exclusively the gift of God. It is a mistake to think that it can be established by man. Man can seek it merely as he seeks bread by fulfilling the conditions for obtaining it, and the great condition is repentance. God himself establishes the Kingdom at the end of the age in a catastrophic way.¹¹ Even the idea that Jesus came to found the Kingdom and did actually establish it, is altogether mistaken. He regarded Himself merely as the herald of the Kingdom. He came, not with a doctrine, but with the glad tidings that the Kingdom was at hand. He was a prophet of serious things, for the coming of the Kingdom meant the end of the age and judgment. He habitually spoke of it as future, and only in moments of ecstasy, when He had a foretaste of the joy of victory, referred to it as if it were a present reality. With the rest of the world He waited for God to bring in the Kingdom supernaturally.

According to the eschatologists the ethical teachings of Jesus were cast in a very sombre mold as a result of His expectation of the fast approaching end of the age. They are negative and ascetic, revealing a sort of disdain for the world and purely natural relations, for the pleasures of life and the treasures of earth. They were not meant to be of universal application, but constituted a sort of *Interims-Ethik*. They were adapted to a people that was waiting for serious things.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 69; Schweitzer, *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God*, p. 92.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 88 ff.

¹¹ Weiss, *Jesu Predigt*, p. 74, 105 ff.; Schweitzer, *Quest of the Hist. Jesus*, p. 353 f.; *The Mystery*, p. 87 f., 94-105, 115; Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, p. 59 f., 85 f.

that was expecting momentarily the coming of the Kingdom and the end of the age. Their almost superhuman demands naturally had only temporal significance, and could not possibly be applied in the present altered conditions of life.

But, as was said, Schweitzer even goes beyond Johannes Weiss. He claims that the latter made a mistake by applying the eschatological explanation only to an important part of Jesus' teachings, and not to His whole public ministry. Says he: "The teaching of Jesus and the history of Jesus were set in different keys." And further: "Eschatology is simply 'dogmatic history'—history moulded by theological beliefs—which breaks in upon the natural course of history and abrogates it."¹²

For Schweitzer the public ministry of the Lord lasted but a single year,—from the season of "the summer seed-sowing" until Easter of the following year. He sees in John the Baptist and Jesus the chief personal manifestations of Jewish Apocalyptic thought. They endeavored to set the times in motion by acting, by creating eschatological events that would usher in the future aeon. John did not regard himself as the Forerunner of the Messiah, but simply as a prophet, whose great task it was to proclaim the imminent coming of the Kingdom. Both he and the common people regarded Jesus as the Forerunner of the Messiah.

The Lord, however, knew better. At the moment of His baptism it was disclosed to Him that He was the One destined to be the Messiah. "With this revelation," says Schweitzer, "He was complete, and underwent no further development. For now He is assured that, until the near coming of the Messianic age which was to reveal His glorious dignity, He has to labor for the Kingdom as the unrecognized and hidden Messiah, and must approve Himself together with His friends in the final Affliction."¹³ The idea of suffering was present to His mind from the start, therefore, but only as a part of the general pre-messianic affliction.

¹² *Quest of the Hist. Jesus*, p. 349.

¹³ *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God*, p. 254.

Jesus keeps these secrets to Himself, and at first simply takes up and continues the work of John the Baptist. He preaches the near approach of the Kingdom and calls the people to repentance. His whole ethical outlook and teaching is ruled by the expectation of the coming supernatural events, and aims at moral renewal in preparation for the Kingdom. The people must understand that God will bring in His glorious rule only on condition of the moral conversion of Israel. Moreover they must be prepared to pass through a time of trial and suffering.

The miracles of Jesus serve as signs that the power of ungodliness and of the evil spirits, is fast coming to an end. When the Lord sends out the Twelve, He commissions them, not to teach, but to herald the coming Kingdom, to cure all manner of diseases, and to cast out demons. He confidently expects them to deal the final blow, and anticipates the coming of the Kingdom before they have finished their circuit.

His work done, Jesus now enters upon a period of retirement. He is not fleeing from persecution, as the liberal school represented it, but simply desires to await in solitude the expected development of things. At the transfiguration, which Schweitzer places before the episode at Caesarea-Philippi, Jesus is revealed to His most intimate disciples as the Messiah. On descending from the mountain, He forbids them to speak about it until at the general resurrection He should be revealed in the glory of the Son of Man. And when they object that Elijah has not yet made his appearance, He explains that Elijah has already come in the person of John the Baptist. In order that they might take no offense at the fate of the Baptist, he reminds them of the fact that this was so ordained, and that the Son of Man himself would have to pass through shame and sufferings.

But the Kingdom failed to appear, and now it is revealed to Jesus that God will bring in the Kingdom without the general affliction. The reading of the prophecy of Isaiah brings Him to a realization of the fact that He must suffer for the people to make atonement for their sins. Near Caesarea-

Philippi He elicits from Peter the confession: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God"; and admits the truth of this confession before all the disciples. Then He reveals to them the secret of His coming sufferings. Peter resents this new disclosure, but the Lord sharply rebukes him.

From that time on Jesus sets His face steadfastly to go to Jerusalem and meet His fate. The secret of His Messiahship is not yet a matter of general knowledge. Even the people that welcome Him with their glad hosannas regard Him merely as the Forerunner of the Messiah. Yet, when a few days later He stands before the high priest, that official knows the carefully guarded secret. Judas had betrayed it. Then and then only does Jesus clearly intimate that He is the Son of Man who will soon appear on the clouds of heaven. He is condemned to death. "On the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan, as they ate the Paschal lamb at even, he uttered a loud cry and died." But even the death of Jesus was not efficacious in bringing in the expected Kingdom. His fondest hopes proved a delusion. "The death of Jesus," says Schweitzer, "was the end of eschatology."¹⁴

Walter Lowrie remarks in his "Introduction" to Schweitzer's work on *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God*, that "it is much to be wondered at that conservative scholars have not gradually recognized the strong constructive consequences of Schweitzer's theory."¹⁵ There are undoubtedly some elements in the eschatological view that deserve appreciation. It vindicates the futurist side of the teachings of Jesus and the eschatological character of the Kingdom of God, and thus counterbalances liberalism with its aversion to apocalyptics and its exclusive emphasis on the Kingdom of God as a present reality. It does not make the mistake of liberalism in virtually detaching Jesus from His historical environment, in removing Him from the time in which He lived, and in representing Him as thinking the thoughts and speaking the language of the nineteenth century. Neither does it attempt to

¹⁴ *The Mystery*, p. 248.

¹⁵ P. 33.

confine Jesus within the categories of the purely human, but allows Him to stand forth in His transcendent grandeur. Says La Touche: "They (the eschatologists) very justly emphasize the transcendental character of His claims and render it impossible for any future school to deny that the Lord conceived Himself to be a Superhuman Personality."¹⁶ Again, it does far more justice to the fundamental idea of the Kingdom as the reign of God made effective in human lives than does the modern conception with its emphasis on the Kingdom of God as an ethical brotherhood. Moreover, it rightly stresses the supernatural character of the Kingdom as a gift of God rather than the product of man's activity, and as belonging essentially to the future aeon. And finally, it brings home to us rather forcibly the valuable lesson that, however much the ethics of Jesus may be lauded in the present day as the acme of moral and social wisdom, there is in many respects a wide gulf between the ethics of Jesus and those of present day moralists.

We should beware, however, of thinking that the insistence of Weiss, Schweitzer and others on the eschatological interpretation of Jesus' teachings and life, implies a condemnation of the modern view. It simply means that they object to reading the ideas of nineteenth century theology into the faith and the teachings of Jesus. For them the question what Jesus taught and what He claimed to be, is merely a question of historical interpretation."¹⁷ Whatever the answer to that query may be, modern theology is not bound by it in any way, but has complete freedom of movement. Schweitzer tells us plainly that by his death Jesus destroyed the form of His "Weltanschauung"¹⁸ and carried mankind forever beyond eschatology. "We believe," says he, "that in His ethical religious personality, as revealed in His ministry and suffering, the Messiah and the Kingdom are come."¹⁹

¹⁶ *The Person of Christ in Modern Thought*, p. 203.

¹⁷ Cf. Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu*, p. 177 ff.

¹⁸ *The Mystery*, p. 251.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

The eschatological view of the life and teachings of Jesus, is open to several objections. In the first place the foundation on which it rests is utterly defective. One who honors the Bible as God's special revelation and as the *principium theologiae*, cannot but feel that eschatologists as well as liberals proceed arbitrarily in the study of Jesus. They at once set the Gospel of John aside as a spiritualization of the original Gospel.²⁰ The Gospel of Luke, too, is practically ignored. Mark is singled out as the most reliable source, while it is thought that Matthew, though valuable especially for the discourses of Jesus which it contains, should only be used with great caution, because it frequently reads later views, that were current in the early church, into the teachings of Jesus.²¹ The attempt is made to get at the fundamental idea of Jesus by clearing away all the later accretions and embellishments that are now found in the Gospels. But the divergent opinions respecting the character and contents of the so-called sources reveal great uncertainty, and make them an extremely precarious foundation for one's theology.

Then, too, the eschatologists fail to do justice to some passages, which they feel constrained to recognize as genuine utterances of Jesus. The charge which they lodge against the liberal school can with equal propriety be met with a similar countercharge. Weiss and Schweitzer construct their theory on the basis of those passages that speak or are in any way suggestive of eschatology, and rob many other passages of their significance, either by rejecting them as later accretions, or by fanciful and arbitrary interpretations. Several examples might easily be cited, but we forbear.

Again, the eschatologists are compelled by the exigency of their theory to deny that Jesus was or even regarded Himself as Messiah, while He was on earth, though He was conscious of the fact that He was destined to be the Messiah at some future time. According to Jewish apocalyptics the Messiah and the Kingdom would appear simultaneously.

²⁰ Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu*, p. 60 ff.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36-40.

But the Kingdom had not yet come; so the coming of the Messiah was also still future.²² Now it is undoubtedly true that Jesus did not, as a rule, come forward with the direct claim of being the Messiah, but this does not mean that He was not conscious of being the Messiah all through His public ministry. Moreover, the assertion that Jesus did not reveal the secret of His Messiahship until the time of the transfiguration and of Peter's confession at Caesarea-Philippi is contradicted by several passages in the Gospels. Already in the early part of His public ministry He says to the Samaritan woman: "I that speak unto thee am He" (John iv. 26). And if this testimony be discredited, because it is found in the Gospel of John, we may refer to the fact that in Mark ii. 5-11 Jesus claims the divine prerogative of forgiving sin. Furthermore, according to the Synoptics, Jesus spoke of himself on about forty different occasions as "the Son of Man," a name that had Messianic significance.²³ To follow Leitzmann and Wellhausen in the assertion that Jesus cannot have used that name with the connotation it has in Greek, means to impair and discredit the trustworthiness of the Gospels. And to say with Weiss and Schweitzer that Jesus employed the title only in a futuristic sense, as applying to the Son of Man coming with the clouds of heaven; and never explicitly identified Himself with the Son of Man, except in the hearing of his disciples at Caesarea-Philippi, goes contrary to the data at hand. The people may not have understood, and most likely did not understand, the true significance of the title, but they could hardly fail to notice that it was a self-designation on the part of Jesus. Could they misunderstand Him, when He said in curing the paralytic: "But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins . . . I say unto thee, Arise," etc.²⁴ And surely, His word to the scribe: "The

²² Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu*, p. 155 ff.; Schweitzer, *The Mystery*, pp. 127 ff., 185 ff.

²³ Schweitzer, *The Mystery*, p. 130; Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu*, p. 161 ff.

²⁴ Mark ii. 10.

foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head," would hardly apply to the Son of Man appearing in glory.²⁵ Moreover Jesus' assertion of His present Messiahship in Mark xiv. 61, 62 is about as definite as anyone could wish.

We pass on to another objection. The idea that the Kingdom of God as announced and represented by Jesus, was purely eschatological, is burdened with several exegetical and historical difficulties. It fails to do justice to the so-called "present utterances." When Weiss claims that the real point in the parable of the Mustard Seed and in that of the Leaven is the contrast between the small beginning and the great issue,²⁶ this may be granted for the sake of argument (though I prefer to think that they illustrate the extensive and intensive power of the Kingdom), but on that very view the idea of the small beginning and of the intermediate process cannot be eliminated, but is implied. The fact remains that the Kingdom comes by a process, though the possibility of a catastrophic coming is not thereby excluded.²⁷ In Matt. xi. 12 and Luke xvi. 16 the time of Jesus is clearly set in opposition to that of John the Baptist, as the present to the past, and the Kingdom of God is assigned to the present as apposed to the past. But Weiss, compelled by the exigency of his theory, rejects the implied idea that John the Baptist was excluded from the Kingdom, and interprets the words as meaning that there will be no distinction of rank in the Kingdom of God.²⁸ Even the word of Jesus in Luke xvii. 21: "Behold, the Kingdom of God is within you" (or: "in the midst of you"), does not, it is said, imply its present existence. And where Jesus infers from the fact that He is casting out devils by the Spirit of God, that the Kingdom of Heaven is already

²⁵ Matt. viii. 20; Luke ix. 58.

²⁶ P. 82 ff.

²⁷ Cf. Metzger, *Der Begriff des R. G. im N. T.*, p. 134.

²⁸ P. 80. For criticism cf. Metzger, *ibid.*, p. 107 ff.; Dobschütz, *The Eschatology of the Gospels*, p. 133; Vos, *The Kingdom and the Church*, p. 54.

come, Weiss simply regards this as a prophetic word, spoken in a moment of ecstasy. But his view that some of the present utterances of the Saviour represent climaxes in His life, is not borne out by the context in which they occur. They simply form a part of His regular teaching.

Besides the exegetical there are also historical objections to the assertion that Jesus in speaking of the Kingdom always had the eschatological Kingdom in mind. We shall not discuss these, but merely ask a few questions that naturally arise. If the Apocalyptic literature rather than Old Testament Prophecy determined Jesus' conception of the Kingdom, how is it to be explained that in His teachings He frequently goes back to the prophets, and never mentions an apocalyptic book? And if the Lord employs certain phrases that are also found in apocalyptic writings, does it necessarily follow that He used them in the same sense? Is not Muirhead quite right, when he says: "There is little likelihood that He read any books outside the canonical Hebrew Scriptures, and less that He deduced anything important from them"?²⁹ Again, we ask, how can the eschatological conception of Jesus' teaching respecting the Kingdom be squared with His evident universalism in Matt. viii. 11; xiii. 38; xxi. 43? How could he speak of the Gentiles of the East and the West as participants in the joys of the Kingdom, if the entrance to it was ethically conditioned, and He expected it to appear during the generation then living? Furthermore, if it be said that Jesus accepted the current view of the Kingdom, the question may well be asked, whether the eschatological was really the exclusive or even the predominant view of His day? Did the Pharisees also embrace it? Was there no political element in the hopes of the Jews at that time? What about the Psalms of Solomon? Such questions as these are rather discomfiting for the eschatologists.

Finally, the eschatological school ascribes to the ethics of Jesus an ascetic and abnormal character. This feature met

²⁹ *The Eschatology of Jesus*, p. 61 f.

with determined opposition from the very start. Weiss felt the force of the criticism offered, and altered his views considerably in the second edition of his work. Sanday correctly called attention³⁰ to the fact that the Mosaic legislation is fundamental in the Bible, and that Jesus recognizes its principles as having eternal validity. Apocalyptic, on the other hand, says he, was "an outgrowth, an excrescence, tending to become rank and wild," so that it seems *a priori* improbable that Jesus would re-write the law in the light of Apocalyptic.

Then, too, this view of the ethics of Jesus cannot be maintained without a good deal of forced exegesis. Weiss, it is true, admitted in his second edition that the eschatological point of view was not consistently maintained by our Lord, and that He sometimes "seeks to improve and help the world, as though it were destined to continue." But the theory of the "Interims-Ethik" is germane to a consistent eschatological hypothesis. Many parts of Jesus' ethical teachings contain absolutely no suggestion of eschatology, and others are so evidently of a general application that they cannot possibly be construed as temporally conditioned.

Moreover, according to the tenets of the eschatological school the ethical teachings of Jesus rest on an entirely false foundation. They are determined by the expectation of the speedy coming of the end of the world. But Jesus' outlook was mistaken. The foundation fell flat, and the superstructure proves to be a castle in the air. The church that gloried in the ethics of Jesus, has been following a false lead for many centuries. What has been lauded for centuries as the supreme standard of morality, proves to be a delusion. A sad plight, indeed. But Schweitzer would console us with the thought that the eschatological investigation leads to the astonishing result that the ethics of Jesus is seen to be modern "in a far higher degree than anyone hitherto has dared to hope." He finds that His eschatology "is thoroughly

³⁰ *Hibbert Journal* of Oct., 1911.

modern inasmuch as it is dominated by the thought that the Kingdom of God is to come by reason of the religious-moral renovation which believers perform. *Every moral religious performance is therefore labor for the coming of the Kingdom of God.*" And so the historical eschatologist turns out to be in practice a liberal moralist.

We are grateful for the fact that the eschatological school recognizes, far more than the liberal school ever did, the supernatural element in the life of Jesus, that it stresses the eschatological features in the teachings of our Lord, so largely neglected or obscured in the interpretations of the liberals, and that it gives full force to the predictions of the Saviour respecting the cataclysmic coming of the Kingdom at the end of the world. But we cannot agree with the main proposition of this school, that the Person and teaching of Christ must be interpreted simply and solely in accordance with the eschatological categories of His age. The Gospels reveal another aspect of the matter, which makes it impossible for us to accept the interpretation of the eschatological school as a well-balanced presentation of the truth.

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NOTES AND NOTICES

INSPIRATION AND ISLAM

In a recent issue of *The Moslem World*¹ there appears an article entitled "The Question of Inspiration" by the Rev. G. N. Gibson, a missionary of the English Baptist Mission, Dinapur Cantonment, Behar and Orissa, India. The writer presents in concise form the Moslem view of Inspiration, which is divided into two kinds, *wahi* and *ilhām*. The former applies to the Koran alone and is a mechanical view according to which God dictates the words of revelation directly to Mohammed, the passive, receptive medium, who in turn records the words thus received. *Ilhām*, on the other hand, is an inspiration of ideas rather than actual words, and is applied to the Islamic traditions. This latter form of inspiration is, in the mind of the Moslem, inferior and unauthoritative.

In considering the origin of the *Injil* or Gospel the Mohammedan holds that in the beginning of the Christian era there was such a document given to the world by the holy prophet Jesus, but unfortunately it has been lost. What the Christians now have, we are told, is but a collection of various traditions recorded by devout followers of Jesus. Had that original manuscript been retained it would have been given a position equal to that of the sacred Koran; its inspiration was of the *wahi* type. Its origin through the medium of the prophet Jesus was in the same manner as the origin of the Koran through the medium of the prophet Mohammed. But the writings that exist in the form of the New Testament are merely traditions comparable to the traditions of Islam; their inspiration is of the *ilhām* order, secondary and, by comparison, unimportant.

The Mohammedan would, therefore, analyze his thoughts regarding textual criticism of the New Testament somewhat as follows. In the first place, there is no original manuscript extant. There are documents called Versions, but these are obviously not copies of the lost original; they spring from a later source which is separate and distinct. Furthermore, the original document, now lost beyond all trace, was poured into the receptive ear of the holy prophet Jesus who was probably in a trance at the time. Today the followers of the Nazarine have nothing

¹ April 1926, pp. 138-143.

more than the traditions of others of his followers. They are deprived of the divine revelation made directly to their prophet.

The following extracts from a booklet entitled "Are the Gospels Inspired?" by Maulvi Sadr-ud-Din, of the Moslem Mission, at Woking (England), are quoted by Mr. Gibson as "typical of the whole argument":

(1) The first Gospel, *i.e.*, St. Mark's, was not written by the holy prophet Jesus.

(2) It was written by Peter's convert, St. Mark, who was the former's interpreter.

(3) It was written neither at the scene of the ministry of Jesus, nor in the language which was spoken by the prophet, nor by any of his disciples.

(4) It was written in Rome from memory, by St. Mark, who was exhorted to do so by 'his hearers,' and among whom it was circulated.

(5) It was written in Greek, and not in Aramaic, which was spoken by Jesus.

These facts, which are known to every scholar of the sacred history, should convince the lay reader that the Gospel of St. Mark was neither revealed nor inspired. There was in fact no need of any inspiration or revelation. Mark jotted down from memory what he had heard St. Peter preach to the Jews in Rome. . . . In other words, neither the sermons of Peter nor their reproduction by Mark represented a faithful record of the words of Jesus.

In the face of this unfavourable comparison of the New Testament with the Koran made by Mohammedans, what is to be the attitude of the Christian missionary? How may he win not merely the argument but the man?

Mr. Gibson presents in his article what he holds to be an adequate answer to this question. He says in brief: The Bible is the product of progressive revelation. The Old Testament contains the record of a long line of messengers and messages to men. Jesus is the culmination of this line. "He was God's greatest messenger to mankind, giving as full a revelation of God as it was possible for man to receive." But he of course realizes that at this stage in his reasoning he is sure to be confronted by the argument of the Moslem that all this may be good and true, but one in that inspired line has since emerged who is the Final Prophet. To this objection he replies in the following fashion:

Christ was indeed the full and final revelation of God to man. Our idea of revelation, however, is a progressive one. In the Old Testament we see the development of ideas about God for a period of over a thousand

years, culminating at last in the coming of Christ. The revelation, however, was not completed then. The ideas that Christ brought into the world needed to be worked out in life, and it is only as life expands that we find them coming to be understood. . . . Our Scriptures, however, are a stream that has been for ever flowing since the beginning. They are complete and final. But the source of inspiration is not dried up. It still continues, and men are still being inspired by God today, and have as real a message for mankind as ever Mohammed believed himself to have. The real meaning of prophet is not fore-teller but forth-teller, in other words, 'a preacher,' and those who go forth today with the message of redemption through Christ can indeed be prophets and receive inspiration from God. The day of God's inspiring His messengers is not past. To those who live in close fellowship with God, His message will come with true inspiration. We believe that under the influence of that inspiration, mankind will be led ever onward and upward till it stands perfected in a new Kingdom of God, more glorious than was ever dreamed of by the prophet of Arabia.

The implication of this inspiration-stream theory is that Mohammed is in the stream,—likewise Christ. The statement is made that He is the full and final revelation, and then it is promptly repudiated by what follows. Scripture is referred to as complete and final, and then the following sentence begins with a "but" that proceeds to show that it is neither complete nor final. A position of equivocation is definitely taken presumably in an effort to lead possible Mohammedan inquirers from the stage of truth in which they find themselves on and up to a stage supposedly better. And the curious extreme to which the writer finds himself drawn in this vain attempt is that we missionaries too are inspired with an inspiration not differing in kind from that of the other propagandists preceding us in the stream.

The confusion as to the nature of divine inspiration is apparent. It arises from confusion as to the nature of Christ. It emerges in confusion as to the nature of sanctification. Jesus Christ, of course, is not one of the prophets in a line of receivers of revelation. He is totally distinct. It is quite true, as the Moslem contends, that He did not write the Gospel as we have it. Nor did He write the imaginary book that they posit behind our Scriptures, and then as conveniently posit its being lost. As Giovanni Papini puts it in his dramatic style, the only thing Christ ever wrote was with His finger in the sand, and the wind has erased that record. He did not receive the Gospel. He is the Gospel. The "holy prophet Jesus" is a pure fabrication of the Eastern mind, quite remote from the historical Redeemer of

mankind. Our Saviour is nothing less than what He Himself said, the Way, the Truth and the Life. No one cometh unto the Father save by Him. Christ is the content of revelation and not, as the Mohammedan would suppose, the receiver of revelation. He is that which hath been revealed.

After all, what do we mean by Inspiration? In the first place, it is something separate and distinct from Revelation. Revelation is the content of truth that God in His infinite wisdom has seen fit to disclose unto finite men. God's Word, however, is made up not merely of His divine revelation, but also includes certain facts of history and of human experience together with conclusions which have been deduced from those facts. Inspiration marks the method by which both the revealed truth and these certain facts of human life are recorded. It extends to the selection and inclusion of just those facts and thoughts of human origin, and those alone, which, in conjunction with God's direct revelation, are adapted to the single redemptive purpose of the Biblical narrative. The method of inspiration is the method of guiding control by the Holy Spirit rendering the documents accurate and reliable. What is written is what God intended to be written, and is true. The divine influence was exercised upon the documents themselves, not merely upon the writers. By this process the Bible is rendered infallible.

There is, to be sure, a progressive element revealed in Scripture. This, however, only serves to strengthen the assurance of supernaturalism permeating the entire sixty-six books. From the seed of the woman who shall bruise the head of the serpent to the vision of the heavenly throne where there shall be no night, there is evinced a singleness of purpose and of authorship that is unescapable. The very progressive nature of the revelation bears witness both to the certainty and the majesty of its inspiration.

Inspiration, in the second place, is something quite different from divine dictation. It is a much loftier conception than the mechanical idea of *wahi*, to say nothing of the lesser type called *ilhām*. It is futile to suppose that the omnipotent God who created man must suspend any of the traits of His creatures or restrict their free operation in order to work through them to the accomplishment of His good pleasure. There can be no conflict between the activity of the Almighty and the unre-

strained activity of men in the world which is upheld by His providence. God is, of course, great enough to work through freely working means. This is no theory of dictation from above, making the writers mere automatons. Their personality is not extinguished under the mechanical force of a power higher than their own. All of human ability, each individual characteristic and talent is allowed full free course. More than that, it is guided and directed in such manner as to insure the highest possible expression. Most of all, the words that are written are infused with a dynamic inspiration which renders them free from all error. This is the activity of the Spirit of God. It is to His glory that He has given us his Word in this manner instead of acting in a mechanical way.

In the last place, one would think it need hardly be said that the inspiration of Scripture is something wholly unidentified with whatever religious exhilaration the devout believer may receive through grace in mystical communion with his Heavenly Father. It is only a loose use of terms which makes it possible to fall into this confusion. Were a comparison able to be drawn, it would not be with inspiration but with revelation. Much as we missionaries and preachers are dependent upon the precious promise that it shall be given us in that hour what we shall speak, there can, by no stretching of the imagination, be any connection shown between these our hallowed experiences and the activity of the Holy Spirit in the preservation of the integrity of Holy Writ.

Let us rather give unto our Moslem brothers the sure word of testimony which is able to the converting of their souls, to the building up in character by grace, which is sufficient for every need, and to the providing of an inheritance incorruptible, which fadeth not away. And in all our witness-bearing, let us trust in the quickening power of that same Living Spirit and Spirit of Life who hath sealed the body of the testimony which we bear.

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REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

Phénoménologie et Philosophie religieuse. Étude sur la théorie de la Connaissance religieuse. Par JEAN HERING, Licencié en Théologie. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan. Pp. 148.

One wishes that there were space for a full discussion (for which the present reviewer does not feel himself competent) of the themes of this interesting and informing book. But it would require a number of lengthy articles to discuss "phenomenology" adequately and as many more to discuss the author's application of it to religious philosophy. His aim is to raise "religious philosophy" from its fallen condition. At the beginning, he distinguishes "religious philosophy" from the "philosophy of religion,"—the latter being "a group of researches having for object religion, itself"; the former being "the sum of propositions having for theme, God or man or some other entity, viewed from the angle of religion." The "natural theology" of the eighteenth century, basing itself on a rational study of the moral and teleological evidences of God furnished by Nature, yielded to the demonstrations of Kant, that Reason was purely regulative; and later the work of Schleiermacher left the basis for religious philosophy to be only value judgments and the testimony of faith. But this turned it into a "philosophy of religion," considered as "a manifestation of human consciousness." This is at once to relegate it to a department of psychology, which has ended in its sinking into what the author, apparently, rather contemptuously, terms "psychologism." With a view to rescuing it from the inevitably skeptical conclusions to which psychologism led it, efforts were successively made to found religious philosophy on history, sociology, pragmatism, and criticism. But none of them were able to lay a metaphysical or epistemological foundation which could withstand critical investigation. None of them could come into immediate contact with or secure certain knowledge of "essences," or furnish other than empirical data, on which, of course, philosophy cannot be built. In this extremity, the author urges on his fellow thinkers: "Let us hearken—prudence recommends it—to the counsels of a group of philosophers who finding themselves grappling with quite analogous difficulties in another domain of philosophy, proposed to have found a feasible solution for all of us."

The group to whom our author thus directs our attention are the "Phenomenologists," participants in a recent method of philosophical investigation in Germany. This movement was initiated by Edmund Husserl, by the publication of his *Logische Untersuchungen*, in 1900-1901. Adolph Reinach and Max Scheler are among its other most prominent workers, though the movement has gained a considerable following. It is an ex-

ceedingly difficult subject to describe accurately in a few words. Also, Phenomenologists differ rather widely among themselves. But Husserl gives the following statements as essential: "All true premises must satisfy this demand . . . an intuitive realisation by the evidence: that further, these premises must never be employed save in the sense in which they have been intuitively established." Next, and more important,—"No theory must ever make us doubt the principle of all principles: that all intuition which is generative of immediate data is a source of valid knowledge, that all immediate data (in some sort, self-presenting) must be purely and simply accepted for such as they present themselves to the intuition." But this does not imply that all truths are equally presentable to the intuition. Nor is presentation to the intuition to mean merely sensible representation. Rather, says Hering, "The intuition is, on the contrary, called perfect when it attains a maximum of *adéquation*, as is the case—in principle—in the reflective intuition of the famous Cartesian 'cogito'." In other words, Intuition is the source of all valid knowledge.

If we may stop here for a brief aside, the problem of the validity of our so-called knowledge, is, of course, of long standing. In the hands of Kant, it took a surprising turn. He took up the problem, not so much of the validity of our knowledge, as rather that of how we *could* make general judgments (synthetic judgments, *a priori*), seeing that sense-perception gives us only a manifold of particulars. As every one knows, he solved it by the innate powers of the mind, the forms of perception, the categories and ideas of pure reason. But, by asserting that these are merely regulative and do not penetrate to reality, he left us without ground for valid knowledge, as far as the pure reason is concerned. Now the Phenomenologists assert directly the contrary. All that is immediately given in intuition is valid. Unless these data represent objective reality, then we have no valid knowledge.

The above indicates why Husserl's first statement is made. All our reasoning, no matter how correct in form, has only as much validity as our premises. Therefore, all valid premises must have come from intuition. But, conversely, all given by the intuition must be valid (second statement), else, we have no valid knowledge, and fall into the abyss of absolute skepticism.

But this principle, once accepted, leads us far and wide. For, first, it will hold to the objective reality of many ideas (intuitions) for which we had hardly thought of an "objective reality." Such, for example, are the relations between ideas. We accept these as valid; but if valid, there must be objective reality corresponding to them. So the Phenomenologists seek for the *Wesen* of these relations. But, among all the realities for whose nature they examine the intuitions, the group called "essences," (*Wesenheiten*, εἶδη) draws most of their attention. But, believing that by careful study of intuition, they can ascertain the reality of laws, forms, essences, they have done an enormous amount of work in their search for these underlying essences, in many a field. They "give an impression sufficiently exact of the variety and importance of the

phenomenological current which, without being seriously arrested by the world crisis, has had for some years past, a development incomprehensible for any one who persists in seeing in it, only a group of logical doctrines. We find here, on one side, the contribution, from henceforth classic, of Husserl, the reading of which is obligatory for the knowledge of this new philosophy, as well as the evolution of the Husserlienne Phenomenology since 1901, in works of morals, aesthetics, the philosophy of law, ontology, logic, epistemology, psychology, sociology," etc.

In all these fields, Hering asserts, finds of the utmost value have been made. The work is by no means finished,—rather, it is hardly begun. And, further, it is a task of the utmost difficulty and one demanding, as a preliminary, the severest discipline in intuitive investigation. For it is no easy task to so accurately interrogate one's deepest intuitions as to find what *is really* "immediately given"; for our mental life is an almost inextricable mixture of an infinite variety of processes. The Bergsonian "intuition" is comparable in point of difficulty, and neither is for any tyro, but only for the patiently and strenuously trained philosopher.

But, finally, Hering claims for Phenomenology that its immediately given data of Essences can be the surest philosophic foundation for "religious philosophy." For inasmuch as the experiences of religion are among the most surely "immediately given" (if there be any truth whatever in our religion), therefore the Husserlienne principle asserts the objective reality of all that is thus given. God, the Absolute, the Divine, all have their reality thus demonstrated. Not only so, but by careful intuitive investigation into the data thus immediately given, valid knowledge of the utmost value can be obtained.

If this claim be true, then Hering is justified in asking for study of this new development, by all interested in restoring religious philosophy to its rightful place. But obviously, any attempt to discuss the validity of these claims is the task for a volume. For it involves the entire foundation of metaphysical thinking,—the validity of Positivism,—the whole epistemological problem. Our limits make it best merely to outline the thought of the book, leaving readers to pass judgment for themselves.

We note the interesting fact that this philosophic method is poles apart from the "experimental psychology," recently so much in vogue, now, fortunately, somewhat declined; also, that nothing could be further than Phenomenology on its psychological side, from the behavioristic and materialistic psychology now so popular. Nor, could any views be more widely at variance than that of Husserl with his clear conviction of the reality of "essences," and the epistemological notions of American "neo-realists" and of Dewey. But all these books are exceedingly difficult reading. Even so brief a summary and exposition as this of Hering, is no easy task. This book is one of a series of studies being put forth by the Protestant Faculty of the University of Strasbourg. Whether all of them share in the characteristic, the reviewer does not know, but this book while French in language, has somehow absorbed a portion, (not discernible in its grammar or rhetoric, in which points the unsurpassable clarity of this admirable tongue remains undiminished, but

in an indefinable something in expression) of the difficulties of German. And the whole method is of such difficulty that Hering more than once voices his hopes that it will *not* be popularized. He closes with the words: "But our design is not to descend into the arena of philosophic journalism. Only to the friends of Wisdom, is this book addressed."

Fulton, Mo.

DANIEL S. GAGE.

New Realism in the Light of Scholasticism. By SISTER MARY VERDE, PH.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1926. Pp. 204.

This book written by one of the sisters of the Holy Cross, St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana, is a detailed analysis and criticism of the New-Realism from the standpoint of Scholastic Realism, which in its modern form is the standard philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church. After three opening chapters devoted to a historical survey of the problem of knowledge in Greek philosophy, in Idealism, and in Pragmatism, the specific task of the book is taken up. The various sorts of Realism are defined, and the New-Realism is appraised and found wanting in its concepts of the knowable universe, mind, the knowing process, truth and error, and in its applicability to the solution of the problems of psychology, ethics, and religion.

New-Realism was initiated in England by two articles written by George Moore on "The Nature of Judgment," [*Mind*, 1899, p. 176], and "The Refutation of Idealism" [*Mind*, 1903, p. 433]. Later Samuel Alexander became its metaphysician, and Bertrand Russell its logician. In our country the theory was first presented in an article in the *Journal of Philosophy*, 1910, entitled "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists"—E. B. Holt and R. B. Perry of Harvard, W. P. Montague and W. B. Pitkin of Columbia, E. G. Spaulding of Princeton, and W. T. Marvin of Rutgers. Two years later this inaugural was followed by a cooperative volume "The New Realism," which with other writings by the same six authors caused American New-Realism to be generally recognized as a distinctive tendency in contemporary philosophy.

In rough outline New-Realism may be described as follows. Let experience which philosophy attempts to describe and explain be thought of as a surface bounded by a curved line. Reflective common sense and Scholastic Realism think of this surface as an ellipse filled by a myriad of objects and events dividing into two groups and clustering round the two foci of spirit and matter respectively, while back of all as creator and upholder is God. Idealism conceives the surface as a circle; but its centre is spirit, of which all objects and events are expressions. The New-Realism likewise conceives the surface as a circle whose centre is *matter*, of which all things are the expression. The New-Realists would probably not accept this description of their system, but Dr. Verde earnestly affirms that it is as described, and concludes that New-Realism is nothing but old fashioned Materialism under a new name.

The universe is thus for the New-Realists a spatio-temporal plurality, of which the individual members form a "neutral mosaic" and are differentiated one from the other not by a substance [a term which the theory

in question rejects], but by differences of form and complexity, differences which enable us to range them in a hierarchy, from the simplest, the "abstract" fundamentals, on through logical and mathematical manifolds, to the physical, chemical, inorganic, organic and conscious complexes, the subjects of psychology, anthropology, political economy, government, and ethnology.

Every "new" philosophical tendency necessitates a novel redefinition of the old familiar terms, and the New-Realism carries through this task as follows: A "mind" is a class or group of entities within the subsisting universe just as a "physical" object is another class or group. Mental content and the content of physical nature differ only in the ways in which the composing elements are grouped and inter-related, and mental content can be known just as any other content is known. Consciousness is the group of entities, a cross section of the surrounding environment, homogeneous in all respects with the surrounding world, to which a nervous system both at one moment and in the course of its life history responds with a specific response. Thought and judgment occur when more or less connected groups pass through the conscious cross section of the neutral entities. The knowing process is the specific response of the body to its environment. Truth is a name for a group of *real* subsistents; error is a name for an unreal group. But what of God, the soul, sin, righteousness, reconciliation, forgiveness, and the host of concepts without which religion is impossible? Dr. Verde shows the inherent impossibility of New-Realism's dealing with these. It is in fact a system that attempts to construe the world with too few terms.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

Can the Christian Now Believe in Evolution? By WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON, PH.D., D.D., Professor in Lincoln University, Pennsylvania, Author of "The Christian Faith Under Modern Searchlights." Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1926. Pp. 188.

This is an admirable little volume on a much discussed subject. It too frequently happens that the natural scientist betrays an amazing ignorance of the problems of Christian theology, and that the Christian theologian and apologete shows little real acquaintance with the natural sciences. Confusion of thought is sure to result when the subject of evolution and theology is discussed.

But such is not the case in this book. Its author knows what Christian supernaturalism means and what the Christian view of the world implies. He is also sufficiently acquainted with the results of the natural sciences to be able to distinguish between well acknowledged results and disputed hypotheses, and also to discern at once when the natural scientist leaves the sphere of natural science and enters that of metaphysical theory and theological polemic.

He seeks to examine briefly the present state of the evidence for biological evolution, including the doctrine of the descent of man; to show the philosophy or metaphysics which usually results from or else underlies the theory of evolution; and to point out the relations between this evolutionary philosophy and the theistic and Christian view of the world.

On the first point, not to enter into the details of the author's discussion, he states what would seem to be the prevailing tendency of evolutionists in the sphere of natural science. The evolutionist "knows" not only that species but also life was produced by natural causes, but he does not know the factors or causes of organic evolution. He "knows" that man is the offspring of the animal, but he does not know "from what animal he sprang, or when, where, how, or in how many instances the transition took place." In a word, the evolutionist during recent years has become more certain of the truth of the evolutionary hypothesis, but more and more agnostic as to the causes or factors of the evolutionary process. In physics or chemistry, certitude as to the truth of an explanatory hypothesis is ordinarily the result of discovery of the causes or factors which explain the phenomena in question. Not so, however, is it in the case of the evolutionary hypothesis. On the contrary many phenomena are pointed to as finding their explanation in the evolutionary hypothesis, but no agreement is reached as to the factors or causes which explain the said phenomena. Rather it is the case that an agnostic position as to the causes of organic evolution is becoming more common among the scientists.

As to the ultimate philosophy which the evolutionist deduces from his hypothesis, Professor Johnson is probably justified in saying that the consistent evolutionist will not admit any intrusion of any supernatural or transcendent cause in the stream of natural events. Some natural scientists may observe the limits of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless it is true that many, if not most of them, turn their scientific hypothesis into a philosophy of the Universe. God, as Professor Johnson says, may be postulated as "a distant Originator in a deistic sense of the natural process or as a sort of spiritual underpinning of all existence in a pantheistic sense, but God is not allowed to act effectively and directly either in nature or in human history." If God is in the beginning, He is in the beginning only, or if He is in all things, He is in all "indiscriminately and so in nothing particularly." In a word, to put the matter as briefly as possible, the evolutionary hypothesis becomes all at once a metaphysic or philosophy of naturalism.

When it does this, it certainly comes into direct conflict with Christianity because Christianity—by which we mean historical Christianity, or the Christianity of the New Testament—is a supernatural religion in its very essence.

This conflict of naturalism and supernatural Christianity, the author brings out very well and concisely in the closing chapters, entitled *Evolution and Revelation*, *Evolution and Miracle*, *Christ and Evolution*.

We commend this little volume. It is no ignorant attack on natural

science; it is a good and clear statement of the opposition between a deistic or monistic naturalism on the one hand, and supernatural Christianity on the other hand. And so it is a worthy, though brief, contribution to Christian Apologetics.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Relation Between Science and Theology. By C. STUART GAGER. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company. Pp. 87.

This little book is concerned principally with the relation between evolution and theology, and defends evolution at the expense of theology, though the author says that his purpose "is to indicate, not so much *what* to think, as *how* to think on these questions" (p. 47). One redeeming feature of the book is a really excellent analysis of the logical steps of the scientific method (pp. 48-56).

The author's attitude toward the Bible is that "the Bible of Christianity contains the priceless account of the religious aspiration and accomplishment of the race that preserved for all mankind and handed down to us the wonderful conception of one God" (p. 77). He of course adopts the development view of Judaism and accepts the documentary hypothesis of the Old Testament (pp. 72, 74). The idea that the writers of the Bible had a special revelation is ridiculed (p. 4), and though the author does not treat the subject of miracles, since he accepts the principle of the uniformity of nature as a fixed law which is "obviously, the key to the future and the past" (p. 45), he would of course deny the possibility of any supernatural intervention in the universe. The author curiously thinks that theologians who believe in the unchangeableness of God ought to recognize the universal application of the uniformity of nature, past as well as present, thus ignoring completely the fact that we believe in a personal God whose *nature* is unchangeable but whose *mode of activity* depends upon His eternal purpose, so that if the purpose of God included a change in His uniform way of acting, that change would occur, and result in what we call "supernatural intervention."

The conservative theological position is grossly caricatured again and again (pp. 4, 7, 22, 23, 34, 35, 45, 85, etc.), and the author can only be excused for such misrepresentation on the ground of ignorance of what the conservative position actually is.

This book offers an excellent illustration of the lack of training in scientific logic which characterizes many writers on evolution today. This appears, for example, in the way in which the author shifts ground in defining evolution. On page 16 he defines evolution as "gradual change," and tells us that "The universe is now what it is because it was something else just a moment ago." Of course such a definition of evolution does violence both to the etymology of the word and to its historical meaning, for the word etymologically means "to unfold or unroll," while historically it means (1) "in metaphysics, the theory which sees in the history of all things, organic and inorganic, a passage from simplicity to complexity, from an undifferentiated to a differentiated condition of the elements," and (2) in biology it refers to that theory of the origin of

the species which says "that later species have been developed by continuous differentiation of organs and modifications of parts from species simpler and less differentiated, and that thus all organic existences, even man himself, may be traced back to a simple cell" (*American Universities Dictionary*). To define evolution as mere *change*, therefore, is to put up a straw man which not even the most rabid anti-evolutionist would think of attacking. No one denies that the universe is changing constantly, but mere *change* (which may be either upward or downward, from the simple to the complex, or from the complex to the simple) is an entirely different question from that of *evolution*, which implies change *always* in an *upward* direction!

In accordance with his definition, the author illustrates evolution by showing how words have changed in meaning, how the surface of the earth is changing in its form by erosion, and how complex chemical elements of the radioactive group are changing into simpler elements, all of which facts no one denies. But when he takes up evolution in biology, after showing that there are constant changes in the new individuals of each generation both through inheritance and environment, he gracefully shifts ground to the orthodox historical definition of evolution, and seems to assume that since change of some kind is a fact in biology, therefore the theory of organic evolution is true, closing his section by the familiar statement that "there is not the slightest disagreement among students as to the *fact* of organic evolution, but only as to the *method* by which new species evolve" (p. 31)! In this sentence he has completely shifted his ground to the definition of evolution as change in an *upward* direction only. The section on "evolution in biology" involves two or three other logical fallacies, but the one mentioned above is given because it is typical of what occurs in other recent books on evolution. In fact one is impressed more than ever after reading this book with the desirability of writers on scientific subjects taking a course in logic before attempting to write on these themes.

The themes upon which the author touches are so varied and important that a volume could easily be written in reply to many of the statements which he makes, but the book is so mediocre in argument and thought that it merits no extended treatment. He believes that evolution is true, that any conflict with theology or Christianity can be obviated by having Christianity give up any teachings or beliefs which conflict with evolution, and that it is the business of the scientist to tell "where we came from and for the theologian to tell where we are going." Beliefs, however, are one thing, and argument and evidence is another. Unfortunately there is little of either sound argument or valid evidence in this book.

Pyongyang, Korea.

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

God and Evolution. By W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., D.D., Chaplain to the King, Dean of King's College, London. Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd. London. Pp. 58. Price \$1.20.

After reading the shallow books on the relation between evolution and

theology which are being published at the present time, one is inclined to feel that all the writers who deal with this subject and try to reconcile evolution and theology from an evolutionary point of view, know little of the modern evidence on evolution, and less of orthodox evangelical theology. To one who is in this frame of mind, this book offers a splendid antidote. One seldom reads a book characterized by such clarity of thought, lucidity of style, and breadth of scholarship. Though we disagree entirely with the author's position that "an evolutionary view of the world is, in its degree, a true one" (p. 41), his defense of theism against the mechanistic evolution of the Neo-Darwinians, and his acute criticism of the "emergent evolution" of Julian Huxley, S. Alexander, and Lloyd Morgan, is pure gold. Though the author disclaims "special knowledge of any science except psychology" (p. 3), he shows a thorough knowledge of the literature of evolution, especially that published in England, and handles the subject with a sanity and absence of dogmatism that might well be emulated on this side of the Atlantic.

The first chapter discusses "the precise meaning of evolution both as a scientific theory and as a philosophical principle"; the second chapter discusses "what we may call 'evolutionary religions' and criticizes those substitutes for historical Christianity which profess to be founded on a scientific view of the world," while the third chapter deals with "some difficulties concerning the nature of God and His relation to the world which are raised by the theory of evolution" (p. 3).¹

In his analysis of the present evolutionary situation, we believe the author places too much credence in the validity of the modern claims as to the transmission of acquired characters. The evidence adduced by Kammerer and others is questionable to say the least, and even if accepted as true, would in no way overthrow the great mass of evidence against the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characters under all ordinary conditions.

It would be difficult to determine the author's doctrinal beliefs from this book, though he is probably a Liberal, as shown by the following quotation: "The evolutionary view of the world has not yet made its influence felt in our religious conceptions. It is desirable that this process should be hastened, for at the present time much Christian teaching has an appearance of standing in opposition to scientific conclusions, which is as unnecessary as it is unfortunate. The permanent values of the Christian faith can be preserved by a theology which welcomes the new insight not only as a challenge but as an opportunity" (pp. 50, 51). From this passage it is fairly evident that the author regards Christian doctrine as the product of man's thinking on religious themes rather than as the rational attempt to systematize revealed truths, for if Christianity is a supernatural religion its doctrines cannot be altered to fit the modern evolutionary view of the world.

The author, however, has done invaluable service to the Christian Church in vindicating the theistic view of the world against the modern

¹ The omission of the "in" from the word "inconsistent," on page 2, is the one serious typographical error in the book.

anti-theistic evolutionary theories of the Neo-Darwinians, and the pseudo-theistic evolutionary theories of the "emergent evolutionists," and this too, from the point of view of an evolutionist! We believe the author is perfectly right in finding one of the greatest rivals to Christianity in what he calls "the religion of evolution," which is "the belief that in evolution itself, or rather in a particular interpretation of it, can be found the satisfaction for the spiritual needs of mankind" (p. 27). He calls H. G. Wells and Bernard Shaw the prophets of this new religion, while Alexander, Julian Huxley and Lloyd Morgan are its philosophers. These writers differ among themselves as to the various details of the religion, but they all agree in including all the God there is in the evolutionary process itself, and in finding in the evolutionary process itself the *summum bonum* of the human race, evolution becoming the goal of mankind, to the attainment of which it is our privilege to cooperate. As the author clearly shows, such a religion, with its denial of all teleology in any ultimate sense, is diametrically opposed to Christian theism with its transcendent and purposive God. In vindicating theism the author acutely reasons that without a transcendent God, the upward striving in the universe is unexplained, as is also the problem of what causes the "emergence" of new factors. Moreover, as he shows, the scientific evidence points to an end to the process when the energy of the universe is radiated into space. Thus, even on the supposition that evolution is true, a transcendent God is necessary to account for the process of upward striving which evolution postulates.

One is tempted to quote profusely from the scintillating gems of argument that abound in this little book. For example, in commenting on Julian Huxley's claim that "deity is the next highest empirical quality to mind which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth," the author characterizes it by saying "that, on this view, the world is in unrelenting pursuit of a deity who does not exist—and never catches up with him." Again, in commenting on Alexander's statement that we should welcome the emergence of new qualities with "natural piety," the author says: "We may suspect that 'natural piety' is commended to us lest, pushing our questions beyond the appearances of things, we should be led to supernatural piety."

This book is stimulating, always interesting and scholarly. Our only regret is that the author himself accepts the theory of evolution. However, it is encouraging to realize that even on an evolutionary basis Christian Theism is the only rational ultimate explanation of the universe.

Pyongyang, Korea.

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

Science and Religion. Five So-Called Conflicts. By WILLIAM NORTH RICE, Emeritus Professor of Geology in Wesleyan University. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1925. Pp. 53. Price \$.50.

This very superficial little book has little in it to commend itself to either minister or layman. The style, however, is simple and pleasing, though the thought content is neither original nor profound. The incon-

sistency of the author's position is apparent in the fact that while he holds that "There can be no contradiction between science and religion, as there can be no collision between trains running on parallel tracks," (p. 8), he nevertheless devotes his principal chapter to a discussion of "Conflicts of Science and Religion." Of course what is meant is that the proper function of science is to "observe phenomena, and study their relations of coexistence and succession" (p. 7), while that of religion as our author conceives it is to deal with "our individual relation to the Personality conceived to be the soul of the universe." Thus the two spheres should never conflict, according to the position of our author. The weakness of this position is apparent in the fact that science is not content merely to observe phenomena and study their relations, while the Christian religion has always been historically regarded as dealing with an alleged revelation of God to man of certain facts necessary to his salvation, as well as his personal relation to God and to those revealed facts and the revealed Person, Jesus Christ. When this revelation becomes an historical fact, and Jesus Christ enters the stream of human history, both become proper material for the examination of the scientist. It is impossible therefore to separate the spheres of science and religion, as does our author theoretically. Practically, our author acknowledges this in effect when he proceeds to recount the different conflicts between the two. These conflicts relate: "to the form of the earth, the relation of the earth to the sun, the age of the earth, the antiquity of man, and the origin of species of living beings" (p. 28). Professor Rice thinks that science has always been right on these questions and the theologians and the Bible always wrong. Therefore he would abandon the field to the scientific theorists, and center religion about the "central truth of Christianity, that 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself'" (p. 52). If our author accepted these latter words in their historical sense, it would be difficult to see how he could be safe from the assaults of the naturalistic scientist, even in that central article of his faith, for the Christ there set forth is a Supernatural Being, a fact which plunges us at once into a conflict with unbelieving science. However, Professor Rice is far from taking the above words in their historical sense. "The Divine Spirit, which had come in limited measure to law-giver and prophet, to seer and saint, in ages past, dwelt in Jesus in unmeasured fullness" (p. 23). It is therefore plain that the author regards Jesus as different from the rest of humanity only in degree and not in kind. Thus, on such a naturalistic basis, science in any form can have no possible quarrel with religion!

It seems hardly worth while replying to the position taken by our author in regard to all the principal features of historic Christianity. He regards evolution as a universal law, but offers no evidence in its support, beyond a few trite examples which have been exploded long ago. Our familiar friends, alleged rudimentary organs and Eohippus, greet us once more from these arid pages.

He accepts unquestioningly the development theory of the composition of the Old Testament (p. 18 ff.), even to the elder and younger

Isaiahs (p. 22). He believes in the familiar evolutionary view of religion itself and says that: "The early Hebrew conception of Jehovah was apparently that of a tutelary god of the Hebrew people" (p. 15). One is inclined to wonder why: "we may be very sure that whatever he (Solomon) said of plants and animals was folklore rather than botany and zoology"? Of course our author has discarded belief in an inerrant Bible, even in the original documents, but one wonders why he can be so grossly ignorant of the Conservative position as to hold that the Bible of mediaeval theology was: "believed to be the words of men receiving passively an inspiration like that of the Delphian priestess" (p. 53).

The book is a typically Liberal book which resolves all the conflicts between science and religion by turning over the keys of the citadel to the scientific opponents of religion! It is neither original in thought nor striking in its expression of trite statements.

It is useless to deny the fact that there are certain fundamental conflicts between true religion and certain scientific theories. Both cannot be true, and when we look at the long list of scrapped scientific dogmas, we are not encouraged to say that the Bible and historic Christianity *must* be on the wrong side of the present conflicts! Many of the conflicts of the past like the first two mentioned by our author have arisen not because of contradiction between the Bible and science, but because Christians have used a wrong exegesis in interpreting the Bible.

Pyengyang, Korea.

FLOYD E. HAMILTON.

Nomogenesis, or Evolution Determined by Law. By LEO S. BERG, D.Sc. (Moscow), Chief of the Bureau of Applied Ichthyology and Professor of Geography in the State University of Leningrad. With an Introduction by D'Arcy Thompson. Translated from the Russian by J. N. Rostovtsov. London: Constable & Co., Ltd. 1926. Pp. xviii+477. 28 shillings net.

The book under review is a noteworthy one. It is a scholarly attempt to place a vast number of scientific facts in relationship to each other and toward several of the great "credal" dogmas which have become so much an integral part of modern biology. It is probably the most elaborate and terrific indictment of Darwin's selection theories that has yet appeared; but while whipping this essentially dead lion Dr. Berg, as it seems to me, has completely undermined the entire foundation of any scheme of development which could rightly be called "evolution." Like the late Dr. Bateson, he still believes in evolution somehow, "as an act of faith"; for he keeps his eye on the long serial arrangement of the fossils in their impressive sequence of progress, and has never heard a breath of suspicion against the geological series as a purely artificial arrangement. But he has almost as much contempt as J. P. Lott, the Holland botanist, for the pedigrees based upon the fossils. And so far from believing in the development of all our plants and animals from one original stock, or at most from a very few, as Darwin and most other evolutionists have imagined, Berg says that the *phyla*, the great *classes*, and even the *orders* of both plants and animals have developed

"polyphyletically," that is, from several original forms. In other words, to quote his own statement, which is repeated in various places throughout the book, "Organisms have developed from tens of thousands of primary forms" (p. 406).

This last conclusion is of itself sufficiently startling to the docile follower of Darwin or Haeckel; but the book is full of facts and admissions which, to those possessing sufficient scientific training to understand the argument (for the book is extremely technical in its vocabulary), would seem to ruin any lingering hope that modern science may be thought of as gradually making the theory of evolution more understandable and more credible.

The following, for instance, might be imagined as coming from some Fundamentalist work in opposition to organic evolution, instead of from this accomplished author who has given us a work that sums up all that modern science has worked out along the various lines of which it treats. Dr. Berg says:

"It is truly remarkable that palaeontology in no way displays transitional forms between phyla and classes, and, possibly, not even between orders. Thus, we are ignorant of transitional forms not only between vertebrates and invertebrates, fishes and tetrapods, but even between cartilaginous (*Chondrichthyes*, such as sharks, etc.) and higher fishes (*Osteichthyes*); in spite of a wonderful affinity between reptiles and birds, no transitional forms between them are known hitherto. Formerly, this circumstance was accounted for by the imperfection of the geological record; but it is none the less surprising that the deeper our knowledge penetrates into the domain of fossils, the further back recede genetic interrelations, which, as it were, ever elude our grasp. True, we know a number of groups that exhibit in their structure an intermingling, as it were, of peculiarities of two different orders or classes: such groups are generally alleged to be transitional. Thus, the *Dipnoi* have been regarded as a transitional stage on the way from fishes to amphibians, *Acanthodii* as a step from *Selachii* to higher fishes, *Bennettitales* as connecting link between gymnosperms and dicotyledons, etc. But a more careful examination reveals that in all these cases terminal branches of evolution are represented, and not the transitional links so eagerly sought for" (pp. 347-348).

Here is another somewhat similar statement:

"On the whole, it is difficult to imagine an organism in which the characters of the monocotyledons and dicotyledons might be combined. This is one of the cases frequently occurring in the history of phylogenetic constructions: in our endeavours to trace the phylogeny of two groups we often fail to find any transitional forms in the fossil state between the two, and are therefore induced to resort to the creation of ideal ancestors, to which we are obliged to attribute either diagrammatic, pale and lifeless characters, or such a combination of features as, by embracing all the characteristic properties of both groups, precludes thereby the very possibility of the existence of such progenitors; such is actually the case with the imaginary 'protanthophytes,' on which the characters of both monocotyledons and dicotyledons have been lavished.

"Arber and Parkin (1908) agree with this opinion, and affirm that there never existed on earth such a primordial angiosperm, all the organs of which were *equally primitive*" (p. 210).

Professor Berg is never weary of dwelling on the utter impossibility of complicated organs like the eye or the ear being slowly evolved by

many successive chance variations all luckily tending in the same definite direction, as Darwin's theory requires. Then he gives a great profusion of examples where various organs of this sort have *repeatedly* appeared in widely separated kinds of animals, such that we must suppose that these similar-looking organs must have each developed *independently*, for we cannot imagine the two kinds of animals to be genetically related in any way. Such examples are known among naturalists under the name of "convergence"; and recent works on the genetics of plants and animals fairly teem with remarkable cases of such "convergence," or "parallel development."

Among other instances, Berg mentions the *Dipnoi*, or lung-fishes, and the *Amphibia*; and he thinks it quite incredible that chance variations (*a la* Darwin) could have enabled both of these kinds of animals to transform their respiration by gills into a similar system of breathing by means of lungs. "Such a transformation," he declares, "would require a simultaneous modification not of one, but of a number of systems, including the heart, the nasal cavity, the lungs, the muscles, etc. That all this should have been combined into one harmonious whole by means of accidental variations of characters, and that such a consummation should have been effected simultaneously in the two groups, the *Dipnoi* and the ancestors of the *Amphibia*, is a miracle which no naturalist ought to credit." He takes up the matter mathematically, according to the theory of probabilities, and shows that, on the basis of the idea that "anything may happen," if we only give it time enough, a stone might happen to rise "by itself" once in a number of years which would have to be expressed by the quantity ten raised to the power of ten thousand millions. "But the probability of an *accidental* occurrence in two different groups of a combination of characters leading from aquatic to atmospheric breathing is still less" (p. 174). And I feel sure that every one of my readers will agree with him.

There is a group of flies both in the Old World and in the New, belonging to the genus *Volucella*, and in each region the various species and subspecies of these flies look almost exactly like the corresponding species and subspecies of bumble-bees. And Berg asks, "Is an *accidental* occurrence of the features of *Bombus* (bumble-bee) in these flies conceivable? It would be quite as probable as the supposition that a word, say 'Washington,' could be obtained by picking out at random letters from a heap containing the whole alphabet" (p. 315).¹

Here is his summary of the case against the theory of Darwin and the two other theories which in recent years have to a certain extent been regarded as substitutes for that of Darwin:

"Since the struggle for existence does not lead to the preservation of single favoured individuals, but, on the contrary, tends to maintain the standard, all theories of evolution based on natural selection fall to the ground: to such belong not only the theory of Darwin, but also the mu-

¹ The interested reader will find a large number of examples of "convergence" or alleged "parallel evolution" in Chapter VI of my *Phantom of Organic Evolution*, published some two years ago.

tation theory of de Vries and the hybridization theory of Lotsy (1914)" (p. 402).

The limits of space will permit of only a few more specimens of this author's searching criticism of theories which have held sway for two generations. As I have already remarked, Dr. Berg contends for the idea that each of the great *classes* and *orders*, perhaps even each of the *families*, or some of the *genera* (p. 345), "owe their origin not to one ancestor, but to several." And he says very truly, that "the determination of the origin of any one group from others will always remain guesswork" (p. 226). This reminds us of what Lotsy has said: that "Phylogeny, that is, reconstruction of what has happened in the past, is no science but a product of fantastic speculations" (*Evolution by Means of Hybridization*, [1916], p. 140). Unfortunately, this "guesswork" and these "fantastic speculations" have been the favourite occupation of many people who have been regarded as men of science, while the results of such guesswork and such speculations have been widely used by their theological camp followers as objections against the teachings of Christianity.

It is as clear as sunlight that the progress of our knowledge of animals and plants is only increasing the difficulties in the way of believing in any theory of organic evolution at all. Says Berg: "As the knowledge of the structure of plants and animals grows more exact, the number of cases of polyphyletic origin increases" (p. 340). "If we turn to the history of the classification of plants and animals, we shall see that the number of phyla, classes, orders, etc., continually increases; and this increase is, in an overwhelming majority of cases, due to authors realising that they are unable to derive one group from another, i.e., it testifies in favour of polyphyleticism" (p. 341).

All this represents substantial progress in the right direction. And now, if students of these problems can only come to see the arbitrary and artificial character of the geological arrangement of the fossils in an alleged historical order, this polyphyletic origin of the plants and animals from "tens of thousands of primary forms," as Dr. Berg says is his own view of the matter, will inevitably lead us back to the Bible view of a literal Creation, a view which henceforth will become all the more precious to us as Christians, because it has been extorted from the reluctant labours of two generations of investigators, who have all along been protesting against this result which the facts have now rendered inevitable.

Stanborough Park, Watford, England. GEORGE MCCREADY PRICE.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Introduction a la Bible. Par WILLIAM HENRI GUITON, Pasteur. Editions de "L'Union des Chrétiens Évangéliques," 32 Boulevard de Vincennes, Fontenay-sous-Bois (Seine), France. Serie A, No. 7. Prix: 6 fr. 50.

The author tells us in his preface that this work was prepared at the

request of the members of the Committee of the "Union des Chrétiens Évangéliques," a request which was consequent upon a vote of the General Assembly. It was eminently fitting that this important task should be laid upon this distinguished member of the Union; for one of the most imperative needs of evangelical Protestantism today, not merely in France, but in England and America as well, is the preparation of introductions and other helps to the study of the Bible which will meet the need of the layman. The thoroughly evangelical character of this little book can be inferred from the following statement in which the author describes the deeper sense of the marvelous perfection of the Bible which came to him as he was writing this Introduction: "Never has the Bible seemed to us so perfect, so manifestly inspired of God in all its parts, so supernatural and at the same time, and also for this very reason, so admirably suited to all the needs of the human soul." This is the result which the devout study of the Bible should always produce. And we believe that the earnest study of this little book will help many a reader, as the studies connected with its preparation helped the author to a deeper appreciation of that Book which because it is the one Divine book, the Word of God, supernatural in its origin and vested with the authority of God, is also the most human of all books, the only book which can meet all the needs of the heart of man.

After a general introduction, which deals with the history of the canon, Pasteur Guiton proceeds to give a brief sketch of each book of the Bible, to which are added an analysis of the book and a few supplementary notes. The discussion is brief but admirable and in a very small compass the author succeeds in giving the reader a great deal of valuable information. While Pasteur Guiton is writing for the layman and not for scholars, he shows very clearly that he possesses sufficient acquaintance with "critical" problems to enable him to state them clearly and answer them effectively. As an illustration of his method, the following may be quoted from his introduction to the Psalms:

"It goes without saying that a certain school of criticism is concerned to challenge the reliability of these indications (the headings of the Psalms) and to deny that David composed these psalms. It has argued that the psalms attributed to David were written after the exile and even long after the exile. It has argued that David was incapable of rising to such heights of poetry; that his coarse and violent nature, as also the fact of the very recent call of the people, prohibits us from attributing to this king and to this age so sublime a work. But the David of the Bible happily is not that of the critics and the history of Israel, according to the Bible, is happily not that of the critics. Undoubtedly David was a man of war and he was guilty of grievous faults, but it is none the less true that on the whole he sought to serve the Eternal and sought His glory with zeal. He had the rare consciousness of being His 'anointed,' the instrument of His will. He is the Israelite without guile, whose faith is determined by enthusiasm and love, who knows how to sacrifice himself for his God, and who after his fall knows how to humble himself and to consecrate himself anew. The true David appears in the Psalms; it is there that he reveals himself. When we read the story of his life, we understand his psalms; and conversely, when we read the Psalms, we understand his life. When he is pursued by Saul he writes Psalm lvii; when he is convicted of the sin which he has committed

with Bathsheba, he writes Psalm li. Could not the man whom God enabled to show such a faith and so sincere a repentance, have written these psalms; should not the man who has so often seen the hand of God in his life, be able to write Psalm xxiii and Psalm ciii?" (p. 119).

In this passage, our author makes it clear that the question of "Davidic psalms" is one which is to be decided not so much by the minute examination of this or that passage or verse, but by the whole course of the history of Israel's religion, as set before us in the Old Testament. If the critical reconstruction advocated by the at present dominant school of criticism is accepted which dates the earliest extensive documents of the Old Testament (J and E) considerably later than the Davidic age and which maintains that the religion of Israel did not differ very greatly from that of the neighboring peoples until the time of the eighth century prophets, it is, of course, absurd to ask anyone to regard half of the Psalms as Davidic. But, as Pasteur Guiton well points out, such a view runs counter to the whole teaching of the Old Testament; and it is only in its relation to these larger questions that the problem of a Davidic psalmody can be correctly studied.

Turning to the New Testament, the following may be quoted as illustrative of our author's attitude and opinions:

"The New Testament, like the Old, carries in itself the evidence of its reliability. It is written by men who offer the best guarantees of moral rectitude and historical accuracy. They are 'witnesses' who possess all the necessary qualities to inspire confidence. No one can deny the beauty of their character, the depth of their spiritual life, the greatness of the work which they accomplished, no one can deny the certainty of their information: many were immediate disciples of the Lord; Matthew, John, Peter, James, were companions of Jesus, heard Him, were able to witness His works, were taught, directed, strengthened by Him. Luke and Mark were the intimate friends of several apostles. Luke, who gives us in the Book of the Acts a picture of the missionary activity of Paul, tells us most often of what he has himself seen, since he became in various circumstances the co-worker of Paul. As for Paul, with what right can we question his veracity when he relates his conversion, when he reveals to us the secret of his life and his ministry, when in his epistles he makes reference to certain events in which he had a part. He also is in the full meaning of the word a witness, and a witness all the more worthy of belief because he has suffered constantly for the sake of his message. His witness is already a martyrdom" (p. 216f.).

While Pasteur Guiton in this paragraph states the historic faith of the Christian Church quite positively, declaring that "no one can deny" the certainty of the information possessed by the writers of the New Testament, it is not to be supposed that he is unconscious of the fact that there are those, and many of them, who do deny this. In the case of the New Testament, as of the Old, the author shows that he is acquainted with the objections which are raised against the apostolic authority of the New Testament. Thus, with regard to 2 Peter, he tells us that "The authenticity of this epistle has sometimes been questioned. Great pains have been taken to prove that this epistle could not be by Peter. But none of the arguments which are advanced seem to us to be substantial and on the other hand we have for our part excellent reasons for holding to the statement of the epistle itself, which commences thus: 'Simon Peter,

servant and apostle of Jesus Christ.'” Then there follows a brief discussion of the arguments for and against the authenticity of the epistle.

We have quoted two paragraphs in full with a view to giving the reader an opportunity to judge for himself the general character of this admirable little volume. It seems to us that without going into the minutiae of critical problems, the author has stated in a very effective way the great arguments for the acceptance of what may be called the Biblical theory of the Bible; and he has done this in a way which relates his statements with regard to the Bible directly to the attacks which are made upon it from the standpoint of criticism. We feel sure that this book will render great service to the cause of evangelical truth in France. We should like to see it translated into English and extensively used in the English speaking world. Until this is done, as we hope it may be, we would heartily recommend it to all who have even a slight acquaintance with French. It is beautifully written, and yet its diction is so simple and clear that it is remarkably easy to read.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

The Bible for Youth. With Introductions and Notes by Rev. R. C. GILLIE, M.A., D.C.L., and Rev. JAMES REID, M.A. London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, Ltd. 1924. Crown 8vo. Pp. viii. 1003.

This volume contains a great many Selections from the Old Testament, together with Introductions which usually cover a page or two and are placed at the beginning of the selection, or group of selections, to which they refer, and occasional brief explanatory Notes, which are placed at the end of the selection. With regard to these selections, the following statement is made:

“The Selections from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are adopted (with additions and omissions) from the Syllabus of Religious Instruction, compiled by a Joint Committee representing the Church of Scotland, the United Free Church of Scotland, and the Educational Institute of Scotland.”

We are told further that the text of the selections “has for the most part been revised for use in schools by the Rev. Professors G. Milligan, D.D., D.C.L., A. R. S. Kennedy, D.D., and J. Moffatt, D.D., and the selections are already being used in Scripture instruction in the schools of Scotland, in pursuance of the syllabus of religious instruction.”

We shall look first at the Selections. In the Old Testament, there are many omissions. Up to Exod. xxi the bulk of the Old Testament narrative is given; of the rest of the Pentateuch, only a dozen chapters or parts of chapters (viz. Num. xi, xiv, Deut. xxix-xxx, xxxiv in full; and parts of Ex. xxiv, xxxi, Num. ix, x, xiii, xx, Deut. xxxi), of Joshua (about half, chiefly the first part), Judges (9 chaps.), Ruth (entire), Sam.-Kings (most), Chronicles (barely 2 chaps.), Ezra-Neh. (scarcely half), Esther (none), Job (none), Psalms (32 in whole or part), Prov. (chap. viii and portions of 8 other chapters), Eccles. (none), Song (none), Isaiah (i-xii [in main], xxix, xl-lxvi [less than half]), Jeremiah (15 chaps. or parts), Ezekiel (9 chaps. or parts),

Daniel (i-iii, v, vi), The Twelve (only Amos [most], Haggai i-ii, 9, Zech. iv). It is significant that the Messianic Psalms are almost totally absent, both the Royal Pss. (Pss. ii, xviii, xx, xxi, xlv, lxxii, lxxxix, cx, cxxxii—only Ps. lxi is given) and those of the Suffering Messiah (Pss. xxii, xxxv, xli, lx, lxix, cix); Pss. xiii, xvi, xl are also wanting. This is remarkable since Isa. vii, Micah v, Zech. vi, Dan. ix, are also omitted. One of the most remarkable omissions is Ps. li. In the New Testament the treatment of the Epistles of Paul is particularly significant. The selections include only eleven chapters out of eighty-seven: viz. Rom. xii, xiii, 1 Cor. xiii, xv, Gal. vi, Eph. iv, vi, 1 Thess. v, Philemon, 2 Tim. i, ii. It is significant that the great doctrinal portions of Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, are omitted. Similarly in Hebrews only chapters xii and xiii are given. It is clearly the deliberate intention of the editors to stress the practical teachings of the epistles but to ignore the doctrinal presentation upon which the writers of these epistles base them. The omissions must be intentional. Lack of space cannot be given as a reason for omitting Ps. li and Isa. vii, Rom. viii and Col. i, as long as space permits the story of Samson to be given in full (Judg. xiii-xvi). And certainly youths of 14 to 18 should be old enough to receive some at least of the doctrinal teaching of the Apostle Paul. If not, the youth of today are babes compared with those of a century ago. For we are reminded that Hodge's *Commentary on Romans* was prepared "for the use of Sunday Schools and Bible Classes." Such inferiority the editors of this volume would of course be the first to repudiate. So we must conclude that this ignoring of doctrine is due to that tendency which is so common today, to minimize doctrine and to stress life.

Turning to the Introductions and Notes, it is to be observed that they represent an attempt "to make the Scripture intelligible to the minds of young people with the modern outlook." Consequently we are not surprised to find that many of the conclusions of the critics are stated as facts and that the attitude is one of distinct unfriendliness to and rejection of the characteristic supernaturalism of the Bible. Sometimes the Biblical miracles are explained away, sometimes they are declared to be unnecessary and sometimes they are expressly denied. Thus we are told that "even if it is actually true, it adds very little to our thought of God to tell us that he interfered with the sun to help Joshua. By sustaining his courage and faith in the battle, God was doing a far greater thing for him. The same thing may be said of the fire, which we are told came down from heaven to convince the Israelites that Elijah's God was the true God. What really convinced them was the truth of God shining through Elijah's courage and character as well as his message" (p. 8). Again we read "It is not the wonderful way or the startling way in which a thing happens that shows the finger of God. The mark of God's hand which a miracle seeks to reveal is in the good and the true and the beautiful, not the marvellous or the magical. . . . The great miracle is love." In a word it is in the ordinary not the extraordinary happenings that God most clearly reveals Himself.

Since this is the attitude of the editors to the miracles of the Bible,

we are not surprised to read in a Note upon "the cloud upon the tabernacle" the following statement: "the custom in early times was to carry brasiers of burning wood before an army on the march. The smoke by day and the fire by night showed the line of march" (p. 167)—it was in this ordinary event apparently that the people were expected to see the guidance of God; or to find that the plagues, the crossing of the Red Sea, the crossing of the Jordan, the fall of Jericho, etc., are explained as natural events which were brought about through the faith and courage of God's people. Nor should we be surprised to find in the New Testament, the gift of the Spirit explained as follows: "Then suddenly a great thing happened. A burning love for Christ took hold of them and a clear view of the truth they had from him. They could not keep it to themselves. Out they rushed into the street with glowing words pouring from their lips. . . . Now what was it that happened? We are apt to confuse the real thing with the strange events that accompanied it. We read of a mighty rushing wind, and tongues of fires, and various languages spoken by the apostles, which the crowd could understand. These things were not the real experience, they were only the accompaniment. When people, especially of an imaginative nature, are deeply moved, they are apt to see things and hear voices which are really only in their excited minds" (p. 874f). In short what it amounts to is simply this: miracles did not happen; they are merely the subjective interpretations of natural events by primitive or emotional people.

The anti-supernatural bias of the book shows itself finally in its attitude to the person of Christ. There is only one introduction to the entire series of selections which cover the period beginning with the journey to Jerusalem and closing with the crucifixion. This introduction is significantly headed "Jesus as Teacher." The closing section is as follows:

"His great message about God and love Jesus illustrates in various homely ways; but the great illustration is His own life and spirit. He loves us with God's love, even allowing Himself to be crucified rather than deny the truth He came to teach, or cease urging the way of love towards all men and following it in His own conduct. The rays of the sun are always shining and warming the earth, but they can be focussed in a burning-glass to kindle a spark of flame. So Jesus, in His life and spirit, focusses the rays of God's truth and love, which are always filling the world, so that in Him they can kindle the flame of love and goodness in our hearts. That is why men have called Him 'the Son of God,' because He not only taught that God is love, and showed us in His own life how God acts and loves, but as we think of Him, and study His character, God's love and friendship living still in Him take possession of our own minds and hearts" (p. 774).

This, if we rightly understand it, is pure Ritschlianism. Jesus has the value of God for us; we see God in Him; we see the Love of God supremely illustrated in His death. But we may not say that He was and is God, or that His death had any expiatory meaning or value. The one is metaphysics; the other is repulsive. Yet as we read the New Testament it is made very clear, we think, that in the training of the Twelve there were two great cardinal doctrines which Jesus emphasized:

one, that He was the Son of God, the other, that the Son of God must suffer. But we fail to see how anyone reading this "introduction" would discover in it either of these cardinal doctrines. He would see in Jesus merely a godly man, a great prophet, a heroic martyr; but he would not find Him to be the Divine Saviour.

It is instructive in this connection to turn to the comment on the resurrection. The following paragraph is significant:

"If we have some one like Jesus, so full of love and faith, so perfectly good, surely it is possible that such a miracle might happen. Is it not easy to believe that one so pure, so loving, so truly trustful of God might also have the power to overcome death, and possess the key to life and victory over death, which is not given to us? We cannot set limits to the power which one like Jesus might have over the hidden forces of Nature and the mysterious secrets of life" (p. 862).

The apostle Paul assures us that Jesus was declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead. But we are here told that this was due to Jesus' moral perfection; and it is suggested that if we were as good as Jesus was, we might be able to conquer death as He apparently did. We say "apparently" because while the question has just been asked by the editors "Is there any better way to explain what happened, than the simple story that Jesus rose from the dead," we are perfectly confident that they could not accept for themselves, or ask their readers to accept that story so simple yet so wonderful which the New Testament gives us of the Resurrection without completely stultifying themselves and invalidating the whole method which they have pursued with greater or less consistency in their comments throughout the whole book. If they can accept the miracle of the resurrection as it is set forth in the New Testament, they should have no difficulty with the other miracles which the Bible records. Consequently the fact that they so constantly and consistently explain away these miracles seems to us to make it clear that when they speak of the resurrection, they mean simply that as the Modernist tells us, "Jesus convinced his disciples of his continued existence after death."

In conclusion, we would call attention to a statement which is made in the preface:

"It is hoped the book may enable young people to apprehend the progressive revelation of God in the history of Israel culminating in Jesus Christ, and may remove some of the stumbling-blocks which make the ordinary Bible difficult for young minds. It will not be necessary to state our conviction of the unique authority and inspiration of the Bible as the record of Divine revelation. The constant aim of the book is to make that clear. But the best method of recovering for this generation the sense of the value of the Bible is to focus interest upon it, and let it tell its own story. This, in the main, is what we have endeavoured to do."

On the contrary as we see it, the fatal error in *The Bible for Youth* is that this is the very thing that the editors do not do, allow the Bible to "tell its own story." Between its express statements of fact and the explanations which they give of these facts, there is often a great and at times an utterly irreconcilable difference. The editors are attempting to

make the Bible "intelligible to the minds of young people with the modern outlook." They are endeavoring "to secure that nothing will need to be unlearned as the reader proceeds to further study." In doing this they seek to restate the Biblical data in a way which will not offend the modern mind. And when the Bible and the modern mind are not agreed, the Bible must be made to accord with the modern mind, even at the cost of contradicting itself. Thus we find that the editors do not hesitate to place a meaning on a passage of "Sacred Scripture" which is directly contrary to its express teaching. For a good example of this we turn back to the Old Testament. The account of Saul's disobedience and rejection contained in 1 Sam. xiii-xv is given in full except for the omission of the long passage xiv. 24-52. In chap. xv we find Samuel's rebuke, Saul's excuses and confession, and the final verdict stated with inescapable clearness. Yet this is the way the first paragraph of the introduction "Saul and Samuel" reads:

How are we to read the characters of these men? Was Samuel just the good prophet? Was he right in blaming the people for wanting a king? Was he just in blaming Saul for disobeying the command to slay all the Amalekites? Was it only pride that made Saul preserve the lives of the king and others?—in order to make a triumphal procession and create a big impression. Or may we take a different view? Was Saul a born hero, who gave his life to do battle against his nation's enemies, but whose heart revolted against the barbarity of killing prisoners of war? That is a point of view we may take as we read the story. We may feel that he was really more merciful than Samuel at heart, and saw dimly more deeply into the heart of God. What, then, was the reason of his downfall and his depression? Might it not be that he had a task too big for him, and yet struggled on, doing his best and yet blundering? These are questions which are worth while trying to answer for ourselves.

What does this mean? It means that the editors of this volume feel that they are entitled to try to solve for themselves questions the answers to which are clearly given in the Bible, and are disposed to encourage "youths," who are not to be permitted apparently to grapple with the great doctrinal arguments set forth in the Pauline Epistles, to follow them in setting up their own opinions against the express statements of the Word of God. What wonder is it that the spirit of revolt and lawlessness manifested by the youth of today is becoming a serious problem for the legislator and social worker, if the spiritual leaders of our youth encourage them to wrest the Scriptures on this wise? If it is proper for youths to make a hero and martyr of disobedient Saul and to censure and condemn a prophet of the Lord speaking in the name of the Lord, why should they be expected to give ready and unquestioning obedience to the Ten Commandments? If they are entitled to set up their own opinions—or, to be more exact, the opinions suggested to them by older and supposedly wiser heads—against the express teachings of such an impressive passage of Scripture as this, must not that oft-recurring and singularly impressive phrase of Holy Writ, "Thus saith the Lord!" become meaningless or a hollow mockery to them? Will they not conclude that the modern meaning of the words "Behold to obey is better than sacrifice" is this: "It is better to do what you want

to do, or what you think to be best under the circumstances, than to obey any commandment of God or man no matter how positively expressed?"

The Bible is the sword of the Spirit and we have faith to believe that there will be those who read this little volume who will prefer to believe what the Biblical Selections expressly affirm rather than to accept what the "critical" comments suggest or assert that they should say or mean. But the situation is serious when the Presbyterian youth of Scotland or America who would agree with the Bible must reject the interpretations of it which are given by men whom they are entitled to regard as authoritative expounders of the Word.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

The Gospel According to St. Luke. A critical and exegetical Commentary. By BURTON SCOTT EASTON, D.D., Professor of the Interpretation and Literature of the New Testament, The General Theological Seminary, New York City. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. Pp. xl, 367. Price \$3.50.

This volume makes a significant contribution to New Testament studies. However much one may question some of its methods, or differ from some of its conclusions, one gladly acknowledges that the commentary before us evinces great mental power and alertness on every page, and that the author has put more work into it than perhaps appears at first sight.

The volume opens with an Introduction which lucidly sets forth the principles of Textual Criticism of which the author approves, the theses, respecting sources and editing, which the Commentary will aim at establishing, and the salient literature of the subject in hand.

There is no full Biblical text supplied, whether that be in Greek or in English, and even as a commentary the volume seems to presuppose the reader's acquaintance with commentaries of a different type, commentaries that discuss the original text throughout, in every phrase of the Gospel that is under consideration, such as, let us say, that of B. Weiss, or Lagrange, or Plummer. With a preparation of that character, the careful reader of this commentary will find much to interest, and sometimes to edify him too.

After the Introduction, the three essential parts of the commentary consist of, Exegetical Notes, Critical Notes, and an *Apparatus Criticus*. So far as exegetical notes are concerned, the author's plan is to deal with the Gospel in hand, paragraph by paragraph. The paragraphing does not differ very much from the divisions shown in Westcott and Hort's Greek Text, paragraphing, indeed, being a feature of that epoch-making edition of the Greek New Testament that enhances the value of WH greatly. Where Dr. Easton, in the matter of paragraphing, departs from WH, it is so done for what appear to us to be good reasons. The terse phrase in which Dr. Easton supplies us with a description of the general sense and character of the several paragraphs is usually helpful. An effort is made, throughout, to make the contin-

uity of thought, as one passes from one section to another, patent; juxtaposition, it is held, being due either to the natural development of the history, or the grouping of cognate subjects, or determined by the principle of contrasts, while, in some cases, the principle, upon which the introduction of a particular theme into its actual present position in the Gospel, is regarded as untraceable. Dr. Easton's aim in his exegetical notes is simply to bring out what he considers to have been the Evangelist's sense of what he has recorded. In this Dr. Easton succeeds, as a rule, very well, and while many expressions that might puzzle the mere grammarian are passed over with little or no notice, an analogous statement could scarcely be made in respect of any passage that is likely to constitute a *crux* to the student of thought. That constitutes the value of this commentary for devotional purposes.

Along with that, it has to be said that Dr. Easton seems fully to endorse the maxim that, after all, our estimate of the historical value of the Gospel narrative and sayings, must depend upon the opinion we frame regarding the sources upon which the Evangelist drew, and he is confident that, in the case of the Gospel according to Luke, these sources can even now be almost everywhere ascertained, and, from the point of view of historicity, evaluated. The result is that the reader of these exegetical notes sometimes gets the feeling, that occasionally what appeared as the very helpful thought of the Evangelist does not after all correspond with reality. Yet contributions of a positive nature, that have a distinct value both as science and as religion, are not infrequent, as when, in respect of Luke's narrative of Christ's Temptation in the wilderness, our author makes our Lord Himself the probable ultimate source of that section of the Gospel.

The *Apparatus Criticus* is evidently a part of the Commentary upon which much labour has been bestowed, and is certainly a part that enhances the value of the commentary. But one meets with a curious phenomenon in our author's treatment of the classic passage (x. 21, 22) in which our Lord speaks of Himself as an object comprehensible, in the fullest sense, only to the Father, and claims that His own knowledge of the Father is equally comprehensive with the Father's knowledge of Him. In the exegetical notes, Dr. Easton seems to accept in this case the reading which is common to the TR and to the critical editions of the New Testament as unquestioned, the fact being that the witnesses—the exceptions scarcely count—all support the one text, and further Dr. Easton seems to interpret Luke x. 21, 22, in what I may call the catholic sense of Christendom. Yet, for all that, in his critical notes, Dr. Easton, on what, without meaning disrespect to anyone, I must call flimsy grounds, raises questions, that are radical in their nature, as to what constituted the original text, and, as an interpreter, he seems to question whether after all our Lord's words meant more than His unique knowledge of the Fatherhood of God, as set forth, say, by Harnack.

Of course, it could scarcely be expected that, in a commentary, such as that we are now reviewing, the evidence bearing upon disputed readings should be given with the fullness of a Tischendorf, yet these are

cases in which one has the feeling that in fairness to the reader, the witnesses on either side should be submitted, as is not always done in this commentary. I am thinking especially at the moment of the true reading in xxiii. 34a—ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς ἔλεχεν, Πάτερ, ἄφες αὐτοῖς οὐ γὰρ οἴδασιν τί ποιοῦσιν—where Dr. Easton concludes that the evidence for the omission of this saying—stating fully what that evidence is—is conclusive. But surely something has to be said for a reading that has the suffrage of S*AC, almost all the cursives, almost all the old Latins, a reading that is accepted as correct by Tischendorf, by Soden, and by Rendel Harris, a reading that records an utterance which is worthy of the Son of God Himself, a prayer that seems to find its earliest answer in the conversion of the thief on the cross, and is re-echoed by Stephen. May I be pardoned for saying that the school to which Dr. Easton belongs has a keen eye for apparent discrepancies, but does not seem to have an equally keen ear for the profounder harmonies of Scripture?

We are never, throughout this commentary, out of sight of the Synoptic Problem. With the exception of some fifty verses, our author accounts for the whole of our third Gospel, so far as sources are concerned, in terms of Q and L, and the critical notes are meant mainly to support the correctness of this derivation. L and not Q or Mk, is here regarded as the real framework of our third Gospel. A source [L] that accounts for more verses than Q and Mk combined, and to which the Evangelist owes his Infancy narrative, the parable of the Prodigal Son, and almost the whole of the 24th chapter of our Gospel, must be regarded as pointing to a unique personality. B. Weiss would seem to have been in this region Dr. Easton's mentor, but at least in the comparatively unimportant place he consequently assigns to the Evangelist himself, Dr. Easton seems to have forged ahead of all predecessors. Streeter makes a good deal of L, but to Streeter Q L is the Evangelist himself—Proto Luke. Burkitt, for all the significance he attaches to sources, gives the Evangelist the credit of telling the whole story from beginning to end in his own inimitable style. Dr. Easton gives credit to the Evangelist for having acted conscientiously towards his sources, but he would seem to have done little more as Editor than stitch Q, Mk and L, or paragraphs from them, together. This is particularly true of the Evangelist's handling of L. Even this he did with no conspicuous skill. The epithets, "ungraceful," "unskilful," "unfortunate," and a great many others of a similar import, are throughout this commentary for ever hurled at the Evangelist's head, and that, be it remembered, in the case of a work which competent judges have held up to us as the most beautiful book in all the world.

The ousting, so far, of the Evangelist has, broadly speaking, the effect of depreciating the historical value of our third Gospel. It is just here that Dr. Easton's method seems to us to be most at fault. For, it is far more reasonable to put confidence in the Evangelist's own evaluation of sources, and in his sense of what our Lord said and did, than to trust, as the School to which Dr. Easton belongs seems to do, to their own penetration and ability to test the value, of what I may call the

finished product, by an examination of the value of the raw material, which the Evangelist is supposed to have made use of. For, on the one hand, criticism is here engaged in a task of which it appears, when itself is tested at shorter ranges than our distance from the Biblical writers, to be fundamentally incapable of (Cf. Darlow's *Life of Sir W. R. Nicoll*, p. 361). On the other hand, Luke, by his significant ἐποίησάμην (Acts i. 1), takes full responsibility for all that he affirms in his first treatise. That treatise is, besides, everywhere shot through with literary forms that demonstrate Paul's friend, and companion in his shipwreck experience, to have been the author of it. The same author acknowledges that he made use of sources both written and oral, but he claims that he tested the accuracy of every (πᾶσιν, Lk. i. 3) detail he records with care, and he, in fact, makes ἀσφάλειαν (certainty), that term in which the Introduction to Luke closes, in a rhetorical sense, the most emphatic word in all the two treatises which he wrote. That is a remarkable acknowledgment of responsibility, and a high claim, but the moral grandeur of the book supports its veracity, and may we not further say that, in recent years, it has been the chief glory of archaeology that it has shown Luke to be reliable in every statement, in which 'the Treatises sent to Theophilus,' and Archaeology, have a common interest. We may, then, more or less exactly, know some, at least, of Luke's sources, but we trust Luke. We have not the necessary data to test, independently of the Evangelist's evaluation, all the sources which he used.

Dr. Easton would assign almost all the honours of our third Gospel, not to the Evangelist, but to an unknown author, L. But, if we allow ourselves, for a moment to be herein guided by Dr. Easton, we shall certainly soon find ourselves in difficulties of various kinds. I remark on only one, which is psychological in character. According to Dr. Easton, L believed, and wrote, that our Lord's ascension took place on the day, or on the evening of the day, on which He rose from the dead. On the other hand, the Evangelist Luke, was fully persuaded (Acts i. 3) that it was forty days after our Lord rose from the dead that He ascended up into Heaven. How can an historian of Luke's known capacity, have placed implicit confidence in L, so as, indeed, to be unwilling to alter almost a word he wrote, if L was so far astray in a matter of so great importance as the Ascension, as Dr. Easton would have us believe?

The fact is that Luke's methods, particularly in what appertains to his silences, call for further study. In Acts x, Luke makes no reference to Paul's visit to Arabia, but that need not mean that he was unaware of that visit. In Lk. ii, he makes no allusion to the Flight into Egypt, but that need not mean that he knew nothing about it. In Lk. xxiv, he does not make manifest that an interval of six weeks intervened between Easter morning and the date of the Ascension, but that does not mean that the subject was not present to his mind when he wrote chap. xxiv.

Dr. Easton who, indeed, makes the sources of our third Gospel comparatively early, none of them being, necessarily, later than 65 A.D., does not in the volume before us, discuss the date at which the Evangelist

issued his work, nor does he indicate exactly who he thinks that Evangelist was. Presumably, Dr. Easton is contemplating a Commentary on Acts, and thinks that then will be the time to discuss those questions. But he does reveal to us that, in his judgment, Dr. Cadbury has disposed of the argument by which Hobart, and others,¹ sought to establish the thesis, that a Physician wrote both our third Gospel and Acts. I venture to think that intelligent opinion will in the end confirm M. Jacquier's judgment here, and not that of Dr. Easton: "It seems to us," writes M. Jacquier, "that in the writings of Luke medical terms are too many in number that one should fail to draw the inference therefrom that Luke was a physician, especially when we consider what was Luke's manner of using those terms, and the occasions on which he served himself of them." For my own part, I do not say that, if tradition had been silent, I should have discovered that our Evangelist was a physician, but, with tradition as it has been, I seem, for myself, to see the physician in the appeal which the proverb, "Physician, heal thyself," makes to him; in the interest which is his in beholding the normal development of a child (Lk. i. 80, ii. 40); in the way in which he marshals his material for a powerful apologetic (Acts iii) from the experience of a man born lame, and who was miraculously healed; and, above all, in the choice which the Holy Spirit made of him to tell, with infinite tact and delicacy, truths respecting the mother of our Lord which most naturally fall for narration within the physician's province.

The proof-reading has been very carefully carried through. It may not, however, be amiss, to point out that, on p. 53, ὁρψρός is a misprint for ὁρψός; on p. 273, κτήματα seems, in one instance, to be taken for χρήματα; on p. 318, συνατᾶν is a misprint for συναγᾶν.

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JOHN R. MACKAY.

The Gospel of John. By ARNO CLEMENS GAEBELEIN. New York: Publication Office "Our Hope."

This is an exposition of unusual merit. Written in simple conversational style, the reader is quickly made to realize the profoundly evangelical spirit of the author, as well as his masterly knowledge of the Bible, his acquaintance with the best commentators and with Rabbinical literature, and his grasp of present-day conditions. It is a book well suited to the needs of those whose time or equipment may not permit of more technical studies, while there are interpretations and suggestions well calculated to arrest the attention of the scholar. Mr. Gaebelein's aim throughout has been to make this great Gospel speak for itself, and the result is a splendid unfolding of real Christianity. The viewpoint is premillenarian. Modernism receives the most excoriating rebuke. Thus, a quotation from Professor Samuel Dickey (Article "Lazarus," *Standard Bible Dictionary*) is furnished as a specimen of "the worst form of infidelity, which goes by the name of 'modern Biblical scholarship'—the camouflaged title of that system which is in the fullest sense of the word destructive, for it destroys everything in the line of true faith."

Certain minor details in the Exposition may lay themselves open to question. In speaking of the Holy Family, the opinion is expressed: "There is no certainty about these brethren of our Lord." Yet the 69th Psalm, so conspicuously Messianic, and repeatedly applied to Christ in the New Testament, contains the words (immediately preceding the familiar affirmation "The zeal of Thine house hath eaten me up," and inseparably connected with it by the casual particle *kî*): "I am become a stranger unto my brethren, and an alien unto my mother's children." Nor can we think the explanation offered of the great declaration to Nathanael does full justice to the preposition employed (*ἐπί*): "It is a matter of the future—the day of our Lord's return to earth. Then heaven will be opened, and His holy angels will be His attendants in that great event." But the angels are said to ascend as well as descend, and that upon the Son of Man. Is not the thought here simply this, that completed redemption will so bridge heaven and earth, that the days of Paradise shall be restored? Finally, with the author we believe that John v. 43 is a prediction of the Antichrist; but we cannot follow him in his identification of Antichrist with the second Beast of Rev. xiii. On the supposition that Antichrist is to be an individual, there is good ground for expecting a close outward parallelism between him and the true Messiah. For not only is *ἀντί* (in composition) used at times with parallelistic force in the New Testament, but 1 John ii. 19 directly suggests it. Now, Christ was a King (Matt. xxv. 34); He was so understood to be proclaimed by the star of the Magi, and actually had the title King of the Jews nailed to His cross. This second fell personage is not spoken of as a king, but as one who ministers to the last great Gentile emperor. Mr. Gaebelein rightly identifies the final Antichrist with the Man of Sin described in 2 Thess. ii. 3 (p. 114). But the very next verse shows that this Man of Sin arrogates Deity to himself, just as 1 John ii. 22 would lead us to expect. If so, however, he must be the first Beast of Rev. xiii. For it is this Beast that is to receive universal worship (xiii. 8), as the hellish caricature of Him Who was before Abraham, and before Whom every knee shall bow. The second Beast claims no such worship, but demands it for his great superior.

All in all, this Exposition is a noble contribution to evangelical literature, and must be classed with the *προφή ἐν καιρῷ* of Matt. xxiv. 45. It deserves the widest circulation. There are typographical errors which should be corrected in coming editions.

Lincoln University, Pa.

EDWIN J. REINKE.

The Return of the Lord. The Holy Spirit. The Angels of God. The Healing Question. By A. C. GAEBELEIN. New York: Publication Office, "Our Hope." \$1.00 each.

These four little volumes are from the pen of a well-known expositor. The plan followed in the first three may be gathered from the study of the Lord's Coming, where the passages in the Gospels, the Acts, etc., that deal with the subject, are examined seriatim.

The Return of the Lord. The author is a premillenarian, and will be

recognized by American students of prophecy as belonging to the "Niagara School." He regards the Lord's Coming as extended over a period of years, beginning with, and continuing as, the *παρουσία*, or invisible tabernacling of Christ in the heavenly spaces (during which interval successive judgments fall upon the earth), and ending with the *ἐπιφάνεια*, the Descent in manifested glory on the Mount of Olives. The whole true Church, we are told, is caught away to Christ at the *παρουσία*—as against Dr. W. J. Erdman (the whole Church passes through the Tribulation), and Dr. J. A. Seiss (a prepared and ready company enjoy the privilege). The views set forth are ably supported. In certain instances, those in accord with the general view here presented will enter a caveat. Thus, in Matt. xxiv. 40, 41, we are told: "The one who is taken, when the Lord comes in visible glory, is taken in judgment; the one who is left, is left to have a share in the earthly Kingdom." Apart from the questionable rendering of the verbs *παραλαμβάνειν* and *ἀφίεναι*, the Coming here spoken of by Christ is not His visible Appearing at all, but His *παρουσία* (vs. 39). Also, in dealing with the Parable of the Ten Virgins, Mr. Gaebelein overlooks the *τότε* which begins the entire presentation (Matt. xxv. 1)—which certainly seems to mark the going forth of the Virgins as subsequent to the thief-like coming of the Master of the House (xxiv. 43). Again (p. 68), the passage "The dead in Christ shall rise first" (I Thess. iv. 16) appears to be quoted as a proof of the First Resurrection; but the antithesis here—as appears from the *ἐπειτα* following—seems rather to concern the saints who are translated. Antichrist is identified (pp. 75, 76) with the False Prophet of Rev. xiii, a position which many will question. The author writes with poise and sanity, and scores the ill-advised and hurtful tendency to dabble in chronological speculation.

The Holy Spirit. This is a helpful and instructive little book. Many misapprehensions which in one way and another have become pretty firmly rooted in the mind of a section of the evangelical public (a personal baptism of the Spirit, or at least a sealing, subsequent to conversion) are cleared away. With the master-theologian A. Kuyper, the author sees that the great Pentecostal baptism was a dispensational act, in the nature of the case never to be repeated. Hence he brings the individual instances of the laying on of hands by the Apostles into connection with this. (The Ephesians of Acts xix. 2, 6 are generally recognized as not having yet embraced the real Gospel message). The difficult passage John xvi. 7-14 is admirably handled. The exegesis of I Peter iv. 6 may not so readily be accepted. Mr. Gaebelein holds that the Spirit of Christ proclaimed a Gospel to the antediluvians through the ministry of Noah. This is a well-known, and doubtless sufficiently accredited view, but we are told in addition: "They heard the preaching that they might either live according to God in the Spirit, or be judged as men responsible for what they had done in the flesh." Whether the preaching was a preaching to living men or disembodied spirits, the *ἵνα* followed by the subjunctive (note, too, the force of *μὲν* . . . *δέ*) speaks rather for predetermined judgment, followed by predetermined salvation. The injurious

teachings of the Pentecostal sects—far more wide-spread than many imagine—are severely and deservedly reprobated. The work of the Spirit in Genesis is not referred to. The treatment of the Blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (p. 18) is perhaps a little superficial.

The Angels of God. In this study, Mr. Gaebelien's rich fund of Biblical knowledge stands him in good stead. We have here an informing and highly interesting resumé of Scripture teaching as to angels, with a few helpful hints supplied from Rabbinical sources. The author rightly, as we think, regards the Cherubim as real beings. Following J. H. Kurtz, he argues for what may be termed the intangible corporeality of the angels. Much that he writes concerning Satan must be regarded as at least probably true. Here and there we are unable to follow this diligent student of the Divine Word, or at least we suspend judgment. We are told that the two who appeared at the Ascension (Acts i. 10, 11) were angels. They are at least *called* men (*ἄνδρες δύο*). The rejoinder of the company in Mary's house to the insistence of Rhoda—"It is his angel"—is taken to mean that the spirit of the supposed martyr was thought to have appeared. No doubt the Vulgate, Luther, and even the American Revision (for there is no foot-note) support this view; but may not the meaning simply be "His messenger"? Though not convinced that Peter stood outside, the assembled believers may have thought that some one had been able to convey a message from him. In Luke vii. 24, the same pen has written *Ἀπελθόντων δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων Ἰωάννου*. A passage on page 111 is certainly written *currente calamo*: "Then the angels of God are worshipping Him (Christ), and not only Him, but His body, the Church, as well."

The Healing Question. This is a greatly needed book. To quote from an opening chapter, "During the last few years, a veritable craze in healing of diseases by faith seems to have taken hold of thousands of professing Christians. . . . These faith-healers use the Scriptures to back up their claims. . . . We want to guard the household of faith against one of the most subtle delusions of our times." The utter baselessness of the claims of the professional "healers"—many of them Pentecostals—is made indubitably clear, and the disappointment, wreck and ruin wrought by such deceitful cults dragged out into the light. Freely allowing the sovereignty of God in bestowing extraordinary blessings at times in answer to believing prayer, the position is rightly maintained that the miraculous endowments of the New Testament were bestowed for the sole purpose of assisting in the establishment of the Church, and are not to be looked for much later than the first generation of the Christian age. The author explains the residuum of reality in, *e.g.*, the miracles of the Lourdes shrine, by the semi-mysterious functioning of the psychic powers inherent in the human constitution (auto-suggestion, hypnotism, etc.)—a conclusion that will commend itself to all who have at all gone into the subject. The claim that an obedient believer will be exempted from all sickness is thoroughly exploded. A vast amount of practical Christian wisdom has been packed into less than one hundred and fifty pages.

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EDWIN J. REINKE.

The Modern Reader's Bible for Schools—The Old Testament. By RICHARD G. MOULTON, M.A. (Camb.), Ph.D. (Penn.), Professor (emeritus) of Literary Theory and Interpretation in the University of Chicago. New York: The Macmillan Co. 8vo. Pp. ix, 536.

Dr. Moulton has been conspicuous among those who have sought to promote the "literary" study of the Bible, or the study of the Bible as literature. And his "Modern Reader's Bible" which began to appear in the Nineties has helped many readers to a clearer appreciation of the literary beauty of the Bible. According to Dr. Moulton, "the great obstacle to the appreciation of Scripture in its traditional form has been the indiscriminate mixture of great and small, text and note, matter and appendix, poetry and prose. What was issued in the Modern Reader's Bible simply discriminated these to the eye of the reader, as is done in all other printed books. But in a work specifically intended for use in education it becomes possible to add to all this the device of selection and even of condensation." Thus the underlying principle of the Modern Reader's Bible is "carried one step further."

That there is a certain advantage in printing the Bible like an ordinary book, cannot be denied. The chapter and verse divisions do at times obscure the sense to some extent. But on the other hand these divisions make the AV a singularly convenient reference-book. It is a great advantage to be able to locate a verse quickly and easily, which cannot be done in a volume like the one before us, where chapters and verses are not indicated at all in the text, but only in the index. If the verse-arrangement of the AV were as serious a hindrance to the appreciation of the sense and literary beauty of the Bible, if it were as obsolete as many assert, it would be difficult to account for the fact that the old AV is still by far the most popular Bible in use in the English-speaking world. Furthermore, the unusual form of the AV gives the Bible a certain appearance of distinctness, apartness, which means much to very many Christians. They are inclined to resent the attempt however well-meaning to make the Bible like any other book. It seems to them irreverent.

While it is easy to ridicule such an attitude as superstitious and foolish, it cannot be denied that there is an element of danger in this attempt to treat the Bible as literature—the danger that it will be treated as literature *merely* and not as sacred literature. This danger appears very plainly in Dr. Moulton's treatment, in the failure to distinguish clearly and adequately between the text of the Bible itself and the condensations and comments prepared by Dr. Moulton. Thus, the first section of the Old Testament in his arrangement deals with the "Early History of the Chosen Nation." It covers the period from Creation to the death of Saul and Jonathan. This title is followed by a sub-title "The World before the Call of Abraham." A "block" heading inserted at the right side of the page between lines 2 and 5 of the text reads "Genesis i-xi." The reader would naturally suppose that the text or printed matter which follows must include these eleven chapters. But it does not. There are first eleven lines of introductory comment. Then follows a

sub-title "The Creation of the World," which introduces the text of Gen. i-ii. 3. Then a line is left blank and there follows in Dr. Moulton's own language a condensed summary of Gen. ii. 4-x. 32, which occupies nearly a page. Then there is a heading "Story of Babel" which introduces the text of Gen. xi. 1-9. Then after another blank line, Dr. Moulton adds a few words of comment to prepare the reader for the next section "The Patriarchs: The Chosen People as a Family" which covers Gen. xii.-l. This means that the text of the Bible and Dr. Moulton's summaries and comments are usually printed in the *same* type and the latter are distinguished from the former as a rule only by a slight break in the text (a blank line). This is likely, we think, to confuse the reader and does not show proper reverence for the sacred text. Certainly Dr. Moulton's brief condensation of Gen. ii. 4-x. 32, should not be placed on the same plane with the Biblical text of Gen. i. 1-ii. 3. The summary is not phrased in Biblical language, and it is inadequate. Yet it is printed exactly like the Bible account of Creation which immediately precedes it. If, as would seem to be the case, we are to judge of the relative importance which is assigned to different passages by the treatment which is given them in this volume, Dr. Moulton is much more interested in Creation than in the problem of the origin of evil. The account of Creation as we have just seen is given in full; while the Fall is briefly summarized. In this summary the Protevangel is ignored. Does this mean that no Messianic significance is attached to it? A clearer illustration of Dr. Moulton's estimate of values is found in his treatment of the Book of Daniel. On p. 229 we read "The essential part of the book has already appeared in the "Outline of Old Testament History, among the Stories of the Captivity." Turning back to the passage referred to we find that only chapters ii-vi are given. This would seem to imply that chapters i and vii-xii are not essential. And such an inference is justified by this statement: "Then [apparently with chap. vii] the character of the book changes to Vision Prophecies, which in mystical and obscure language seem to fore-shadow mutations in world history" (p. 229). This is hardly a complimentary way to speak of the prophecies of Daniel. Dr. Moulton apparently regards them as vague and even weird 'apocalypses' which can safely be omitted. In like manner the omission of the last two vss. of Ps. li is probably due to the notion widely current in critical circles that in this "spiritual" psalm any reference to ritual sacrifice would be out of place. These examples of that "device of selection and even of condensation" to which Dr. Moulton refers as a new feature of this volume, show a bias on the part of the author which is not purely literary.

Another criticism which must be made of this volume is that it is prepared from the standpoint of a rationalistic criticism. This appears in a statement such as the following "Books of prophecy, like other books, may happen to contain predictions, but this is no essential part of what the word means" (p. 144). This does not amount to a denial of predictive prophecy; but such a disparaging, minimizing reference to it is not at all in harmony with the Biblical

teaching. One who truly represented the Eternal God—the God of the future, as of the past—could not fail to deal and to deal largely with future events. And this the prophets did.

Dr. Moulton seeks to escape the fish story in Jonah by quoting ii. 3, 5 as proof that “the trouble from which the singer has been delivered is, in the plainest language, described as an immersion in the sea.” And he continues “But to a single line of this song—Out of the belly of hell cried I—a commentator has appended a most prosaic footnote, explaining how the meaning is the belly of a whale that received and vomited Jonah. Had the page-setting which we now use for all literature been early applied to the Bible, it would have been obvious to every eye that this is only a commentator’s footnote, in full keeping with the fanciful thoughts which distinguished early ages of commentary.” And an attempt is made to apply the same kind of critical manipulation to the New Testament with a view to proving that the reference to the whale does not belong to “the words of Christ.”

While the reader is told that *The Modern Reader’s Bible* is not a new translation but is the ordinary Bible (revised version) so printed as to bring out to the eye the literary form and structure of each portion of Scripture . . ., it is to be observed that Dr. Moulton has not hesitated to depart at times from this version. In Ps. xlv. 6 he evades the Messianic reference by rendering “Thy throne is the throne of God for ever and ever.” In Ps. xlv. he repeats the refrain of vss. 7 and 11 at the end of vs. 3. Ps. lxxvii. is called “A Festal Response.” It is made up as follows: The ‘levitical blessing’ (Num. vi. 24-26) is put at the beginning being entitled “The High Priest.” Then the psalm follows as a response of “The People”; and the refrain of vss. 3 and 5 is repeated after vs. 7. Such liberties as these make it easy for Dr. Moulton to give to certain passages a much more striking literary form and a more obvious meaning than they have in the ordinary version. But they also detract very much from the reliability of *The Modern Reader’s Bible*. This book is much more than a mere printing and arranging of the Revised Version in modern style. Dr. Moulton appears not merely as literary editor, but as critic and reviser. And not a few of his changes, condensations, omissions and interpretations are made in the interest of those “critical” views of the Bible which are so widely current today.

As an interpreter of literature Dr. Moulton has great gifts and has rendered a valuable service. He has placed the student of Shakespeare and the student of the Bible alike under obligation to him. The unfortunate thing is that he has allowed himself liberties in his treatment of the Word of God which as an interpreter of the bard of Avon he would hardly approve. In the preface to his *Shakespeare as a Dramatic Thinker*, he tells us that “it is in feeling after the harmony of all parts of a whole that one-sided impressions tend to counteract one another.” As applied to the Scriptures this principle has found classic expression in the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith: “The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any

scripture, (which is not manifold, but one,) it may be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly." If this rule were faithfully followed by the critics of the Bible, the onesidedness and prejudice which characterizes many of the opinions confidently advanced by them would be made unmistakably clear.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Key to the Exercises in the late Professor A. B. Davidson's Revised Introductory Hebrew Grammar with Explanatory Notes. By JOHN EDGAR MCFADYEN, B.A. (OXON.), D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 8vo. Pp. xi. 145.

A dozen years ago Professor J. E. McFadyen of Glasgow undertook, at the request of the publishers, the revision of Davidson's *Hebrew Grammar*, then in its eighteenth edition. Four editions have since been published under his supervision; and shortly after the appearance of the last of these, Dr. McFadyen published a *Key* to the Hebrew and English exercises which it contained. That this *Key* is rather an elaborate work is indicated by the fact that it embraces a hundred and forty-five pages, which is only about fifty pages less than the last edition of the *Grammar* edited by Dr. Davidson himself, and about a hundred pages less than Dr. McFadyen's revised edition. Special significance attaches to this *Key* in two respects: as a "help" to the study of Hebrew grammar, and as a vehicle for the circulation of Dr. McFadyen's theological opinions.

"Opinions differ widely," Dr. McFadyen tells us, "with regard to the wisdom and expediency of publishing a *Key*." We shall not discuss this matter save to point out that the primary purpose of a *Key* should be to help the self-taught student to correct his own exercises and remedy his mistakes. If he uses it in preparing his exercises, it will become a crutch or "pony," a hindrance not a help. For the student studying under a competent teacher, the *Key* should be largely if not entirely unnecessary. Though for him as for the self-taught student it may be of great assistance in correcting his exercises and reviewing the grammar.

From the grammatical standpoint, the *Key* is of significance, especially because it manifests a tendency, already shown to some extent in the *Grammar* to change the character of this well-known and widely used textbook. According to Dr. Davidson's plan it was to be an *elementary* grammar, and the author did not attempt to discuss the intricacies of the Hebrew language, or to enter into detailed discussion of diction and style. Thus, the original Davidson (Tenth Edition) gives the rule for the use of the "sign of the accusative" (אֵת) very briefly, in a single sentence. Dr. McFadyen in the Revised Edition expands this to a quarter of a page; and in the *Key*, he comments repeatedly upon the use of this particle and we find such a comment as the following on the Hebrew of the sentence, "I will cut off their bow and all the weapons of their battle": "In the poetic style, אֵת is better omitted. See Mic. v. 9-12 where הוֹכַרְתִּי and I will cut off (pf. Hiph. of כָּרַח with waw consec.) occurs four times over (and also with other cognate words) without

אה before the noun" (p. 57, cf. pp. 11, 28, 31, 41, 46, 85, 100). The same may be said, for example, of the comments on the "full" and "defective" writing of the unchangeable vowels (cf. pp. 17, 21, 24, 38, 52). It is especially remarkable that this latter topic should be of such interest to Dr. McFadyen because as a textual critic he must be aware that variation in the writing of the vowel letters is far from infrequent in the Hebrew MSS. In fact it is so frequent that it may be questioned whether or to what extent the vowel letters should be regarded as part of the consonantal text. Hence such a statement as this regarding the "full" writing of tone long vowels, "It is, generally speaking, a sign of late date, when vocalic consonants tended to multiply, and were used indiscriminately to represent either \hat{o} or \bar{o} ," is confusing. Does it mean that the full writing was original and therefore in itself a proof of late date? Or does it mean rather that the full writing is "late" *vocalization* of the original text? The former would seem to be the more natural interpretation of his words. Yet we can hardly believe that Dr. McFadyen is as unfamiliar with the manuscript evidence as such a construction of his words would imply.

On the other hand in view of the detailed discussion of such points as the ones just mentioned, the vagueness of the following comment is noteworthy. In the Hebrew exercises on the Niphal, the *Grammar* gives the Hebrew of "Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed" (Gen. ix. 6a). Dr. McFadyen's comment in the *Key* is: "These six Hebrew words really constitute two lines of verse of three words each. Note the assonance—the play upon דם [*blood*] and אדם [*man*]. Note further the use of the ptc. practically as a noun—'the one shedding, the shedder of.' As a nominative it has strictly no grammatical construction in the sentence; it hangs in the air, the vb. יִשְׁפֹךְ [*shall be shed*] having as its subj. דָּמוֹ [*his blood*]; but the meaning is quite clear." This comment is singular, partly because Dr. McFadyen does not tell the student that the words "he that sheddeth man's blood—by man shall his blood be shed" constitute a compound nominal sentence, a construction of which many examples appear in the Old Testament and which is frequently found in the Classical Arabic and the primary purpose of which is to emphasize the first word (cf., Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 143), partly because he enters into a discussion of matters which are far from elementary, and belong rather in a commentary or in a discussion of Hebrew poetry than in a grammar and key designed to be of service to beginners.

Unless Dr. McFadyen curbs this tendency to discuss the details and intricacies of grammatical study which the advanced student alone is in a position to understand and appreciate, the *Key* certainly and perhaps also the *Grammar* will cease to fill the need for which Dr. Davidson originally designed his Grammar; it will cease to be a work for beginners. If all topics were discussed with the detail which Dr. McFadyen gives to some of them, these volumes would ultimately develop into elaborate philological treatises. The temptation to the teacher to tell all he knows, to go into details even when these details involve theories of

questionable values, is very great. We do not wonder that Dr. McFadyen sometimes yields to it. Some of his additions are undoubtedly helpful. But one of the great advantages possessed by the *Davidson Grammar* has been its conciseness. This should not be sacrificed if it can be avoided, certainly not in the interest of theoretical discussion.

But while the *Key* is significant as an indication of the policy of the new editor of this well-known and widely used introductory Grammar with regard to grammatical problems, it is even more significant from the standpoint of the theologian. Notwithstanding the great interest which is being taken today by philologists and archaeologists in Hebrew as an important member of the Semitic family of languages, it is still the case that most of those who study Hebrew study it because of its importance for exact and scholarly interpretation of the Old Testament. Consequently it is natural that the exercises which are contained in Davidson's Grammar should be largely taken from the Old Testament. But this has the natural result that comments which are made upon these exercises become, or can easily be made, comments upon the Old Testament passages themselves, which means that Dr. McFadyen is in a position to make this *Key* to a greater or less degree a higher critical commentary on such Old Testament passages as he has found in the exercises already given by Davidson, or has seen fit to add to them. Thus, in his revised edition of the *Grammar*, he has added exercises to the lesson on the "Particles." One of the Hebrew sentences is taken from 1 Sam. xxviii. 12: "And when the woman saw Samuel, she cried," etc. On the word "Samuel" the *Key* comments as follows: "Perhaps the true reading here (so 1 Sam. xxviii. 12) is שְׂמוּאֵל, which is found in four Greek MSS. 'whence she looked at Saul.' So W. O. E. Oesterley, *Immortality and the Unseen World*, pp. 68f." (p. 134). What possible right has such conjectural criticism in a beginner's Hebrew book? Again, the comment on the sentence, "Every man who shall harden his heart and transgress my law shall be put to death," consists of a discussion of the different words used to express the idea "harden" in J, E and P, it being assumed, of course, that the critical analysis of the plague narratives which Dr. McFadyen accepts is correct (p. 123). Yet again, in the *Grammar* in the section on the "Nouns from Double Ayin Roots," Dr. McFadyen has added to the vocabulary, which is intended to be used in translating the sentence, the word 'alma (it does not appear in Davidson's last edition); and this word is stated to mean "young woman." Then in the exercises the latter part of Isa. vii. 14 is given as we have it in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, except that the words הָרָה (shall conceive and) are omitted. In the *Key* this sentence is rendered as follows: "Behold, the young woman is about to bear a son and she shall call his name Immanuel." The word "young woman" is then commented on as follows: "עַלְמָה a young, marriageable woman, not necessarily a virgin, the proper word for which is בְּתוּלָה. For the παρθένος (virgin) of the Septuagint, the later translators, Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, of the 2nd century A.D., substituted the more correct ῥαίνις." We shall not attempt to discuss this comment, since this subject has recently been

thoroughly treated by Professor R. D. Wilson (this REVIEW for April, 1926). But we ask the reader to observe that this verse does not appear in the original Davidson. It was introduced by McFadyen, and apparently for the express purpose of attacking the time-honored faith of the Christian Church, clearly supported by the teaching of the New Testament, that *'alma* means "virgin."

It is only fair to Dr. McFadyen to state that such comments as those which have just been cited are comparatively infrequent. But this does not justify us in overlooking the impropriety of introducing such dogmatic and controversial questions into an *Introductory Hebrew Grammar* and its *Key*. If such matters are introduced at all they cannot be fully discussed, space forbids this, they can only be dogmatized about. Dr. Davidson was a "higher critic"; it was from him that Dr. McFadyen learned many of the views which he is so zealously propagating. But Dr. Davidson had the good taste to recognize that discussions of text and interpretation such as these have no proper place in text-books designed for the use of the beginner. Conservative scholars are often criticised as controversialists and disturbers of the Church. It should be recognized that not seldom their entrance into the debate has been provoked by just such uncalled for and provocative methods as those employed by Dr. McFadyen in this little volume, which but for this serious defect might be recommended to the beginner, especially if self-taught, as a reliable help to the study of Hebrew.

Princeton.

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SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

A Plea for a Positive Evangel. The Address delivered at the Opening of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland on the 1st of June 1926. By the Rev. ALEXANDER STEWART, D.D. Edinburgh: Free Church Offices. The Mound. Pp. 31.

This is a noble Address. Would that all Moderatorial Addresses were just like it. We agree with all of the Address, and consequently will try simply to reproduce briefly its contents.

Dr. Stewart says that the aim of such opening Addresses, as he understands it, is to consider some outstanding aspect of the Church's mission in the world. Bearing this aim in mind he takes for his subject "Gospel Preaching," and his plea is for a positive Evangel. He is on sure and Scriptural ground when he says—"The supreme task committed to the Church of Christ in this world is to preach the Gospel of Salvation."

First of all, the author seeks to indicate some of the factors at the present time which render it difficult for the preacher to proclaim a positive Evangel. Before doing this, however, Dr. Stewart clearly asserts that he knows of nothing which should cause despondency. He is no shallow optimist. He says that Christianity at this hour is passing through a crisis. "The day is indeed dark and cloudy, and no small

tempest lies on the Church of God." But the risen and living Christ is on the throne of the Universe and the gates of hell shall not prevail against His Church. Nevertheless it would be folly to shut our eyes to the dangers which threaten Christianity today.

The crucial element in this danger lies in the fact that the foundations of the faith are being attacked as never before, and the most menacing feature of this attack lies in the fact that it is directed from within the Church rather than from without. Destructive criticism has assailed the Scriptures. The narratives of the Old Testament, especially the records of "origin" which lie at the basis of revelation, are being discredited as history. The nature of prophecy is radically changed by eliminating its supernatural and revelational element. If the preacher accepts this view of the Old Testament, he is in serious difficulty if his text is from the Old Testament. The leaders of this "new learning," it is true, seek a way out by telling the preacher that the Old Testament narratives yield a "richer harvest" of homiletical material if regarded as myths, than they could if accepted as history. But this view misses the point of the question whether the Old Testament is intended simply to illustrate moral lessons, or whether it is the record of how God has intervened in history to save fallen man and has given a revelation of Himself in the Old Testament books. If only the former be true then the same ends could be served by pagan mythology. "The labours of Hercules could be made to yield lessons for life not less useful than the exploits of Samson."

When the preacher turns to the New Testament, matters are still worse, for here is the heart of the Gospel message. Criticism of a purely subjective character, untrammelled by regard for facts, subjects the New Testament records to a process of dissection, with the result that the authority of the New Testament writers is questioned both as to the factual basis of Christianity and its authoritative doctrinal interpretation of the great Christian facts.

In view of the results of this subjective criticism, many preachers believe that the Bible has been discredited as the supreme authority in religious knowledge, and therefore turn to "experience." This is to make experience the test of truth and the rule of faith. This is an impossible position "if for no other reason than that the field of Christian truth is obviously wider than the range of experience." Dr. Stewart might have added that this way lies scepticism as to all truth because truth or doctrine and belief are the conditions of experience and life. Even assuming, however, what is here claimed for experience, the preacher soon finds the validity of Christian experience challenged and is turned over to the tender mercies of modern psychology with its naturalistic and phenomenistic presuppositions.

The fruits of all this are clearly seen in the negations of "Modernist theology." The message of Modernism does not represent the Christianity of the New Testament, but gives us a totally different religion. It often continues to use the language of evangelical faith, but uses it with a new meaning of its own, a device which Dr. Stewart does not hesitate

to describe as "the most odious form of dishonesty." The Gospel of Modernism involves a denial of the fundamental truths of the Christian faith. "It empties the Cross of Christ of its redemptive content, denies the reality of His Resurrection, and strips Him of the crown of supreme Deity. It does indeed pay compliments to the loftiness of His spiritual genius, but it does not worship Him as the King of glory and the everlasting Son of the Father. It agrees to call Him good, but it refuses to call Him God."

The preacher is also confronted with the ascendancy of the evolutionary theory. By this theory Dr. Stewart does not mean the hypothesis of the natural sciences. He means the naturalistic philosophy which dominates all spheres of thought, including theology. As an ultimate philosophy its special significance for the preacher lies in its bearing on the Biblical doctrine of sin. Its advocates find it necessary to abandon the doctrine of the Fall. So conceived it is bound to revolutionize the preacher's entire message. If there has been no Fall, then there is no sin to be saved from, in the accepted sense of that term. If sin is only imperfection of attainment, it is one's misfortune rather than his fault; and there is no personal responsibility or guilt. From the denial of guilt follows the discarding of redemption. Then there is no need for the Cross as an atoning sacrifice. And without the Cross there is no Gospel, and the work of the evangelist vanishes.

In the second place, the author proceeds to mention some of the ways in which these influences have affected the modern pulpit. There are many preachers who appear to stand in "awe of the modern mind," and to fear being regarded as unprogressive. Instead of demanding that men adapt themselves to the Gospel message, they adapt their message to the popular taste. The voice of the pulpit has become timid and faltering. The weakening of conviction is seen in several ways. It is seen, for example, in the neglect of doctrinal preaching. In some quarters it is considered bad taste to make definite doctrinal declarations. The teachings of some pulpits consist in utterances so vague that they commit the preacher to no particular beliefs. The great themes of redemption are neglected.

As a consequence many substitutes for the Gospel of God's grace are offered. There is, for example, "the ethical Gospel." But while the Gospel of Christ does contain an ethical element, and while it sets forth great abiding principles which are to govern life and conduct, it furnishes at the same time in the truths of redemption the dynamic by which those principles can be made actual in life. But the "ethical Gospel" to which Dr. Stewart refers means something quite different from this. It exalts ethics into a Gospel and proclaims it as the way of life. Legalism which wrought havoc in the Church of Galatia has reappeared with no less disastrous results in our own day. Dr. Stewart asserts that the Moderatism which blighted the religious life of Scotland in the eighteenth century finds in certain respects an unmistakable recrudescence in the Modernism of the twentieth century. Dr. Stewart rightly says that "when the ethical message is in this way put in the place of the Gospel

of free grace it stands, I need not say, in deadly opposition to the Cross of Christ."

Another substitute for evangelical preaching is the "social Gospel." It is true, of course, that the Gospel has a social application, and the Church cannot be indifferent to the outward needs of men. But the Church must remember that to relieve the world of suffering is not so imperative as to save the world from sin. Moreover the preacher must never forget that the reformation of society can only be accomplished through the regeneration of the individual. This is the work of the Holy Spirit through the preaching of the Gospel of God's grace.

Once again the author finds an increasing tendency to exalt ritual and ceremonial over the preaching of the Word. This is the error of sacramentarianism finding an entrance into Protestant Churches because of doubt as to the doctrines of the Word of God. "An unpounded Bible," says Dr. Stewart, "always means an uninstructed people." This sacerdotal tendency is preparing a harvest for the Romish Church.

Again, we have the temptation of the preacher to aim at success through the multiplication of organizations, "making religious bustle a substitute for spiritual power." "The criterion of prosperity is not so much the sound of the Spirit's 'solemn rushing wind' as the clatter of innumerable external agencies." Under such circumstances the message of the preacher becomes sterile. It fails to take account of the soul's disease, and to proclaim with adequate emphasis the sovereign efficacy of the grace of God.

After thus stating some of the current substitutes for the Gospel, Dr. Stewart in his third section states the outstanding elements which enter into the "content of a positive evangel." As to the basis of his presentation he goes back to Paul's statement of his message to the Corinthians. "I delivered unto you that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that He was buried, and that He rose again the third day according to the Scriptures." Here is an example of Apostolic preaching, and it includes three main elements. First, the proclamation of certain historical facts about Jesus Christ, viz., His death and resurrection. Second, the interpretation of these facts relating them to human sin and transforming the facts of history into doctrines of religion. Thirdly, the attestation of these facts and doctrines by the testimony of Scripture. Here we have "the broad permanent elements of the Christian message." In a word "a positive evangel consists of the proclamation of historical facts, presented in their evangelical setting, and deriving their authority both as history and as doctrine from the written Word of God." A positive Evangel, then, means preaching about sin, not in a way which empties the Cross of its meaning, but in its relations to the Justice and Holiness of God. And if this is so, then we must revise our modern conceptions of the nature of God. One of the obsessions of the religious thought of our time, is, as Dr. Stewart says, a doctrine of the Fatherhood of God which is not the doctrine of the New Testament. We can only become sons of God through faith in Christ

and His atoning work. Nothing is more needed in modern religious thought than a new realization of the holiness and righteousness of God. "Modern theology," Dr. Stewart remarks, "has divested God of His majesty, and has well-nigh left Him without a throne. It has represented Him as an indulgent Father and lost sight of His Justice." We should add that in some instances modern theology has not only lost sight of the Justice of God, but has robbed Him of just those incommunicable attributes which make God to be God. We think of the idea of a finite God, or worse still, if anything could be worse, of the pantheizing substitution of the idea of a living Universe for that of the transcendent and living God.

But if God be God in the theistic and Scriptural sense, then a "positive evangel" involves the preaching of the Cross of Christ, of the substitutionary Atonement, and the Satisfaction of Divine Justice. This is the center of the Gospel. Dr. Stewart says he is insisting on the *fact* of the Atonement, but what he gives us is the universal Christian doctrine of the Satisfaction of Christ. If we are to glory in the Cross, it is necessary, as Dr. Stewart says, to understand what the Cross means so far as its meaning has been revealed to us in Scripture.

The next element in a positive Gospel is the bodily resurrection of Christ. For the resurrection of Christ is set in the New Testament in very definite relation to His death for our sin and our justification, and also to our new life in the Spirit. A "positive evangel" must preach a living Lord able to save today unto the uttermost. And this brings us to the crucial question of Christianity—who was Christ? Is Jesus God? The Modernist theology will not and cannot affirm the real metaphysical deity of Christ. But the preacher of the "positive evangel" will not hesitate to assert this great truth of Scripture. He will proclaim Jesus as the eternal Son of God and find in the deity of the Redeemer the infinite value of His saving work.

And finally, back of all this is the wonderful grace of God, His infinite love for sinners. We are to preach a salvation that is all grace, a gift "to him that worketh not but believeth." And if salvation is of pure grace, Dr. Stewart should have added that it is absolutely sovereign. To our mind a Gospel of pure grace means casting the sinner on the grace and power of God alone for salvation. Consistent, as well as Scriptural, evangelicalism finds its purest and only consistent expression in the Reformed Faith to which the Church of Scotland owes its existence.

In a fourth section, Dr. Stewart asks if we are warranted in proclaiming this Gospel in the twentieth century. His reply is in the affirmative. He points to the fact that the scholarship of the world is by no means all on the other side, to the fact that the doctrine of the authority of Scripture for which he contends is the doctrine of Christ and His Apostles, and to the fact that this Gospel is the one that has been transforming the world for nineteen centuries. He sees no reason today to abandon the Gospel.

There are doubtless many so-called Modernists who would repudiate the positions ascribed to them in this Address. But Modernism is not a

matter of individual views; it is a definite theological movement and cannot escape the laws of logic. Dr. Stewart, in closing this section, shows clearly that there is no logical halting-place between the "initial concessions of liberal evangelicals and the extreme critical position" which he has described.

Such being the difficult task of the evangelical minister today, the author in his fifth and closing section describes the qualities of mind and heart which the evangelical minister must have in order rightly to discharge his great commission, and ends his Address by emphasizing the great truth that in addition to labour and devotion, the minister of the Gospel must depend on the working of the Spirit of God for real success in his ministry.

We have devoted considerable space in outlining this Address of only thirty-one pages because of its force and timeliness. We too believe that the Church is passing through a crisis, not only in Scotland but also in America and throughout the world. We also agree with Dr. Stewart that the most dangerous enemies are within rather than without the Church, and we are in hearty accord with his view that this is no time for theological pacifism, but that the only remedy for the Church's ills lies in a vigorous and fearless proclamation and defense of the Gospel of the grace of God in all its fulness and power.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

Grace and Personality. By JOHN OMAN, M.A., Professor in Cambridge University, England, with an introduction by Nolan R. Best. The Macmillan Co. \$2.50.

The introduction by Nolan R. Best bestows fulsome praise on a book which is chiefly a broadside against the doctrine of irresistible grace. Yet Professor Oman claims to be a Calvinist and condemns Pelagianism: and Mr. Best confesses that in disrupting the Calvinistic system and leaving part of it aside "we have forfeited a solidity and substantiality of conviction in respect of which our newer constructions compare but ill." It is needless for either writer to waste words decrying "compelled obedience" which both assume to be the inevitable result of irresistible grace. Mr. Best hopes that Professor Oman will prove to be the Moses who will lead the liberals out of the woods. Yet Mr. Best is not wholly satisfied and is particularly critical of the treatment of the atonement. Furthermore, in appraising the arguments of Professor Oman, Mr. Best does well to qualify with the words, "as this writer understands him," for we have frequently wished that the author might write another book telling us what he means in this one. Yet out of much vagueness we wrest certain definite impressions.

The author thinks that the supreme crisis of Christianity was not the Reformation but the rise of Rationalism; and that this age might have been called "The Age of Reason" but for some odium that attaches to the name. "The Reformation was a mere breach in outward organization which left the old foundation of external authority unassailed, and the body of dogma unquestioned in fact." "Nothing is either true faith or

right morality which is not our own; consequently external authority is an unsound basis, and individual judgment not only a right but a duty." "The greatest thinker of the movement conceived it to be the arrival of the race at the stage of manhood." It is affirmed that there are now no infallibilities, and no external authority. The changes are rung on the statement that "a true belief is not for us truth unless we see it to be true; and a right action not moral unless we ourselves discern it to be right." This is the key to the book. Does it therefore follow that a wrong action is not wrong unless we perceive it to be wrong? Berkeley said "*Esse est percipi*." Do right and wrong and all reality depend upon perception? The argument is made to do yeoman service for the overthrow of external authority. It is perfectly obvious, we think, what havoc it would work if applied to the use of the yardstick, the multiplication table or to the laws of the legislature; but in morals and religion its mere statement is supposed to be a demonstration. It serves to make man his own God. For the external authority which is rejected must include natural law, civil law, the Church, the Scriptures and God Himself unless Pantheism is our philosophy. The author's assumption is not true in the world's affairs. Fire burns and disease wastes, irrespective of recognition. It is not true in the sphere of moral responsibility for Christ continually upbraided men for their unbelief. "It is no worse" someone assures us, "to commit adultery than to eat peas with a knife." Are we then to conclude that adultery is not immoral in him? Is right and wrong determined by what a man thinks, or is the universe constructed on rational and moral principles by an external power and authority? Autonomous authority is the most dangerous principle in the world.

"On the old dogmatic basis," Dr. Oman tells us, "God was the absolute, and all he did was without error or failure. Then to deal with the omniscient was to have infallible truth, to deal with the supreme to have absolute legislation, to deal with the omnipotent to have irresistible succor. Faith was the acceptance of infallible truth, justification coming to terms with absolute legislation, regeneration the inpouring of efficacious grace; and the whole dogmatic edifice stood solid and four-square." This old structure is undermined, we are told, though it is admitted that much definiteness and certainty have vanished in the process. Yet our author thinks that certainty can be reached by the witness of reality to our minds, and that only an obscurantist encased in a jointless armor hard enough to turn the edge of any fact will expect a return to the old infallibilities. He thinks that infallible external authority would have vanished long ago but for the conviction that it is a plain inference from the nature of God. But, he holds, we must not argue *a priori*, we must look at the world as it is; therefore God's method is not irresistible, unerring might. "All infallibilities presuppose an idea of grace mechanically irresistible"; but "we discover His method to be by way of persuasion and education through our errors and failures." Does irresistible grace in regeneration exclude the idea of cooperation in sanctification, and also all significance of education? The author's statement is question-begging.

Leaving behind Calvin's sovereign and monarchical God who did everything, and the Deistical God who did nothing, and the pantheistic Absolutism whose immanent cosmical process was more fatalistic than Calvin's determinism, the author attempts to present the modern problem which is so to unite the individualism of the 18th century and the absolutism of the 19th as to give us a person in whom nature and grace cannot be divided. Deism gave us moral independence, absolutism gave us religious dependence. These are to be united and harmonized. It is here that the author objects to irresistible grace. While recognizing the weakness of Pelagianism and Arminianism he quite disagrees with Hodge for saying that "regeneration or effectual calling is the work of omnipotence." This, he thinks, makes God absolute, unconditioned force. "We cannot be content to ascribe our whole life to the direct operation of God, after a fashion that makes God the most overwhelming of all forces, the most destructive of any reality to which the name personality could be given." Dr. Hodge would hardly recognize this as describing his position. "If omnipotence acts in regeneration why not in any other sphere?" "Why restrict it to effectual calling, and not ascribe it also to vicious desire and perverse will? If God can work anywhere with overwhelming fiat why not everywhere? Can a world thus easily to be corrected be evil, yet omnipotence be good and blameless?" If God acts so impersonally and irresistibly that a prophet may be a pen and a pope a mouthpiece, the uncertainties of revelation, the divisions of the church, and any evil in the world are mere scandals of God's negligence. So Dr. Oman argues.

But the Calvinist declines to be forced into such a dilemma. He believes in irresistible grace and the omnipotence of God in regeneration but refuses to be forced thereby into the denial of second causes. When the author asks the question of which he is never weary: "If omnipotence acts in regeneration why not in any and every sphere?" he denies to God the liberty he claims for man. If some things are effected by God's immediate fiat, which must be true if creation is a fact, must we therefore contend that all things, even vicious desire and perverse will, are the immediate effect of the Divine omnipotence? Why hedge God about with a necessity which he denies can be affirmed of man? The author might apply his argument to Divine providence and say: If God's providence has brought the Gospel to Britain and America why not to Thibet and Timbuctu? It is illogical to deny one fact because it is not another.

The nature of personality is made an argument against irresistible grace. This embraces the proposition that a moral person is self-determined. If determined from without the act is held not to be a personal act. Hence if a man is sovereignly regenerated by an act of God he is determined from without and the law of his personality is violated and the virtue of his conduct as well. Accordingly God, in dealing with man's spiritual state, can only present motives and inducements, as one man can to another, for action which as the product of a character already determined leaves no room for self-determination, which is of the essence

of personality. Moreover self-determination is essential to responsibility and to the moral character of one's acts. Thus man is not responsible for character inborn, nor praiseworthy for character determined by sovereign grace. So the argument runs. "Bad action as the effect of mere native disposition we rather condone." Which means that a murderer may well be excused because it is his natural disposition to kill.

Reformed theology has always taught that it is God's sovereign prerogative to regenerate when and whom He pleases; the unborn babe, the imbecile, the heathen, the dying sinner *in articulo mortis*. No argument can deny to God that right, nor deprive us of that hope. To say that God cannot act except through reason and perceptive appeals is to limit God, and the assertion that He will not, must be proved. Further it must be admitted that a sinful nature destroys however acquired. Leprosy kills whether hereditary or acquired. It is vain to talk about not being responsible for inborn sin. It works its destruction just the same.

Again the author avers that moral worth attaches to an act only if it is apprehended as right. "Once admit external and arbitrary commands as His will, arbitrary as far as our discernment can go, and God and the moral order are no more one. Good then becomes merely what God wills; and there is no more any meaning in calling God good. An order imposed by God otherwise than through our own sense of right would be no true moral order," which might be very well if we were omniscient. "Nothing is *morally* observed which is done as the exaction of God's will. It must be the expression of our own." The simple facts are that God never imposes what is wrong. We do not know in all cases what is right. Once assured that an order is from God, obedience is justified. There is such a thing as a justifiable implicit faith. "Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed."

It is said that the essential of morality is independence, and the essential of religion is dependence on God. But religion ceases to be spiritual unless moral independence is allowed. "Faith is not spiritual unless won by our own insight into truth," for otherwise "faith becomes mere submission to arbitrary greatness. As that greatness has no moral relation to us, it can only operate on us after the manner of a merely mechanical force." "No religion can deliver us which regards salvation as the effect of sheer unrelated underground explosion."

There are three positions frequently distinguished, first that a renewed life is the result of the natural effect of the truth; second that it is due to the Spirit working with the truth; third that it is due to the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit in a new birth or new creation. The first has been emphasized by the Pelagians, the second by the Lutherans, and the third by the Reformed. But the Reformed do not exclude the other two ideas in their proper place. And the direct operation of the Holy Spirit in regeneration cannot be denied if we accept the teaching of Christ and the Scriptures, which seems to be entirely foreign to the mind of the author. Certainly orthodox Christianity does not deny that faith embraces insight into truth and "consent of our own wills" though some content of faith must be received by revelation, which revelation

is accepted on good grounds. Professor Oman asserts man's moral independence even of God. By this, we conceive, he means that man must perceive and judge for himself the rightness of an action required, and proceed on that basis, and not because commanded, or on any external authority, which action, he thinks, would be unmoral if not immoral. It can be allowed that man's thought is his own mental exercise; his volition is his own volition; and man's act is his own act. But it cannot be allowed that man is independent of God's control, that God is limited to an appeal addressed to the reason. It cannot be denied that God has both the power and prerogative to go behind the volition and determine the character and disposition that will exercise holy volition. Otherwise God would be in man's power and His purposes of grace might be frustrated. If God had a right to create a nature capable of volition, has He no right to recreate its dispositions when perverted by sin, or deal with it in any way He pleases? In so doing He does not destroy personality nor repeal its laws. But the author has a poor opinion of such divine operations. "True religion is so far from being succored by any sudden and transforming experience, described by Hodge as a material change, that to rely on it is to expose ourselves to grave dangers. Persons who rely on this passive type of regeneration are often wanting in kind and patient relations to their fellows and often fall into utter uncharitableness. The reason is that right relations to men are for them of no significance for their relations to God." It is not true that relying on regeneration separates ethics from religion. The author says: "Christ's concern is not with operations of grace affecting the mysterious sources of life, but with the conduct of life itself." Yet it was Christ who said: "Ye must be born again," and "Except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God."

The Fatherhood of God and a gracious relationship, we are told, harmonizes all antinomies. "Augustinianisms have all started out on the wrong road. Attention is fixed on grace as a gift merely given, and on works as human resolves merely carried through, with no attention paid to the gracious relation of the Father to His children which does away with all that hard contrast between tasks and gifts. How utter is the failure would appear in this alone that grace is conceived as irresistible precisely because it is not conceived as gracious."

But if God does not operate by the bestowal of grace as a gift, what is the *modus operandi*? "How are we to be the sons of God? Not as mere tools or sycophants." But a gracious relationship takes the place of an overriding omnipotence which of course does not produce a flawless world, "because a personal relation can only work as it meets response, and response means that we can only accept God's will and rely on it by seeing it to be good. In short we can only accept God's will as by insight we discover it to be our own." This at once explains the author's view of the operation of grace and accounts for the imperfections of the world.

The author is never weary of hacking at the infallibilities and views of revelation as a word dictated from heaven and views of inspiration that turn a man into an animated pen, and irresistible grace that is

mechanical might with no reference to experience. If all his straw men should become reality there would be much fodder for cattle.

As to revelation the author thinks that irresistible grace makes revelation unnecessary. "If by the finger of power God can implant faith, the other aids would only detract," and "all historical events have to be attached in an external, arbitrary and even illogical way." "If God can mould hearts like clay why should there be any unbelief, or any sin?" On such a view God is "grossly culpable" since men's aloofness "must be the easiest possible obstacle to overcome, or rather the most senseless for God ever to permit." The author objects to intermittent revelations in the past which have now ceased in spite of increasing unbelief and wickedness. His view of revelation is a mysticism in which God is self-revealing at all times and in all ways, and not alone in special actions. A revelation confined to times and events could only be attributed to gross arbitrariness. So he thinks.

How fearful men of this type are lest the omniscient and holy God might be arbitrary. That irresistible grace would render revelation unnecessary is a false position. It rests on a narrow view of the functions of revelation and the needs of man. Man needs to know the facts of the past, the duty of the present and the grounds of hope for the future, all of which a written revelation graciously supplies. Neither does a general revelation exclude a particular one, and if any man has a better let him bring it forth with full authentication. If God is a terrible failure on the basis of the older views, it does not seem to help matters much to assume that God has so tied His own hands that He cannot intervene.

The author is seldom fair in any doctrinal discussion. He attributes to the orthodox believer the most extreme and absurd positions. He accuses Catholic and Evangelical alike of the baldest nominalism of Duns Scotus, which would make right to rest on mere arbitrary decree regardless of rational or ethical considerations. "One plays on the emotions by ritualism and the other by revivalism, but the aim in both cases is to override the moral personality." Comment is needless. Both Catholic and Evangelical, he thinks, make God a dismal failure.

Perhaps the saddest chapter in the book is the chapter on justification. Imputation of Christ's righteousness is "an arbitrary solution which no subtlety can make moral." "To accept the sufferings of the innocent for the punishment of the guilty would not even be legal." The Protestant doctrine of justification is "legal fiction," "self deception," "arbitrary," "crude legal device," "crude moral device," "legal evasion," etc. Such Unitarian epithets are used with lavish generosity. It never seems to occur to the author to inquire what the Scriptures teach, and evidently to his mind it makes no difference what they say.

No "hard legal conditions obtain" in the matter of reconciliation. "There are no conditions, no legal dealings with the past in any way, but simply arising and going to our Father." We would like to inquire if there is any nominalism in this, if God can abrogate His laws by a mere wave of the hand, if God's love as well as His justice is not manifested as evidently by a vicarious atonement as by the reception of a

sinner on no condition at all? Furthermore does not legal condition obtain in the whole matter of sin and atonement? Why is modernism so afraid of legal relations? Why is the word "legal" lacquered over with the paint of contumely? Is it not perfectly evident that the repudiation of legal relations is the denial of all law? In the absence of law we are left to a scheme of arbitrariness which the modernist so much condemns. The author's fundamental doctrine is that God stands in a gracious relation to all men and therefore nothing is necessary but for man to realize it and come to Him. This abrogates all need of an atonement and might be construed to render unnecessary the incarnation itself.

Professor Oman has some very emphatic objections to making Jesus Christ an external authority, or an example to be followed. "When Jesus is set up as a standard to which we ought so directly to conform as to make it a sin to go round by the way of our own discernment of duty, He is vehemently rejected as the heaviest of all impositions on our freedom." "To depend on Jesus as an external authority for the will of God is not a right conclusion from the belief that He is pre-eminently the Word of God." "On the contrary the proof of His Divine commission is in setting us free from the slavery that hinders us from being our true selves, living our own life, and dealing with God's world as our heritage." "The exactest imitation would only be lifeless, unedifying mimicry." That is to say, Jesus Christ is not to be regarded as an authority nor followed as an example except as the human mind evaluates Him and the human reason approves of what He does and bids. This is a dangerous line of assertion. It asserts that the measure of man's duty is one's own understanding and perception. It exalts man and belittles God. It assumes that man is always capable of perceiving the true goal and the best means to the end. It would repudiate a higher wisdom than our own lest obedience might be mimicry or blind submission. The rationalism involved is evident.

The author deprecates any offer of heaven or future blessedness as a reward for virtuous life. Such is but an appeal to selfishness, and leads men selfishly to seek their own happiness, and not virtue for its own sake. "Blessedness in another life cannot be either a direct gift from God or a direct object for our own attainment, without corrupting morals by religion or religion by morals." "A mere hope of immortality would leave us in the immoral position of making our moral end the perfection of our immortal souls, which would leave us still living for ourselves." The charge that to seek one's own good is mere selfishness and therefore immoral is a shibboleth of modernism. It is unnatural, unhuman, and irrational. Moreover to seek one's own good involves unselfishness, and the two are inseparable in this world or the next. It is all very well to say that we must do right because it is right and not for hope of reward. But abstract rightness or goodness separated from personal good has little meaning for us. Further, right for right's sake cannot be separated from personal good, and it is never wrong to present a right incentive for right action, and it is wrong to call such an appeal immoral.

The worst feature of this book is that its author claims to be a Cal-

vinist. The Reformed Theology has had its enemies and detractors in the past. It will doubtless have them in the future. Its doctrines of human inability and Divine sovereignty are too humbling to the pride of man for it to be otherwise. But it is passing strange to find a competent scholar who professes to accept a system of theology which even its enemies usually concede to be logical and self-consistent devoting an elaborate volume to the refutation of one of its cardinal doctrines.

Philadelphia, Pa.

DAVID S. CLARK.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Life and Letters of St. Paul. By DAVID JAMES BURRELL. New York: The American Tract Society.

The Golden Parable. By DAVID JAMES BURRELL. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company.

The reviewer takes up the last two volumes from the pen of Dr. Burrell with a feeling of sadness. He, who for over half a century served so faithfully his generation by the will of God, has fallen upon sleep, leaving an aching void in the hearts of thousands to whom his virile faith has been as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land.

The first of these books is entitled *Life and Letters of St. Paul*. One always hesitates to open a new life of Paul. "Is there anything new that can be written on this subject?", we ask. Perhaps not. But there is always a new way of presenting familiar truth. This was Dr. Burrell's rare gift. He was a scholar and thinker who never lost his touch with the everyday needs of ordinary men and women. He knew how to link the cloister to the hearth. He was a master of the fine art of translating profound spiritual truth into the language of the office and the home and the street. And for over half a century the common people heard him gladly.

We discover in this volume also another of the secrets of Dr. Burrell's power—his rich imagination. He pictures in the opening chapter the lad of Tarsus standing in wonder on the bank while the gilded barge of Cleopatra came sailing up the Cydnus to meet Mark Antony. He tells of the visions that came to Paul at Troas of the "man" of Macedonia, whom he found when he reached Philippi to be a woman. The story of Onesimus, which he divided into "a melodrama of five scenes," is one the reader is not likely to forget as he sits down to read this tender epistle to Philemon. The entire book is charming in its style and content. One feels as he lays it down that he has renewed acquaintance with an old and dear friend.

The Golden Parable is a series of addresses upon "The Parable of the Prodigal Son." Here the love of the Father for the sinning son is presented with that winsomeness and compelling earnestness which made Dr. Burrell's church for decade after decade one of the most attractive in America for souls who were hungry for the Gospel. Some of the chapter titles are suggestive, "At His Wit's End," "Right about Face,"

"The Love that Will not Let us Go," "Grace Abounding," and "Joy in Heaven." The whole is lighted by a wealth of imagery and illustration drawn from a lifetime of study and experience. The closing words of this volume are the valedictory of the author to the hosts who have known and loved him these many years: "What are these that are arrayed in white robes and whence came they? . . . And he said to me, These are they which have come out of great tribulation and have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb . . . They shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; neither shall the sun light on them nor any heat; for the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne, shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of water; and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes." This is the climax, the crown of it all. We close the book with tenderness and reverence and think of those words spoken long ago beside the Jordan, "My father, my father, the chariot of Israel, and the horsemen thereof."

Pittsburgh, Pa.

STUART NYE HUTCHISON.

Twenty-five Years as Bishop of London. By CHARLES HERBERT. Milwaukee, Wis.: Morehouse Publishing Co. 1926. Pp. 118. \$1.00.

The Sword of Goliath. By the RT. REV. ARTHUR F. WINNINGTON INGRAM, D.D., Lord Bishop of London. Milwaukee, Wis.: Morehouse Publishing Co. 1926. Pp. 143. \$1.40.

The first of these little books contains a short biography of the present Bishop of London issued on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of his headship of the London diocese. The second contains eleven rather brief sermons together with answers to various questions submitted to the Bishop. Together they give us a fairly accurate conception of one of the most conspicuous as well as most successful ecclesiastics of modern times as a man, as a preacher, and as a bishop.

The biography is not official nor was it issued with the Bishop's approval; rather it is "a tribute, from an outside source, to Dr. Winnington Ingram, both as London's loved Bishop, and as a man." Mr. Herbert writes not only in the belief that the Bishop is one of the most remarkable men of our age but that the story of his career reflects the history of the Church of England and the problems it has faced in the great city of London during the last quarter of a century. The little book does much to justify Mr. Herbert's estimate of the man in the account he gives of his early training and qualifications for the position of Bishop of London and the manner in which he has adorned that position for so many years. The impression we get is that of a strong and vigorous and commanding personality rather than that of a great scholar and thinker. Theologically he is apparently an evangelical churchman of a moderately liberal type. In the volume of sermons the *Sword of Goliath* represents the old Gospel of Jesus Christ and it is firmly but attractively maintained that this is the one thing that the world needs, that apart from it neither the problems of the city nor of the world will find any adequate solution. The discriminating reader will take exception here and there, but, in our judgment, will be quick to express his general approval.

Special interest attaches to these books because of the Bishop's recent visit to this country. We commend them to the attention of those who want to know something about one who is, perhaps, one of the "really great men" of this generation. Certainly it is a matter to be grateful for that so strong and so evangelical a man occupies what is perhaps the most important diocese of the Church of England.

Princeton.

S. G. CRAIG.

The Truth and the Life. And Other Sermons. By JOSEPH FORT NEWTON, D.D., LL.D. Author of "Preaching in London," "The Sword of the Spirit," "The Builders," etc. New York: George H. Doran Co. Pp. viii, 340.

Dr. Newton was originally a Baptist minister, later becoming an Episcopalian. For a time he was Rector of the Church of Divine Paternity, New York, and is now Rector of the Memorial Church of St. Paul, Overbrook, Pennsylvania.

This volume of sermons is the latest and perhaps the most thoughtful and mature in the series of volumes that have come from his pen. Judged by ordinary canons of homiletics, these sermons are not models to be safely followed by younger or less brilliant preachers. From the standpoint, however, of literary acumen, simple diction and warmth of feeling, the critic can have only words of praise. But Dr. Newton is not a theologian, he is rather an artist and poet. His imagination takes daring flights, and to his idealism he sets no bounds. His vision sweeps so wide a horizon that he falls little short of being a visionary. And from his dreams there is no disenchantment. Facts which are stubborn things carry with them no disillusionment for him. If there be spots on the sun, they are but marks of arrested development. Sin, to be sure, is a defect, but only a necessary stage in the progress of individual and social evolution. Universal amity, race solidarity, brotherhood resting on the logia of Jesus respecting the Fatherhood of God, is the panacea for all human ills. "With Jesus," he says, "there was only one question: Is God a Father?" (p. 19). "God cares more for a brother than for His own glory" (p. 81).

Dr. J. F. Norwood in the Introduction to the volume says: "If no echo of the angry debates which have agitated the churches is heard in these sermons, it is because the preacher has no interest in such issues, deeming them in no wise relevant to the actual issues of our age." But Dr. Norwood has allowed his affection for Dr. Newton to blind his eyes to the evident fact that this volume is replete with the "echo of the angry debates," into which the author enters as a full-armed warrior on the side of extreme Modernism. Almost every word he utters reveals that he has "signed up" without qualification with those enlisted in the battle of Armageddon, the outcome of which he maintains can have but one issue, to wit, the annihilation of the "small remnant" of evangelical Christians whose cause is already as good as lost. His dogmatism as a protagonist for "liberal theology" is so sweeping and unequivocal that only a gesture of the hand is necessary to consign conservatism to the limbo of oblivion.

He says: "Today God is thought of as finite, limited not only by his character but also by his purpose in the human enterprise. . . . He is an unfinished God, still in the making, whom we somehow by heroic moral enterprise help to liberate if not to create" (p. 27). Again he says: "God is imprisoned in our human world, a captive struggling to be free, forever seeking His liberty" (p. 35). In the realm of soteriology, Dr. Newton is no less dogmatic. For example, he says: "We must accept Christ not as a scapegoat, but as the truth and love of God in which our sin is cleansed and the meaning of our sorrow revealed" (p. 82).

In the sermon on "The Gospel of His Life," Dr. Newton says:

"Not once does Jesus suggest, even by inference, that God is angry with humanity, and must be placated, appeased, or reconciled before He can or will forgive our wrong doing. Such an idea is alien to the spirit and faith of Jesus, to whom God is not a Judge to be placated, but a Father whose love never tires, never tarries, never forgets, never fails. Unhappily, the old pagan idea of propitiation—born of fear—was imported into Christian thought and darkened our faith for ages; but we may now rejoice that it is fading away as we come nearer to the vision of God in Christ. . . . Nor must we think of the atoning work of God as something which began at a definite date in time and was finished long ago. . . . The incarnation was the climax of immanence in the world; Calvary was the climax of an age-long process of atonement ever going on in a world where God is always present, always suffering, always triumphing over evil. . . . The atonement of Christ is not simply something done for us long ago, but something that He seeks to do in us now. . . . Today no one can read the signs of the times without discerning a shifting of emphasis to the Gospel of the Life of Christ, and here lies the hope of religion and of the world in the future. . . . For atonement, as the word means, is Identification, oneness with Christ in the purpose and passion of His life, whereby we realize our oneness with God. The old dogmatic Christianity has collapsed, and is ready for the scrap heap. Everywhere men are in revolt against it because it is ineffective, inadequate, unreal" (pp. 109-110).

In the sermon on "The Church for Today," he utters words like these: "Jesus was not the founder but the finder of the Church" (p. 185). "The best definition of the Church of which I have any knowledge is that by Matthew Arnold: 'The Church is a society for promoting goodness'" (p. 191). "No promise is given to a timid Church, a beleaguered Church, a Church defending its Creed" (p. 193).

In the sermon on "The Will to Fellowship," Dr. Newton declares: "Christianity must be read in the context of the universal religious experience as a completing and not competing religion" (p. 198). "The plain truth is that while there have been Christians in the Church in every age, the Church itself has seldom been Christian" (p. 200). He quotes with approbation a message from "certain young disciples" in Japan: "Send us no more dogmas. Send us Christ" (p. 202). "There is hardly a single sect whose original reason for being is valid today, or whose central insight has any relation to the issues of our time" (p. 219).

In the sermon entitled: "The Loaf and the Cup," the author thus explains what seems to him the essential significance of the Lord's Supper: "It proclaims the enduring work and meaning of our social fellowship; the sanctity that hallows the home; the eternal quality of the dear love of man for his friend" (p. 287).

In the sermon on "The Spirit of Truth," the author says: "The movement of historical research overthrew the old external authorities, and found the basis of faith, and its verification, in the life of God in the Church. . . . Jesus based everything on experience" (p. 324). In the same sermon, several leading questions are asked, such as: "How did the Bible come to be what it is?"; "How much of it is the accretion of the creative imagination of the time?"; "How much of it is authentic history?" Dr. Newton's conclusion is that we have an old book with a new Bible, but, withal he sees in it new beauty—the beauty of a scant salvage (p. 325).

As to the truth of evolution he expresses himself with characteristic dogmatism as follows: "There is no longer any doubt of the truth of evolution; all that is in debate is the method by which new forms of life are produced, whether suddenly by leaps or slowly by small variation" (p. 325).

What might be taken perhaps as the summing up of Dr. Newton's position as presented in these sermons may be stated as follows: "Today we know that faith is not final; it is a dawn, a spring with infinite summers in its heart. . . . Make your own creed out of the truth learned by living—make it broad enough to include the purest, freest soul the earth has known, in whose friendship there is power" (p. 327).

What a pity that a preacher of rare culture and eloquence should be found shifting from the factual basis of the gospel of the Son of God and erecting upon a foundation of sand a temple dedicated to a Christ unhistoric and therefore unreal!

Princeton.

SYLVESTER W. BEACH.

God's Picked Young Men. By HENRY K. PASMA, M.A. Chicago: The Bible Institute Colportage Association. Pp. 96.

This book consists of sixteen short studies of as many young men of the Bible. Each study is a little gem in itself. The character of the young man is spread out before you and the real traits of his manhood are clearly seen. The style is attractive. Crisp, short, snappy sentences quickly give the author's meaning. The possibilities in the life of a young man are shown to be unlimited if he be humble and obedient to God. No young man need despair if he will read this book and get out of it its valuable lessons. The study on Gideon is worth the price of the book. Let every young man read Chapter V which deals with "The Young Man Who Dared God."

We hear much today of psychology. This book goes back to the Bible for psychology. "The standard textbook of psychology is the Word of God, the Bible. It represents the cross-section of the mind of man for over four thousand years. In it are the pictures of minds that were lawless and the pictures of young men whose minds were well ordered, because they had sat in God's clinic, where He showed them the mind of the young man as it is, as in a psychology class you are shown a human brain; when God showed them the pitfalls which are in a young man's mind, and the mental grooves which lead away from true wisdom."

In the study of Stephen the need of the Holy Spirit in the life of even a young man is seen. "The Holy Spirit grieves when he sees a young man go his way facing the great impossibility. The great impossibility is this: that a young man will never be a manly young man, a complete young man, like Stephen, unless he becomes a young man full of the Holy Ghost. You may study the biographies of a hundred young men. As you follow them through life, as you study their development, you will notice that some of them become great men, but only after a fashion; that their lives do not leave the impress of greatness which comes to you when you study the life of Stephen."

This little book will help you to believe in God. The old, the eternal things are emphasized and one feels the solidity of it all. Then what is of tremendous value is this: God is seen as a living, active God, choosing today as His instruments those who live according to His word.

Norristown, Pa.

J. M. CORUM, JR.

The Portraits of Jesus Christ in the New Testament. By HENRY SLOANE COFFIN. Pp. 96. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926.

Much as we differ from Dr. Henry Sloane Coffin, now President of Union Theological Seminary of New York, we imagine that when Jesus looks upon him He feels toward him much as He did toward the rich young ruler who came to Him in the days of His flesh inquiring the way of eternal life. While we are unable to reconcile in our own thinking Dr. Coffin's utterances with his position as a minister of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., yet there is such a ring of candor and sincerity about him as to make it difficult to speak severely of him and his work.

This little book sketches the eight portraits of Jesus Christ Dr. Coffin finds in the New Testament. It seeks to point out how He is pictured in the earliest preaching, the letters of Paul, the Gospel according to Mark, the Gospel according to Matthew, the Gospel according to Luke, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Revelation of John, and the Gospel according to John. It contains the substance of a series of sermons and makes "no pretence at original scholarship" being "an attempt to bring the learning of scholars to plain folk."

It is needless to say that Dr. Coffin in the course of these expositions of the New Testament delineations of Christ says much that is true and that must be kept in mind if we would know Jesus Christ as He was and is. We regret, therefore, that he also says not a little that, in our judgment, is false or misleading. Dr. Coffin proceeds on the assumption that the New Testament contains a variety of interpretations of Jesus Christ—interpretations that differ not only as regards details but which are irreconcilable at numerous points. For instance we are told that the writers of the New Testament give different explanations of our Lord's origin, and death, and life thereafter. Hence Dr. Coffin maintains that we cannot speak of "the Christ of the New Testament" in the sense that we can have a conception of Him that includes every item in every book.

No doubt there is a measure of truth in what Dr. Coffin says about the different manner in which Jesus is pictured by the various writers of the New Testament; but these pictures are always to be treated as complementary never contradictory. Dr. Coffin, however, not only maintains that we cannot combine all the representations of the New Testament in one portrait. He maintains that nothing in the New Testament portraits is essential that is not found in them all. This principle supplies Dr. Coffin with an easy method of eliminating such New Testament representations as does not commend themselves to his judgment. Dr. Coffin's root error is, perhaps, the notion that each writer was "trying to present a whole Christ to his readers."

Princeton.

S. G. CRAIG.

A Century of Excavation in Palestine. By R. A. S. MACALISTER, LL.D., LITT.D., F.S.A. Professor of Celtic Archaeology, University College, Dublin. Formerly Director of Excavations, Palestine Exploration Fund. With 36 Illustrations. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. 8vo. Pp. 335.

The author of this volume is eminently qualified to write with authority upon the theme suggested by the title. As a former director of excavation under the Palestine Exploration Fund, Dr. Macalister has had first hand experience in the field of archaeological research. He knows its problems, its limitations and its successes. The first chapter gives an informing sketch of the history of excavation in Palestine. The second treats of excavation and topography, especially with reference to Jerusalem. The last three chapters, covering a little more than half of the book, discuss the excavations in their relation to political, cultural and religious history. Thus it will be seen that in this volume the author speaks as practical archaeologist, as historian, and as theologian.

For Dr. Macalister as archaeologist and excavator, we have great respect. His sketch of the history of excavation is instructive and helpful. When he confines himself to the ascertained facts of archaeology, we feel that we are listening to the statements and opinions of one who knows whereof he speaks; and in so far as his conclusions are not manifestly influenced by his acceptance of evolutionary principles, we are disposed to accept them as statements of objective fact. When, however, Dr. Macalister attempts to reconstruct for us the religious history of Palestine, we find much to which we feel entitled to take exception, partly because we are persuaded that the evidence which the excavations have brought to light, Dr. Macalister himself being witness, is too meager to justify the sweeping assertions which he sometimes permits himself to make, and partly because his naturalistic bias is at times so plainly apparent.

Dr. Macalister has, it is to be noted, quite a modest conception of the function of archaeology. He introduces the chapter on "Excavation and Religious History" by telling the story of a certain American gentleman who endeavored to secure funds for archaeological research from a relative by telling him that he hoped "to prove the truth of the Bible"

and was met with the remark "Yes, but suppose you prove the Bible *isn't* true, what then?" Dr. Macalister then proceeds to say:

"Both speakers were absurdly wrong in their ideas of the aims and results of excavation. The Biblical record, like any other literary document, must stand or fall on its own merits. It cannot be either authenticated or disproved, as a whole, by excavation. In minor points of detail it can be corroborated, or it can be corrected. For example, the Book of Kings appears to give a date for the rebellion of Mesha which is incompatible with the account of the event recorded for us, on the Moabite stone, by Mesha himself. But even here, if we knew everything, we might be able to see that the two histories are not so irreconcilable after all. For all we know, there may have been two rebellions; there may even have been two Meshas.

"What we gain from excavation is illustration, rather than confirmation. Above all, we obtain a background, filling in the outlines drawn by the historian. We learn how to look at the events which the historian describes for us. We learn—and it is a very necessary lesson—not to think of Bethany and its village life as though Bethany were a village in England; we learn not to picture Solomon's Temple in our minds as though it were a building of the impressive immensity of a French Cathedral" (pp. 266f., cf. pp. 144f, 164f).

In view of this very definite declaration on the part of Dr. Macalister that "what we gain from excavation is illustration rather than confirmation" and that "the Biblical record like any other literary document must stand or fall on its own merits," we would be disposed to expect him to pay careful heed to the express statements of this record. But we do not find this to be the case. Thus we are told: "The Bible is the record of the gradual progress made by one favored community in the discovery of the Divine: beginning with the rudest and crudest savagery and advancing thence in knowledge until the time was ripe for a fuller revelation, to be made by the mysterious Stranger in Israel who appeared in the land of Palestine nearly two thousand years ago" (p. 267). Yet our author tells us elsewhere regarding the entire period from the Palaeolithic Age to the time of the Arabs and the Crusaders: "It is no exaggeration to say that throughout these long centuries the native inhabitants of Palestine do not appear to have made a single contribution of any kind whatsoever to material civilization. It was perhaps the most unprogressive country on the face of the earth. Its entire culture was derivative" (p. 210). Again we read, "The pre-exilic Hebrews, as a body were hardly other than pagan. Their 'lapses' into idolatry were not really lapses; they were the normal condition of their religious life" (p. 295), and "down to the end the populace as a whole was polytheistic in its conceptions" (p. 268f). And with express reference to the "wonderful literature of the Hebrews" which of course means the Old Testament we are told: "That literature admittedly now stands on a far higher and lonelier peak than heretofore, now that we have seen for ourselves the humble pit from which it was digged" (p. 147).

These statements which we have quoted do not harmonize with one another, nor with the teachings of the Bible. Surely a "community" cannot be regarded as particularly "favored" in the "discovery of the Divine" if it can be said of it that "down to the end the populace as a

whole was polytheistic in its conceptions." If the "discovery" was made at all, as Dr. Macalister's reference to the "wonderful literature of the Hebrews" clearly implies that it was, and if his estimate of the religious condition of the people is at all correct, as we believe that it is, then we are confronted by two possibilities. Either the "discovery" was made later than "the end," which would mean, for example, that Jeremiah, the great "theoretical monotheist" as the critics are prone to describe him, was at least later than Ezra, if indeed a place can be found at all for him in the history of Israel; or the discovery of ethical monotheism, of what we may call the true religion of Israel, whether made by Moses or David or Amos or Jeremiah, did not at any time seriously affect the lives of most of the community. The first position has, indeed, been advocated by Vernes and his school who accept the late date of the Law adopted by the Wellhausen School and then proceed to make the Prophets still later; but it has never become popular in critical circles, and would clearly be rejected by Dr. Macalister. But if the other alternative is adopted, if it is recognized that the *true* religion of Israel was never the *real* religion of *all* the people, never that is to say for any length of time, for the history of Israel is one long record of apostasies and returns, then the only question is when this "discovery," or to use Biblical language, when this "revelation" was made? Dr. Macalister apparently can trace practically no development in the religion or the culture of Israel. Consequently as far as we can see the religion of which the Old Testament is the "wonderful literature" might go back to Abraham and to Moses just as readily as to the "great prophets." Israel could not produce it. Israel as a community never accepted it. Pre-exilic or post-exilic makes no material difference; viewed as an ethnic religion, it is inexplicable, an anomaly. Yet it is there and it demands an explanation. And this very anomaly of the "wonderful literature" of Israel and the low, derivative, unprogressive nature of Israel's culture indicates clearly that Israel's religion was not indigenous, not an evolution, not a discovery, but a "revelation" made to a singularly unresponsive and rebellious people; a people who far from having a *genius* for religion, scorned and persecuted the prophets who spake unto them in the name of their God, and when at last He sent unto them His Son cast Him out of the vineyard and slew Him.

In view of the wonderful discoveries which have been made in Egypt, Babylon and Crete, Dr. Macalister naturally feels it necessary to give some explanation of the relatively meager results of excavation in Palestine. His first explanation is the one to which allusion has already been made, "that Palestine was always a land of comparatively low material culture" (p. 45). To this he refers more than once (cf. pp. 63f., 146). Yet this is not the whole story. For, as we have seen, Dr. Macalister does not believe that "the wonderful literature of the Hebrews" could have sprung from an illiterate soil. On the contrary he holds that "it presupposes, of absolute necessity, a considerable practice in transferring the thoughts and conceptions of the mind into the written word" (pp. 146f.). He points out elsewhere that the Akhiram sarcophagus recently

found at Byblos proves that the "Old Hebrew script was much earlier than had been supposed" (p. 248)—a discovery of great importance to the Bible student! The explanation which he gives of the dearth of inscriptions is partly *iconoclasm*: the inscriptions that existed "have not been allowed to survive" (p. 147), because of their heretical, i.e. idolatrous, character. It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that this explanation finds considerable support in the Old Testament. Another explanation is found in the successive plunderings to which Palestine has been subjected. Thus, with regard to the meager results of the excavations at Megiddo, Dr. Macalister remarks: "No one, looking at the wretched huts which the excavators exposed, could possibly guess that from this very city Tahutmes III had carried off the great store of treasures which that acquisitive monarch enumerates in his records" (pp. 65f.). This is undoubtedly "a point of some importance," if we would estimate correctly even on its material side the culture which the excavator reveals to us. As to its political, historical and religious aspects, these are, as our author more than once reminds us, largely immaterial things as to which we should not expect too much light from the excavator.

As has been stated, we listen to Dr. Macalister with great respect when he confines himself to objective facts; but when he theorizes and especially when his theories conflict with the plain teachings of the Bible, we feel at liberty to take issue with his conclusions. As a theorist, the archaeologist is no more infallible than the theologian. And it is very easy to propound plausible theories where but little is known. Thus in his discussion of implements and weapons, Dr. Macalister tells us, "Stones were, and still are, the commonest of all weapons of offense in Palestine. People throw stones at one another on very slight provocation, regardless of consequences; fortunately the aim is usually bad, as the assailant is as a rule in too violent a temper to control it. Stoning was the chief method of execution under the Mosaic law. Any and every stone in the country which a man can lift, might be regarded as a weapon" (p. 235f.). This is a very simple and readily understandable statement and seems to have no very profound or mysterious implications. Yet in the discussion of the very difficult problem of the beliefs of the early Israelites regarding the state of the dead, we find this remarkable statement: "The process of execution *by stoning* was assuredly followed, in order that the ghost of the dead should be enclosed at once in a great carn, that would effectually shut it in and prevent it from wreaking its vengeance upon those who had deprived it of its life upon the earth: compare the heaps of stones erected over notorious malefactors, such as Achan and Absalom" (p. 315). This statement is noteworthy. Dr. Macalister, it will be observed, makes it with some positiveness; he uses the word "assuredly." Whether he would regard it as the legitimate corollary to the statement made earlier in the volume to which we have just directed attention, or whether he has forgotten what was there stated, is not clear to us. At any rate this explanation is very far from being an obvious and necessary inference from the practice to which he refers, and the explanation implies a

crudity of belief regarding the "soul" and the "future life" in the days of Joshua and of David which if sanctioned by them, as would seem to be implied, would necessarily give us a very low, an absurdly low, conception of the religious beliefs of their day. Yet after all there is no real basis for this explanation except in the theories of Dr. Macalister and others regarding the evolution of religious ideas in Israel. The practice itself has, as Dr. Macalister's first statement shows, a very natural and obvious explanation. If stones were the usual weapon of the common people and were to be found everywhere, it would be natural that stoning should be the method used in the execution of criminals, especially when as in the case of Achan, the "troubler of Israel," it was clearly the intent that the whole community should participate in the transaction and thereby testify to their abhorrence of the crime and to their sense of the justice of the punishment. Under such circumstances, the larger the heap of stones, the more conspicuously would it mark the scene of judgment, condemn the crime and warn against its repetition. In Gen. xxxi. 46-54 a heap of stones is made a "witness" of the covenant between Jacob and Laban.

It is such speculations as the one which we have just cited which make it impossible to regard much of the so-called science of today as really scientific. There is not enough care exercised to distinguish between theory and fact, between necessary inference and doubtful conjecture. On the contrary highly fanciful speculations are not seldom stated with the utmost positiveness—"assuredly" this or that is the case!—when there is no real proof to support the contention of the writer. The fallacy which underlies much of the scientific dogmatism of today is the mistaken notion, that the real test of the truth of a theory is its accordance with the doctrine of evolution.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Postmodernism and Other Essays. By BERNARD IDDINGS BELL, D.D., President of Saint Stephen's College. Morehouse Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 1926. Pp. 135.

This little book is put forward as indicative of the latest and most advanced thinking that calls itself Christian. "Fundamentalism," we read, "is hopelessly outdated. Modernism has ceased to be modern. We are ready for some sort of Postmodernism."

Fundamentalism as understood by Dr. Bell is essentially the same as historic Protestantism. This, he points out, was based on two beliefs, the infallibility of the Bible and the sufficiency of the individual intellect. Modernism has forced the abandonment of the first of these beliefs by all those who have both knowledge and intellectual honesty. Modernism, however, still clings to the second of these beliefs. It puts its trust in the sufficiency of the human mind. It believes itself capable of discovering truth and formulating the right way to live by clear reasoning from accurately observed phenomena. That, however, is also now a discredited belief. "While in 1895 practically every first-rate scientist assumed that man is capable by observation and reason of discovering essential truth about the universe and about himself—assumed it without much thought

and because he was engrossed in methodology—there is not a mind of premier rank in the world in 1925 which believes any such thing. The scientific intelligentsia now realize, and for the most part freely admit, that, merely by scientific methods, nothing of basic importance, of primary importance, of ontological importance, can be discovered." Consequently "the only possible end of the scientific method, unless that method be augmented extra-scientifically, is honest and complete agnosticism about everything and frank surrender in man's age-long battle toward Truth and toward a meaning for the universe and himself within it."

Modernism being as truly though not as far behind the times as Fundamentalism, some sort of Postmodernism is an urgent need. Since Fundamentalism is an offense to the good sense of the age and human reason incapable, by virtue of inherent limitations, of dealing adequately with the problems involved, as Modernism mistakenly supposes, some better way must be found.

The outstanding characteristic of the Postmodernism commended, and the one that goes furthest toward justifying its claim to be Christianity, is its acceptance of the Incarnation, its definition of Christianity as "this personal religion of an Incarnate God. It accepts the Incarnation" chiefly because millions of people, of every sort and race and class and culture, including many of the most intelligent individuals the world has ever known, have taken it as a basis upon which to build up the practice of the presence of God and have found that it forms a firm and satisfactory foundation for the cultivation of such love as does really reveal him." But while its acceptance of the Incarnation seems to us inadequately grounded it is seemingly whole-hearted. "Within the realm of time and space came God Incarnate, in all points tried and limited as we are, yet perfect God all the while. In the womb of the Virgin by divine creative power was conceived a Child. From his mother He took every human essential. From the Eternal He came, in very perfection, Deity. Born He was and lived, and grew, and labored, and loved, and died upon the Cross to which blinded men condemned Him because of the man-shaming beauty of His life. But God cannot be annihilated nor His will in becoming Incarnate thwarted. From the grave He rose again to continued life. He left our sight at last, but He still lives on, forever Incarnate, forever God and Man." Another outstanding characteristic of Postmodernism is its acknowledgment that "for purposes of worship the Incarnation must needs be extended and continued sacramentally." Dr. Bell is an "Anglo-Catholic" and rejoices in the thought that his position is fundamentally that of the Catholic Church of the ages. While he is as much opposed to an infallible pope or an infallible hierarchy as he is to an infallible book or a supposedly infallible brain, yet he tells us that "the Postmodernist looks with more approval upon Roman Catholicism than he does upon current Protestantism, for while the latter seems to him chiefly a mad babble about nothing, he sees the former ministering to the souls of men and bringing them sacramentally and humbly to the feet of the Incarnate God." For

Postmodernism "the Church will have its only meaning as the guardian of the truth of the Incarnation and the practice of its sacramental extension."

The essay on Postmodernism constitutes about one-half of the book. The other essays deal with "The Moral Revolt of the Younger Generation"; "Religion in the Colleges"; "The Church and the Young Man"; "Victorian Ethics and Religion Today"; and "Religion and Civilization."

This little book has characteristics which give it an interest, if not a value, beyond its size. Frank and pungent in its utterances it is at times keen and penetrating in its insights. It is conscious, for instance, that the widespread repudiation of Christian morals is due to the rejection of the assumptions on which they are based; that the failure of the churches to hold young people is largely due to "the attempt to solve intellectual difficulties by avoiding them or minimizing their legitimacy and importance"; that it is as a religion that Christianity has blessed mankind and that present-day humanitarianism is not religion at all and "may easily become mere pride, vainglory, and hypocrisy, from which we ought to pray to be delivered just as much as from envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness." Dr. Bell would fain be an apostle of the Christian religion but before he becomes the apostle of Christianity in its purity he will have to become a post-post-post-Modernist, which being interpreted means that he will have to get back or rather forward to that Calvinism which he now regards as "an antiquarian curiosity." If Dr. Bell is wrong-headed he is delightfully wrong-headed. His book excites both dissent and appreciation.

Princeton.

S. G. CRAIG.

The Crystal Pointers. By F. W. BOREHAM. New York: The Abingdon Press.

The author tells us that the title of this book was suggested on a cruise in the Southern Ocean, when a discussion arose as to the points of the compass, and suddenly the "pointers" of the Southern Cross appeared. Everyone in southern waters knows these pointers, they are not the Southern Cross but they point to it. The author adds that these papers are of value only because they point to the Cross, and they do. Boreham's stories point to the Cross, his books preach Christ.

Elkins Park, Pa.

RICHARD MONTGOMERY.

Everlasting Salvation. By CHARLES FORBES TAYLOR. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co.

A series of Gospel Addresses which are fresh without being novel. The author has brought forth treasures old and presented them in an interesting way. Two addresses different from others are: "The Relation of the Movies to the American Home"; and "What is Patriotism?" both exceptionally good. Adult Bible Classes could use this book to good purpose.

Elkins Park, Pa.

RICHARD MONTGOMERY.

Finding God in Books. By Rev. WILLIAM L. STIDGER, D.D. New York: George H. Doran Company.

This book is in response to the request we are told, for more such sermons as the author's *There Are Sermons in Books*. It is no doubt true that the themes of many poems and stories are found in the Scriptures and it would no doubt be interesting to show the influence of the Bible in the works of the great authors. Dr. van Dyke has done this in the case of Tennyson. The preacher may use these as illustrations but why not go to the original source for his themes? Some of the books used by Dr. Stidger are worth while but that can hardly be said of *The Woman of Knockaloe*. Hall Caine wrote this story as a protest against war and it is overweighted with sentiment and hysterical, but the cowardly suicide of the English woman and her German lover is in this book made the conclusion of a "great story of undying love and an illustration of the words of the Almighty 'I have loved thee with an everlasting love'."

It is impossible to understand why the book *The Autobiography of Judas Iscariot* should be selected as a theme for a sermon. It is of course an old story that Judas never meant to cause the death of his Lord and that he was converted at the Cross, but the Bible says he took his own life and Peter said he went to his own place. Presumably Peter knew as much about him as a man writing twenty centuries later.

There is a curious blunder quoted in the sermon on William Allen White's *Life of Woodrow Wilson*. Mr. White asserts that President Wilson had two strains of blood, the Scotch and Irish, in his veins, and these accounted for his different moods. This proves that when Mr. White writes Biography, he knows a great deal about his subject which is not true. There was not one drop of Irish blood in President Wilson's veins.

Elkins Park, Pa.

RICHARD MONTGOMERY.

Psychology for Bible Teachers. By EDWARD ALDRIDGE ARNETT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1925. Pp. xii. 241. \$1.50.

This volume, one of the "Life and Religion Series" edited by Frank K. Sanders and Henry A. Sherman, aims to present without technical terminology "the psychological laws which govern the unfolding of human personality." It is written for Sunday School teachers, parents, religious educators, and all who deal with rapidly growing minds, and who wish guidance in sound and efficient methods of instruction. It fulfills its aim most excellently. The topics treated are the relation of mind and body, sensation and perception, association and memory, imagination, instinct, the subconscious and unconscious, suggestion, heredity, habit, intelligence, feeling, motives and ideals, will, conscience, conversion, character, and home training. At the end of the book is a selected list of reference material with review questions and topics for research and discussion, but unfortunately there is no index.

Here and there are certain inconsistencies of exposition—for example, what is the connection between the statements that "the mind is com-

posed of units which are sense impressions" (p. 11), and "the instincts, call them what we will, form the groundwork of the whole structure of the mind" (p. 49)? Again, we find it impossible to agree with the very confident commendation of the Freudian hypothesis of the unconscious, the revelatory nature of dreams, the dangers of suppressed instinct and emotion, with the Coué view of autosuggestion, etc., in view of the fact that the majority of psychologists who are generally taken as authorities are exceedingly hesitant in accepting these assumptions, and indeed not infrequently call them mythical fancies. In other words Freudism is to sober scientific psychology as osteopathy and chiropractic are to sober scientific medical orthodoxy.

Nevertheless the author has produced a book that is clear, interesting, and instructive, well suited to be a manual for him who would teach himself or others.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Church Monthly, New York, October: J. G. H. BARRY, Has the Episcopal Church a Future?; MARSHALL B. STEWART, Prospects of the Catholic Movement; A. PHILIP McMAHON, What will become of Religious Journalism?; EDWIN S. FORD, Are we extending the Church to the Country Districts?; FLOYD W. TOMKINS, JR., Cross Currents in the Tide of Christian Unity. *The Same*, November: SIDNEY DARK, The Crisis in the English Church; CHRISTOPHER CHESIRE, Importance of Belief; E. EDMUND SEYZINGER, The Bible: its Nature and Purpose. *The Same*, December: GEORGE P. CHRISTIAN, Pathways of the Little Poor Man; FRANCIS J. HALL, The Idea of God; THOMAS R. DAWLEY, JR., The Chief Trouble with Mexico; F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, Outline of Christianity.

American Journal of Philology, Baltimore, September: MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, On Organized Brigandage in Hindu Fiction; G. L. HENDRICKSON, Cicero's Correspondence with Brutus and Calvus on Oratorical Style; ROBERT G. NISBET, *Justae Quibus est Mezentius Irae*; ETHEL M. STEUART, Some Notes on Roman Tragedy.

Anglican Theological Review, Lancaster, October: GILBERT RITTER, Problems and Tasks of the Modern Pulpit; FRANCIS J. HALL, Requirements for Reunion; CLARENCE A. MANNING, The Theology of Bishop Nikolaj; MAURICE CLARKE, The Church School Opening Service.

Biblical Review, New York, October: R. BIRCH HOYLE, Spirit in St. Paul's Experience and Writings; H. M. DUBOSE, Amurru and the Genesis Stories; G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, Biblical Homiletics; Introduction and Conclusion; E. G. SIHLER, The Religion of Rome at the Beginning of the Christian Era; JUNIUS B. REMENSNYDER, Seventh Centenary of St. Francis of Assisi.

Bibliotheca Sacra, St. Louis, October: MELVIN G. KYLE, Excavations at Kirjath Sepher; GEORGE L. YOUNG, Final Fate of the Wicked; F. D.

JENKINS, Germany's New Paradox Theology; WILLIAM W. EVARTS, Coincidences between the Old Hebrew and other Literatures.

Canadian Journal of Religious Thought, Toronto, September-October: R. P. BOWLES, Theology; ERNEST THOMAS, Tennyson's View of the Evolution Debate; JOHN T. McNEILL, John Knox, Destroyer and Builder; GEORGE L. HURST, Christian Literature; A. M. POPE, The All Embracing Faith. *The Same*, November-December: J. A. LINDSAY, A Layman's View of Modernism; A. J. JOHNSTON, The Secularization of Life; C. K. CUMMINGS, The Preaching of Yesterday and The Preaching of Tomorrow; J. H. PHILP, The Seeming Egotism of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel; H. T. F. DUCKWORTH, Christianity under the Crescent; R. B. Y. SCOTT, The Expectation of Elijah.

Catholic Historical Review, Washington, July: NICOLAUS PFEIFFER, Doctrine of International Law according to Francis de Victoria; MARY C. McMAHON, The Astrée and its Influence; M. BARBARA, Napoleon Bonaparte and the Restoration of Catholicism in France. *The Same*, October: MARY J. ALOYSIUS, Peace Laws and Institutions of Medieval France; LAURENCE J. KENNY, America—a Land of Destiny.

Congregational Quarterly, London, October: H. M. PAULL, Originality in Sermons; JOHN LEE, Spiritual Law in the Economic World; T. H. DARLOW, The Price of Bibles; ALEX. McINNES, The Gospel of the Apostolic Church; W. C. NORTHCOTT, A Summer Student-Pastorate; J. C. GREGORY, Science and Realism; W. H. JACOBSEN, The Religion of the Man in the Pulpit; ATHERTON MERCER, Menace of Islam; GEORGE WALKER, Drink and Colour: South Africa's Inter-related Problems.

Crozer Quarterly, Philadelphia, October: GEORGE W. RICHARDS, Is Church Union Attainable?; DANIEL G. STEVENS, The Hearts that Cradled the Christ; BEN L. BAKER, China's New Revolution—Its Significance for American Christianity; ARTHUR E. HOLT, The Contribution of Sociology to the Making of the Minister; EUGENE E. AYRES, Baptists and their Worship; ERNEST E. CHAVE, Assets and Liabilities of a Modern Minister.

Expositor, Cleveland, October: FRANK W. BOREHAM, Setting the Mob to Music; J. H. DEFEW, Broadcasting Sacred Music; JOHN F. WILLIAMSON, Music and the Church Today; W. E. M. HACKLEMAN, Solo and Concerted Music in the Church Service; C. HAROLD LOWDEN, Successful Church School Music; GAMBA CELESTE, Music of a Devotional Character. *The Same*, November: F. W. BOREHAM, A Sword Bathed in Heaven; F. W. NORWOOD, My Gospel; JUNIUS B. REMENSNYDER, The Newly Discovered Portrait of Christ; ALVAH E. KNAPP, Some Problems of the Modern Home; OSCAR E. SEYD, Church Advertising. *The Same*, December: WM. R. GLEN, Christmas in Music; LEWIS KEAST, Beginning at Bethlehem; JOHN A. HUTTON, A Way to Escape; G. R. SMITH, The Rural Church Problem; W. A. TYSON, Attractions of the Rural Pastorate.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, September: J. F. McFADYEN, Parable of the Unjust Steward; F. HERBERT STEAD, Idea of God in the Psalms; J. DAVIES BRYAN, To Take Up the Cross; J. RENDEL HARRIS, Influence

of Philo on the New Testament. *The Same*, October: W. A. CURTIS, The Parable of the Labourers; F. HERBERT STEAD, Idea of God in the Psalms, ii.; W. R. INGE, 'Private Vices' and 'Public Benefits.' *The Same*, November: C. J. CADOUX, Judaism and Universalism in the Gospels; B. VERNON BIRD, Broadcasting in Old Testament Times; S. LANGDON, Recent Excavations in Mesopotamia, 1919-1926; J. RENDEL HARRIS, Early Christian Interpretation of the Passover.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, July: HENRY A. SANDERS, An Early Papyrus Fragment of the Gospel of Matthew in the Michigan Collection; GUSTAV KRÜGER, The "Theology of Crisis"; KIRSOPP LAKE and ROBERT P. CASEY, Text of the De Incarnatione of Athanasius; ROBERT P. BLAKE, Ancient Georgian Versions of the Old Testament.

Homiletic Review, New York, October: ROBERT G. ARMSTRONG, The Pastor Talks with the Organist; HENRY P. SMITH, How far should Resignation be Carried?; ROLLIN L. HARTT, The Revolution in Divinity School Training; JOHN R. COWAN, Four Remarkable Bible Dramas; A Code of Ethics for Ministers. *The Same*, November: OLIVER LODGE, What is Truth?; The Minister and Books; JOHN RICHELSEN, Shall we Abolish Thanksgiving Day?; ALVA W. TAYLOR, The Ecclesiastical Strike in Mexico; JOHN R. SCOTFORD, Psychoanalysis and the Minister; CHARLES MACK, Can we Visualize God? *The Same*, December: A Thrilling Missionary Story; EDWIN A. HUNTER, The Kind of Pastor the People Want; JOHN W. BUCKHAM, What the Theologian has to say to the Preacher; SAMUEL CROWTHER, A Scientist's God; ALVA W. TAYLOR, The Church and the Color Line.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, October: ISRAEL EFROS, Studies in pre-Tibbonian Philosophical Terminology; ABRAHAM DANON, Documents relating to the History of the Karaites in Turkey in Europe.

Journal of Biblical Literature, New Haven, 45:3-4: ROBERT H. PFEIFFER, Images of Yahweh; JULIUS A. BEWER, On the Text of Ezekiel 7:5-14; GEORGE R. BERRY, Messianic Predictions; HENRY P. SMITH, Moslem and Christian Polemic; MORDECAI M. KAPLAN, Isaiah 6:1-11; KARL BUDDE, Zu Text und Auslegung des Buches Hosea 1.2; NATHANIEL SCHMIDT, The Numen of Peniel; JULIUS BOEHMER, Die erste Seligpreisung; HENRY J. CADBURY, Lexical Notes on Luke-Acts, iii.; G. R. DRIVER, The Aramaic Language; NATHANIEL SCHMIDT, Recent Study of the term 'Son of Man'.

Journal of Negro History, Washington, October: JAMES S. RUSSELL, Economic Progress of the Negro in Virginia; FRED A. SHANNON, The Federal Government and the Negro Soldier in 1861-1865; FRANK W. PITMAN, Slavery in the British West India Plantations in Eighteenth Century.

Journal of Religion, Chicago, September: JAMES H. TUFTS, A University Chapel; DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, The Meaning of God in Modern Religion; STEWART G. COLE, What is Religious Experience?; CHARLES A. BENNETT, Worship in its Philosophical Meaning; JOHN T. MCNEILL, Interpretation of Protestantism during the past Quarter-Century.

Journal of Theological Studies, Oxford, July: A. WILMART, Easter

Sermons of St. Augustine; E. A. LOWE, Vatican MS of the Gelasian Sacramentary and its Supplement at Paris; R. P. CASEY, Naassenes and the Ophites; P. R. COLEMAN-NORTON, Use of Dialogue in the *Vitae Sanctorum*; P. BATIFFOL, D'une prétendue représentation de la *Cathedra Petri* sur un sarcophage du Musée du Latran; P. GARDNER-SMITH, Date of the Gospel of Peter; T. SYMONS, Introduction of Monks at Christ Church, Canterbury.

London Quarterly Review, London, October: C. J. WRIGHT, Is Christianity the Final Religion?; R. ERSKINE OF MARR, A Day of Judgment; IVAN D. ROSS, The Chinese Wheel; ALLEN LEA, Native Separatist Churches; ARTHUR S. GREGORY, Meaning of Belief in a Personal God.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, October: WALTER N. MYERS, Ancient and Medieval Latin Hymns; EMIL E. FISCHER, Apologetics and Modern Trends of Religious Thought—iii. Person of Christ; JOHN O. EVJEN, Luther's Ideas concerning Polity; DAVID G. JAXHEIMER, How Modern Psychology Aids the Efficiency of Memory Work.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, July: ABDUL R. WENTZ, Lutheran Church in the Foundations of America; W. J. FINCK, Lutheranism South of the Potomac; CHARLES J. HINES, Beginnings of English Lutheranism in Baltimore; JUNIUS B. REMENSNYDER, Dr. Moffatt's Translation of the Old Testament.

Missionary Review of the World, New York, October: SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, Islamic World and Missions Today; JULIUS RICHTER, Rise and Fall of Islam; JAMES L. BARTON, Moslems Breaking away from Tradition; J. KINGSLEY BIRGE, Mohammedan Boys and Girls; Moslems under Christian and non-Christian Rulers; H. E. PHILIPS, Some Moslem Views of Christianity; C. G. NAISH, Hindrances to Christian Work for Moslems. *The Same*, November: THOMAS E. BARBER, Does South America Need Missionaries?; CHARLES H. SEARS, Western Front of World Missions; A Notable Conversion from Islam; JAMES CANTINE, A New Enterprise in Mesopotamia; Mrs. WALTER B. WILLIAMS, A House by a West African Road. *The Same*, December: EMORY W. LUCCOCK, A Missionary View of the Chinese Situation; HENRY H. MEYER, Near East Children of the Golden Rule; BASIL MATHEWS, Islam and Western Civilization; C. J. HALL, Triumphs among the Sumatra Cannibals.

Monist, Chicago, October: C. LLOYD MORGAN, Influence and Reference; R. F. ALFRED HOERNLE, Idealism and Evolutionary Naturalism; M. C. OTTO, Instrumentalism; HAROLD R. SMART, Logical Theory; WILBUR M. URBAN, Value Theory and Aesthetics; HENRY W. WRIGHT, Ethics and Social Philosophy; B. M. LAING, Hume and the Contemporary Theory of Instinct; A. A. ROBACK, Psychology as an American Science.

Moslem World, New York, October: ARTHUR JEFFERY, Quest of the Historical Mohammed; JENS CHRISTENSEN, New Afganistan; W. G. GREENSLADE, Roman Catholic Literature in Arabic on Islam; S. KHUDA BUKHSH, Mohammedan View of Islam and Christianity; G. E. ZOCKLER, What the Shiahs Teach their Children.

New Church Life, Lancaster, October: R. J. TILSON, The Ancient World; W. F. PENDLETON, Leading into Temptation; HUGO L.J. ODHNER, Sources of Early Christian Thought, ii. *The Same*, November: T. S. HARRIS, The Whirlwind; HUGO L.J. ODHNER, Following the Multitude; E. E. IUNGERICH, Remains. *The Same*, December: ALBERT J. BJÖRCK, The Visible God of the New Church; HUGO L.J. ODHNER, Why and How the Word Conjoins with Heaven.

Open Court, Chicago, September: W. G. BLAIKIE MURDOCH, A Life and a Way of Life; IVOR B. HART, Factors in the Transition from Mediaeval to Modern Science; VICTOR S. YARROS, Social Science; Subjectivism, and the Art of Thinking; F. W. FITZPATRICK, The "Pursuit of Happiness"; T. B. STORK, The Solipsism of Religion; HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND, Environment and Character. *The Same*, October: GLADYS B. KIRBY and FRANK M. RICH, Asoka: the Peerless Monarch of India; GEORGE H. DAUGHERTY, JR., The Indian Reveals his Character; HARVEY M. WATTS, As a Naturalist Sees it; HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND, A Thorough Aesthetic Education. *The Same*, November: MRS. HENRY HULST, On Greek Religion; VICTOR S. YARROS, Science, Religion and the New Humanism; J. ALAN JENKINS, Understanding Japan; GEORGE H. DAUGHERTY, JR., Motives of Indian Speeches and Songs.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, July: RAY H. DOTTERER, Tendencies in American Philosophy; H. A. FESPERMAN, Is the World Growing Better?; A. E. TRUXAL, Unity and Continuity; ALFRED N. SAYRES, Fundamentals of the Christian Religion; A. ZIMMERMAN, John 1:1-18, and Genesis 1; A. S. ZERBE, Fossil Men and Modern Men; ALBERT G. PETERS, The Family as the Primary Social Unit.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, October: W. O. CARVER, "Foreign Missions," the New Era and the New Method; F. M. POWELL, Baptist Progress from Roger Williams to the Present Time; H. J. FLOWERS, Salvation from Sin in the Teaching of Jesus; A. D. BELDEN, Prayer and the Soul; CHARLES H. NASH, Stephen, the Model Layman.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, October: THOMAS C. JOHNSON, Walter W. Moore—Sketch of his Life and Labors; BENJAMIN R. LACY, JR., A Look Backward and Forward; WILLIAM R. MILLER, A Great Executive; A. D. P. GILMOUR, Dr. Moore—the Ideal Teacher; JAMES I. VANCE, A Man Sent from God; J. G. MCALLISTER, Walter W. Moore in the Field of Literature; A. M. FRASER, Servant of Christ and His Church; JOHN S. MUNCE, A Many-sided Life.

Yale Review, New Haven, October: WILBUR C. ABBOTT, Democracy or Dictatorship; WILLARD L. SPERRY, Religion in Contemporary America; DON MARQUIS, The Men Who Make the Newspapers; VALESKI BARI, From Minimum Wage to Mass Production; W. J. HAIL, The Chinese Enigma; STARK YOUNG, Realism in the Theater; F. B. LUQUIGENS, Jeremiad of a Modern Language Teacher.

Bilychnis, Roma, Luglio: R. MURRI, Volontà e personalità; M. FAVILLI, Il pensiero etico di P. Charron. *The Same*, Ag.-Sette.: C. FORMICHI, Lungo i "Ghat" di Benares; G. GLÄSSER, L'irrazionalismo religioso di S. Kierkegaard; G. E. MEILLE, Trittico spirituale: la lettura, la medita-

zione, la preghiera. *The Same*, Ottobre: M. MARESCA, I presupposti gnoseologici dell'idealismo attualistico; M. FAVILLI, Il pensiero religioso di Pierre Charron.

Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, Toulouse, Juillet-Octobre: LOUIS SALTET, Les faux d'Adémar de Chabannes; PIERRE J. MONBRUN, La "Rhetorique" de Pascal; XAVIER DUCROS, Chronique de philosophie.

Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Septiembre-Octubre: M. BARBADO, Correlaciones del entendimiento con el organismo; VICENTE BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Los manuscritos de Santo Tomás en Biblioteca Real de Madrid; ALBERTO COLUNGA, La ley mosaica y los sentidos de la Sagrada Escritura según Santo Tomás. *The Same*, Noviembre-Diciembre: ANTONIO G. PELÁEZ, La sanción penal en la moral tomista; MAXIMILIANO CANAL, El padre fray Andrés Pérez de León; TOMÁS S. PERCANCHO, Desorientación de una clase; VICENTE BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Crónica del movimiento tomista.

Estudis Franciscans, Barcelona, Setembre: FRATER LEO, Gaudi . . . genial en tot; J. RIUS, La confraria de Santa Eulàlia del Camp; ETIENNE GILSON, Saint Thomas et la pensée franciscaine. *The Same*, Octubre: MODEST DE MIERES, El dogma de la Comunió dels Sants; FERMIN DE LA-COT, Evangelio de San Lucas; MIQUEL D'ESPLUGUES, Preliminars de la Vocació de Sant Francesc. *The Same*, Novembre: MIQUEL D'ESPLUGUES, Per una Major eficàcia de la filosofia cristiana; LIVORIUS OLIGER, Revelacions de Santa Elisabeth; FREDEGAND D'ANVERS, La Joventut joiosa de Sant Francesc.

Etudes Théologiques et Religieuses, Montpellier, Septembre: HENRI BOIS, La méthode en psychologie; EDOUARD BRUSTON, L'alphabet sinaïtique; GABRIEL BOUTTIER, Le témoignage du Sadhou Sundar Singh (suite); L. DE SAINT-ANDRE, Les miracles catholiques: Lourdes. *The Same*, Novembre: E. DOUMERGUE, L'agonie de Calvin; HENRI BOSCH, Les conceptions du Code civil et leur évolution; JACQUES BOIS, Sur une récente critique du théisme néocriticiste d'Hamelin.

Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift, Aalten, Sept.: G. CH. AALDERS, Het Bijbelsch Wereldbeeld, het Paradijsverhaal en de tekstkritiek; H. W. VAN DER VAART SMIT, Handhaving der critiek. *The Same*, Oct.: JOHN WILLCOCK, Ecclesiastical affairs in Scotland in 1926; G. VAN DER ZEE, Gegevens uit het kerkelijk archief van Hagestein. *The Same*, Nov.: W. J. A. SCHOUTEN, Wereldbeeld en Exegese; N. D. VAN LEEUWEN, Iterum Contra.

Journal Asiatique, Paris, Janvier-Mars: M. J. PRZYLUCKI, Un ancien peuple du Penjab; M. M. CANARD, Les expéditions des Arabes contre Constantinople dans l'histoire et dans la légende; M. R. SCHWAB, Le Zend-Avesta l'exemplaire d'Anquetil-Duperron.

Logos, Napoli, Aprile-Giugno: P. GATTI, Filosofia del linguaggio; N. ABBAGNANO, L'idealismo inglese contemporaneo, iii.; F. ALBEGGIANI, Il naturalismo di G. M. Guyau; M. GALDI, Un passo poco noto del de excessu Satyri di S. Ambrogio e il simbolismo cristiano della Fenice.

Nieuwe Theologische Studiën, Wageningen, Juni: Preekshets; H. M. VAN NES, Zending onder Joden, Heidenen en Mohammedanen en Inwendige Zending. *The Same*, September: A. H. EDELKOORT, Genesis

14; A. KLINKENBERG, De plaats der Evangeliën in het Nieuwe Testament; M. VAN RHIJN, Nieuwe Literatuur over Kerkgeschiedenis.

Nouvelle Revue Théologique, Tournai, Septembre-Octobre: EMILE DELAYE, La Vie de la Grâce; JEAN-MARIE AUBRY, Saint Paul écrivain; J. M. DE BUCK, Le bienheureux Juan de Avila et les Jésuites espagnols. *The Same*, Novembre: EMILE DELAYE, L'onction du Saint-Esprit; CHANOINE CERFAUX, Saint Paul et l'Unité de l'Eglise.

Onder Eigen Vaandel, Wageningen, October: F. C. W. L. SCHULTE, Heerlijkheid; N. G. VELDHOF, Athanasius en de Melitianen; TH. L. HAITJEMA, De Asser Synode en het Schriftgezag.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Octobre: JULES LEBRETON, La Connaissance de Dieu chez saint Irénée; JACQUES DE BLIC, Sur la récente édition de Gandulphe de Bologne; JEAN CALÈS, Les Psaumes d'Asaph. *The Same*, Décembre: LUCIEN CERFAUX, La Gnose simonienne; E. MERSCH, Une leçon défectueuse dans le texte des "Enarrationes in Psalmos" de Saint Augustin?

Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, Toulouse, Octobre: J. DE GUILBERT, Gouter Dieu, servir Dieu; A. TENNESON, Présence de Dieu, Venues de Dieu; P. GALTIER, Temples du Saint-Esprit.

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, Louvain, Octobre: J. CARREYRE, Le Jansénisme pendant les premiers mois de la Régence; É. TOBAC, Le problème de la justification dans saint Paul et dans saint Jacques.

Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses, Strasbourg, Juillet-Aout: J. PANNIER, Calvin et l'épiscopat; P. SCHERDING, La théologie de Karl Barth; P. DUCROS, De la Vendetta à la loi du talion; MAURICE GOGUEL, Une nouvelle méthode pour l'étude du problème johannique.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Mai-Juillet; ADRIEN NAVILLE, La croyance au surnaturel et la pensée scientifique; CLAUDE Secrétan, Trois opinions sur le rôle de l'hypothèse dans la recherche scientifique; JEAN LARGUIER DES BANCELS, La logique d'Aristote et le principe du tiers exclu.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris, Juillet: CH.-V. HÉRIS, La royauté du Christ; A. WILMART, Une Méditation théologique sur les bienfaits de l'ordre surnaturel.

Scholastik, Freiburg, 1:4: JOHN B. UMBERG, Liturgischer Stil und Dogmatik; JAKOB GEMMEL, Gegenwartsprobleme in der Nikomachischen Ethik; HERMANN LANGE, Marin-Sola, Báñez und Molina.

Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Gotha, 45:2: F. SCHNEIDER, Canossa; K. MÜLLER, Zur Mystik Hugos von St. Viktor; K. HAMPE, Eine unbekannte Konstitution Gregors IX; F. KÜCH, Zur Geschichte der Reliquien der Heiligen Elisabeth; L. OLIGER, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Spirituellen, Fratizellen und Clarener in Mittelitalien.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, 50:3: J. B. UMBERG, Die richterliche Bussgewalt nach John 20:23; A. MERK, Der armenische Irenaeus Adversus Haereses.

Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen, 7:5: THEODORE SIEGFRIED, Das Unbedingte und der Unbedingte; W. THIMME, Das Problem der Einigung der evangelischen Kirchen und Stockholm; R. PAULUS, Zum Problem "Glaube und Geschichte."

THE WORK OF THE PASTOR

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, D.D., LL.D. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. 1924, 8vo, pp. vii. 257.

"This volume is intended to serve as a handbook to pastors and as a textbook for students of theology. It should be found helpful, however, to many others who are concerned with the organization and activities of the Christian Church. . . . Large portions of the last five chapters have been furnished by other writers, who are recognized as specially trained and qualified for their tasks."

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WHAT IS FAITH?

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 263. Price \$1.75. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Price 7sh.6d.

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By FRANCIS L. PATTON, President of Princeton University 1888-1902, President of Princeton Theological Seminary 1902-1913. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926.

"This volume is the outcome of five familiar lectures delivered in 1924 on the James Sprunt Foundation in Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia. Though since expanded far beyond the limits allowed to lectures, the author prefers to keep the personal form of address; and ventures to hope that the additional matter may make the book more useful to ministers and laymen in various churches who by reason of contemporary controversy feel called upon to consider anew the meaning of Christianity."

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The Modern Debate about the Messianic Consciousness. By GEERHARDUS VOS, PH.D., D.D., Professor of Biblical Theology in Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926.

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Devotional Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit. By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, Professor of Practical Theology, Princeton Theological Seminary, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Princeton, New Jersey. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926.

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